893.00/7–3048
Memorandum by the Consul at Tsingtao (Strong)22
The following information regarding the loss by the Nationalists of Yenchowfu, in Western Shantung on the Tsinp’u Railway between Tsinan and Hsuchow, was obtained from American and other foreign missionaries who were present at Yenchowfu during the siege. Their reports, received separately, agree on the events leading up to the capture of the city by the Communists, on the behavior of the Nationalists, and on the situation prevailing for a few days thereafter.
The first threat against the city apparently developed about June 4. At that time a small amount of firing of small arms could occasionally be heard. Certain of the missionaries sent through a request to the Lutheran Mission in Shanghai for evacuation by that Mission’s plane. They thereupon took up residence near the airfield and waited until June 11 for the arrival of the aircraft. Later they learned that as a result of the reports by General Li Yu-tang, Commander of the 10th Pacification Area, concerning the “heavy fighting” in the vicinity of the airfield, apparently the Chinese Air Force refused permission for the plane to land. On June 11 one small shell fell on the airfield and some small arms firing was heard, not in volume, whereupon the garrison at the airfield hastily packed up all its arms and equipment, loaded them on trucks, and fled in disorder into the walled city. From June 11 until the evening of July 12 there was little serious fighting although each night the Nationalist defenders consumed considerable quantities of ammunition shooting at what appeared to be very small numbers of Communists using harassing tactics without seriously attempting to attack the city.
The defending forces consisted primarily of the 12th Army commanded by Ho Shou-yi and certain local troops. The numbers of men in each of these organizations is not accurately known although the observers stated that the city was crowded with soldiers. The relationship between General Li and General Ho was apparently very poor. General Ho gave the impression of being a much more reliable man than General Li and he was active in attempting to assure the internal security of Yenchowfu. For example, General Ho arrested the Staff Secretary of General Li and proved by documents found on him that he had a very close connection with the Communists. He also executed many other persons found guilty of activity on behalf of the Communists. At the beginning of the siege General Li made [Page 392] no pretense of attempting to direct military action against the Communists and during any firing by the Communists he took refuge in the basement of the dwelling in the Catholic Mission in which he maintained his headquarters.
Although his troops were expending ammunition uselessly, General Li continually informed Nanking that serious fighting was in progress and that he was running short of ammunition and food. On June 20 four Nationalist planes air-dropped 45 parachutes of ammunition per plane (probably over six tons total) and that night the Nationalists seemed to shoot it up more freely than before. From June 20 to July 12 an average of at least five planes per day dropped supplies of food, ammunition, and money to the garrison, and even continued dropping it on July 13 and 14 after the city had been abandoned.
Fighter aircraft occasionally made an appearance over the city and bombed and strafed without any coordination from the ground and with practically no effect whatsoever. After the Nationalists left the city the CAF23 bombed and destroyed the Catholic Cathedral and press. During the siege CAF planes occasionally dropped flares at night, but usually over the city and not where they might have done some good.
During the period of the K’aifeng campaign the bulk of the Communists appeared to have left the vicinity of Yenchowfu and the situation for several days was quiet. At 5:30 p. m., July 12, the Communists started a heavy artillery barrage with an estimated twenty-five guns of 75 caliber, and in two hours or so it created a small breach in the wall to the southwest. The local troops had been placed in the outer defenses, on the theory that “they had more reason to fight”. At 8 p. m. General Li called Nanking by radio in the presence of several Catholic priests and reported intense fighting, half the city in flames, et cetera, and that food, ammunition and money were desperately needed. By midnight some 30 Communists had gotten inside the city and found little organized resistance remaining. The Nationalist troops fled in all directions seeking only to save themselves individually, throwing away their weapons and failing to destroy any of the stocks of ammunition and other supplies which had been accumulated prior to and with the aid of the air-drops. General Li was one of the first to leave, disguising himself as a beggar, making his way to Tsining and then by boat to Hsuchow. From there he flew to Nanking, doubtless to report on, and receive honors for his valiant defense. General Ho evacuated in slightly better form, taking with him a fairly sizable group of troops and joining General Wang Yao-wu’s 84th Division then at T’aian.
[Page 393]It is reported that at no time did the Communists have more than 300 troops inside the city walls past the militia. Only one real fight occurred either outside or inside the city, when a group of about 50 militia men attacked a smaller group of Communists near the Catholic Mission, hoping thereby to attract to them others of the defenders, and to enable them to attempt to throw the small group of Communists out and continue to hold the city. However, this occurred between 8 a. m. and 11 a. m. in the morning of July 13, by which time the city had been almost completely abandoned both by soldiers and civilians. The militia men thereupon gave up their effort and made their escape.
During the so-called siege of Yenchowfu the garrison at Tsining apparently made no effort to support the troops at Yenchowfu, and approximately two days after the fall of Yenchowfu evacuated the city to the south without having a shot fired against them.
