893.00/7–1548: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 15—8:21 a. m.]
1299. As further evidence of the probable Soviet policy in China, Soviet Ambassador96 recently had a 6–hour conversation on Chinese civil war with the new Minister of the Interior. Peng Chao-hsien, incidentally, once spent several years in Moscow at the Chung Shan97 University. The Ambassador urged that the war be brought to an end for the sake of all concerned. Peng said he replied that two points would have to be safeguarded: (1) There must be no encroachments on Chinese sovereignty and (2) that China could not desert the US, its war-time ally. This second point referred to the Ambassador’s proposal that China maintain her complete independence. Peng says he sensed a certain distrust of the Chinese Communists, apparently fearing they might take a course of action similar to that of Tito. He says he also sensed a Soviet unwillingness to fight on two fronts.
Peng added to his conviction that the ideal solution would be a joint US-Soviet mediation which would end the military phase of the conflict.
It is our opinion that three conclusions can be drawn from this approach by the Soviet Ambassador: [Page 361]
- 1.
- Soviets are seriously concerned by their estimate of the extent to which American aid will strengthen the National Government.
- 2.
- There is a growing body of evidence that the Chinese Communists are weaker than would appear superficially; that they are faced with mounting problems for armament and food stuffs; and that they are in a far better position than are we to evaluate their basic weakness which they compare with their estimate of potential Nationalist strength and are therefore desirous of ending hostilities before the Communists suffer any major defeat.
- 3.
- The Soviets on various occasions during the last 2 or 3 years have been known to express doubts and at times even scorn of the Chinese Communists. Their direct experience of working with them in Manchuria may well have done very little if anything to increase their respect for them.
In any event, we believe there will be other Soviet approaches to the Chinese Government on the basis of Soviet assistance as a mediator either singly or jointly with the US. It is our conviction that any such mediation will be calculated to advance Soviet interests to the detriment of the US.
Sent Department as 1299.
Department pass-to Moscow as 48.