893.50 Recovery/7–2048

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

Subject: Comments on Mr. Chen Li-fu’s Memorandum9

Mr. Chen’s memorandum is a blend of Oriental self-abasement, veiled implications and an appeal for a “Marshall Plan for China”.

After accepting partial responsibility for the failure of the Kuomintang–Communist negotiations in 194610 and referring to “misunderstandings between us”, Mr. Chen states that he knew in advance that the negotiations would fail and that the Generalissimo had agreed with him. He expresses regret that he, who had failed in three attempts to negotiate with the Communists, was not able to be of greater assistance to you, “who made the fourth attempt”. He apparently overlooks the fact that the basis for the negotiations in 1946 was actually laid in the meetings held in Chungking in September 1945 between National Government and Communist representatives when agreement was reached on the calling of the Political Consultative Conference11 which met in January 1946 and reached agreement among the Chinese factions for a coalition government. The cessation of hostilities was the forerunner of this agreement and [Page 370] the agreement for the reorganization of the Chinese armed forces a necessary corollary to the political agreement reached by the Chinese themselves. Regardless of the reasons for the breakdown of the negotiations, events have in general followed the course predicted by you to the Generalissimo and other Government leaders in 1946—economic collapse would overtake them before they could prove their contention that they could destroy the Chinese Communists.

When Mr. Chen describes the United States as the “doctor” and China as the “dying patient”, he overlooks one fundamental factor—the patient can live only if there is the will to survive. The “doctor” in this case has demonstrated that he desires the patient to live and has given, and is giving, a considerable amount of medicine to that end. It is gratifying to note that Mr. Chen now realizes that new methods and practices, internal unity against the Communists and the introduction of needed reforms provide the fundamental answer to communism in China and that he is prepared to work with “one and all” toward these goals.

No action required.

W. W[alton] B[utterworth]
[Annex]

Memorandum by the Vice President of the Chinese Legislative Yuan (Chen) to the Secretary of State

Though I am on no official mission to call on you, I wish to avail myself of my present visit to the United States to have an informal talk, so that whatever differences there might be between us, resulting from the Chinese Government negotiations with the Communists a few years ago, might be cleared up.

If there should be any misunderstandings between us, I might have a chance to explain myself. If I have done anything wrong, I would concede my mistake and blame myself for it.

You will remember that in the course of your mediatory efforts, which lasted well over one year, I had the pleasure of chatting with you for only two short hours. I regret that I did not have ample opportunity to tell the life-and-death story of my struggle with the Communists for more than two decades. I am sure that you, as an impartial observer, would like to hear what I have to say before you deliver your final verdict. If I discover any mistakes on my part, I will gladly take on myself my share of the responsibility, and learn how to do better in years to come. For, I do not wish you to despair of the whole of China as a result of the mistakes which I, as an individual, might have committed. I am afraid that any such despair [Page 371] on your part might have the effect of placing the 460,000,000 Chinese people at the mercy of the Red Terror and of reducing China again from an independent country to a colonial status.

I have always felt regret that I did not insist, before the negotiations between the Chinese Government and the Communists took place, that a person of your stature should not be involved in the discussions. The Generalissimo agreed with me, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs thought otherwise. My experience with the Communists and with Russia had convinced me that these negotiations would run great danger of failure. Three times before we had tried. This made the fourth attempt. I knew in advance that the chances of disappointment were very high.

It will interest you to know that I later found out that the Central Political Council of the Communists had previously made a decision to enter the negotiations with the cynical intention of reaching no conclusion. Their declared object was to gain time for further military and political preparations. I asked Dr. Leighton Stuart to tell you to prepare for a breakdown in the negotiations. No compromise was possible when the typically opportunist mentality of the Communists prevailed.

My fault in the whole matter was that I did not insist strongly enough on seeing that the right thing was done, in respect to advising you in advance about the convictions I held.

One more point. The student uprisings which took place against the Communists were not of my doing, as some have alleged. These were a spontaneous outburst of patriotic feeling, which I was powerless to prevent.

It is a source of great regret to me—and I am profoundly sorry—that I, who had failed in three attempts to negotiate with the Communists, was not able to be of greater help to you, who made the fourth attempt. Yours was a sincere desire to aid my country and my people. If you had succeeded, it would have given China a period for reconstruction, and, I may add, for survival, which the Communists had no intention we should have.

You will recall that President Chiang Kai-shek led the Chinese people successfully in 1926 to overthrow the warlords, and later to unify the country, stem the rising tide of the Red menace, and resist the Japanese aggression. Will you please visualize China’s position. She has been the object of foreign encroachment for many years. She has been able to liberate herself, partly through her own efforts, and also by the generous assistance of her friends, especially the United States. Now at the end of eleven years of intermittent warfare her resources are exhausted. Her need of a helping hand is just as urgent as that of the thirteen colonies for French assistance during [Page 372] their War of Independence. Had the French withheld their support, the rich and prosperous United States which we see today might not be what it is.

It is my earnest hope that the Chinese people will remember you as their Lafayette. I may very well be forgotten by them, but you shall not. If the plan which is known by your name succeeds in Europe, as I have no doubt that it will, but no comparable success is forthcoming in Asia, then the gains which the democracies score in the west will not be able to sustain their losses in the east. In consequence of which, over 70,000,000 Chinese would suffer cruel death, calculating on the basis of the number of those killed by the Communists when they were in control of Kiangsi Province from 1928–1935.

A doctor would never see his patient die without raising a finger in a last desperate effort to save his life. To make the analogy complete, we should add that the patient is not only suffering from internal ailment but is also menaced by a group of gangsters, and that the doctor is widely known as a chivalrous gentleman. Under such circumstances I am sure the doctor will do everything in his power to protect his patient.

If you think that I can be of any help to you as the doctor in question, I will discard, in real earnest, all methods and practices that were in use during the period of political tutelage by the Kuomintang, because they are incompatible with the requirements of the constitutional age which has now begun. No matter how others may treat me, I will do my utmost to promote internal unity and present a united front against the Communists.

I will work with one and all to bring about the much needed land reform, to infuse a new spirit of cooperation in the Kuomintang, and to introduce measures into the Legislative Yuan, looking towards the socializing and rational distribution of wealth. I am of the opinion that it is only through these means that the fundamental reason for the existence of the Chinese Communists can be removed and China can expect to have a new lease of life.

  1. Infra.
  2. For correspondence on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1946, volumes ix and x.
  3. For correspondence on this subject, see ibid., 1945, vol. vii, pp. 455 ff.