The Communists, using only their small group of soldiers inside the city, immediately began removing by truck the stocks of ammunition, food, and other supplies, which they found undamaged. One observer stated that she saw sixty truckloads removed from the city and that that was only a portion of what was taken out. The Communists seemed to be thoroughly organized. Each appeared to know exactly what he was expected to do. There were no moves made against either the foreigners or the remaining Chinese in the city. In fact the Catholic fathers were treated far better by the Communists than by General Li, who frequently was very unpleasant to them although he was accepting their hospitality. The Catholic and Protestant Missionaries approached the Communist Commander on July 14 to obtain permission to leave Yenchowfu for Shanghai. The permits were granted to all except the Nuns, believed to be twenty in number, on July 16, the day before the expected arrival of Communist Political Administrators for the city, and the priests were advised that they had better get out while the getting out was good before these officials took up their duties. The Nuns were required to stay in Yenchowfu to keep the Catholic hospital in operation. The Commander stated that he was granting some permits in order that foreigners might go to Shanghai and there report that the Communists were not so bad as they had been made out to be, and to state that they, the Communists, would be in Shanghai within one year, and that the foreign population need not be concerned since it would be well treated. At least one Japanese was seen in the Communist Commander’s Headquarters. The commander also stated that before the fall of Yenchowfu his particular forces had lacked only ammunition, that they were well organized, well disciplined, and in ample numbers. Now he declared the supplies captured in Yenchowfu would enable his force to attack any city in China with the assurance that it would fall to them. He declared that their next targets were Tsinan and Hsuchow. As a [Page 394] revealing sidelight he claimed that until the final attack only some 25 men had been employed each night to keep the Nationalist defenders on the walls stirred up and that they had used practically no ammunition, employing a type of cartridge which explodes in the air and gives the impression to the enemy that a rifle was fired at him in his near vicinity. An interesting commentary is that about half of the Communist artillery shells which were observed failed to detonate.
The missionaries left Yenchowfu on July 17 and arrived in Linch’eng, to the south, on the noon of July 20. En route they passed many deserted villages, many small groups of Communist troops, and large numbers of Nationalist troops who having been disarmed were being allowed by the Communists to return to their homes in Nationalist territory. Some of these Nationalist soldiers had even been given money by the Communists to provide subsistence for them on their journey. The Tsinp’u line was torn up between Yenchowfu and Linch’eng. At one village en route they found that the riffraff who had joined the Communist civil authorities had a free hand to do as they wished and were robbing the people at will. The missionaries were not molested at all during their journey by cart through Communist territory. On the trip they exchanged Chinese National currency for Communist currency at the rate of Communist $500 to CN $120,000. At the time they reached the last Communist post immediately outside the walls of Linch’eng, their baggage was not searched and they were allowed to proceed into the Nationalist lines without formality. The Nationalist lines were, as they described them, practically only a few paces from the Communist post. In Linch’eng they were placed aboard a train which had just transported considerable quantities of ammunition to that city. They were informed by residents there that the Nationalists were building up large stocks in Linch’eng and it was the general feeling that they were being accumulated solely to provide their enemies with a new supply in the not too distant future. One long train reached Linch’eng daily.
In Hsuchow they found that the railway to the south had been cut and having no desire to be caught again, they booked air passage immediately to Shanghai. While in Hsuchow they learned from persons who had fled from Lin-i (Ichowfu) in South Shantung, that Lin-i had been taken by the Communists without a fight after the Garrison Commander had required the people to tear down their homes and places of business adjacent to the city walls in order that they might not provide the Communists with cover during an assault. Despite these precautions the city was evacuated and the Communists were able to move in unopposed. The whereabouts of the garrison of Lin-i, which amounted to at least 10,000 troops, is unknown. They also learned that the only rail traffic out of Hsuchow is to Linch’eng, 25 miles to the north.
[Page 395]The missionaries reported that there had for some time been no will on the part of the Nationalist Garrison at Yenchowfu to fight. They believed apparently the propaganda issued by the Communists that they were fighting a war for the United States against the Soviet Union. The population, on the other hand, though not necessarily enamored of the idea of Communist control, felt that it had nothing to gain under the Nationalists and might well receive more consideration from the Communists. For several months during the spring and summer there were many deaths from starvation as a result of the requirement by the Nationalists that each 15 families provide three tons of wheat for the Garrison. It was practically impossible to supply this amount without stripping themselves of a means of existence. One of the ironies of the whole episode was that a number of people were killed by bags of rice which were dropped into the city without parachutes.
That the failure of the Nationalist forces at Kaifeng, Yenchowfu, and Lin-i, to make any defense against the Communists will be repeated time after time during the coming months must be assumed, with a snowballing effect. The Nationalist garrison at Yenchowfu, before the arrival of besieging Communist forces, made no attempt whatsoever to carry out training or maneuvers. The men were allowed to occupy themselves all day as they would. As a result they did not know what their tasks were or how to perform them. There was no coordination established between units. In addition, the Nationalist forces lacked communications equipment and it was, therefore, impossible for the Commander, even if he so wished, to keep properly in touch with his various units. This situation is probably the same in other areas in central and north China and is in contrast to the apparently excellent organization and morale of the regular Communist troops. One of the informants stated that a number of other smaller district seats in Shantung have fallen in a similar fashion without creating the deep impression made by the manner of loss of the larger cities named.
One of the informants stated that the head of the Presbyterian Mission in Hsuchow had been told quite “unashamedly” by a high Nationalist Army Officer that the troops had no intention of defending Hsuchow against the Communists if the Communists appeared stronger than the defending forces.
Under the circumstances the prospects of a successful defense of Tsinan and Hsuchow is very slight, and the creation of an offensive frame of mind in Nationalist commanders and troops is practically hopeless.