893.00/7–2748: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 27—4:59 a. m.]
1366. Embassy believes observation contained in Deptel 1054, July 21 is well taken. Embassy quite possibly placed undue emphasis on its appraisal of CCP weakness and increasing problems which it faces in areas now under its control. Peng said nothing additionally which would support Embassy’s deductions which were made largely on basis of information from other sources.
Embassy in referring to CCP weakness should have elaborated that it meant weakness in relation to previous Communist strength and not in relation to National Govt strength. Indications to date are that progressive deterioration in Govt position have increased Communist strength relatively though not absolutely. Soviet Ambassador is doubtless aware of this but Soviets may well conclude that cumulative effects of American aid during coming year may quite possibly reverse present trends.
Embassy agrees that repercussions and implications of Yugoslav developments must play a major and disturbing role in Soviet thinking. China would be no exception and might indeed cause graver concern than certain other areas because of distance of China from [Page 378] Moscow, because of traditional Chinese qualities of individualism and nationalism and because Communist efforts to take over all China are so far from being completed. In any such situation it is obviously to Soviet advantage that military attempts be abandoned in favor of political action.
Recent developments do indeed suggest that effort for a unified China may, at least temporarily, have been abandoned in favor of a system not unlike that adopted by Japanese in China. It is seldom that reference is made any more in North Shensi broadcasts to Manchuria which might suggest that that area is being subjected to a kind of integration and control which is so far not possible within China proper. Failure of a Communist spring offensive to materialize in Manchuria has been interpreted in generally well informed military circles as a result of a conflict over strategy between Lin Piao14 and Mao Tse-tung. At same time there has been an announcement of [consolidating] all Communist controlled areas in North Shensi [China] but south of Great Wall into one organization called North China Bureau. Communist armed forces in North China area have in recent weeks become active in all directions, probably with objective of eliminating as much Nationalist resistance as possible throughout area. If North China Bureau can consolidate its hold without assistance from Lin Piao, it seems hardly likely that Mao Tse-tung will subsequently be much disposed to submit to Manchurian direction. It should also be remembered that CCP support for Corn-inform action on Yugoslavia was couched in very general terms and that, as reported previously to Dept, comments by Chinese Communist spokesman in Hong Kong were notable mostly for their lack of enthusiasm.
Above comments should hardly be taken as definitive. While present indications suggest their validity, one should not make mistake of underestimating Soviet organizational ability and willingness to make most unscrupulous use of any instruments of coercion available. Whatever primary motivation, it seems hardly open to question now that Soviet purposes would best be served by cessation of hostilities and establishment of a coalition. By same token we are also convinced that coalition from standpoint of US would be worst thing which could happen since in addition to making complete and eventual Communist domination almost certain it would probably get a kind of international sanction to that Communist control.
Sent Dept., repeated Moscow as 54.
- Commander in Chief of Chinese Communist armies in Manchuria.↩