893.00/7–548
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 12.]
Sir: I have the honor to report developments in the revolutionary movement of Marshal Li Chi-shen who for some time past has had his headquarters in Hong Kong. Mr. Richard M. Service of our Consulate General staff there is in frequent contact with him or his representatives [Page 337] and reports that he is quite anxious to have American cooperation in this undertaking. Mr. Service has the impression that Marshal Li is working hard and is confident of success. He intends to declare himself openly before the American November elections as the head of the “Southwestern Provisional Government”, with headquarters probably in Kueilin though they refuse to divulge this feature. He apparently counts on the support of Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch’ung-hsi, and they are of course all fellow-provincials. He looks forward to a new P. C. C. agreement and revised Constitution followed by a Coalition Government with the Communist Party participating.
A few weeks ago Marshal Li wrote me expressing his desire to talk with me and implying that it was not impossible to reach an understanding with the C. P. After some reflection I showed the letter to President Chiang whose first remark after reading it was that he wondered how closely in contact the writer really was with the C. P. I replied that I was much more concerned with his own ability to ignore all personal or political estrangements among non-Communists and rally them in a supreme effort to end the internal conflict. He left me free to reply to the letter at my discretion but advised me not to write a personal reply. I wrote Mr. Service asking him to acknowledge the receipt of the letter verbally and to assure the writer of my readiness to learn whatever he saw fit to tell me. I am informed that both Marshal Li and his lieutenant were visibly disappointed at not receiving a signed letter from me.
We have been approached as to the possibility of our transporting two very important members of the Nanking Government to Hong Kong, whose names as yet are undisclosed. This may be more of a desire to involve us than because of the exigencies of air travel.
A few days ago an agent of Marshal Li’s stopped by to see me on his return from Peiping. He mentioned the names of several men whom I happened to know as ardent supporters of Li Tsung-jen which adds some color to the assertions that the Vice-President is associated with the movement. He also wished to get some indication of the probable American attitude. I replied that it seemed to me much more important for them to ascertain the real attitude of the C.P. toward a negotiated peace, the demands they would make, etc., and to determine their own policy in the light of what they could thus-learn. We Americans desired to help toward whatever would result in a united, peaceful, prosperous and truly democratic China.
These minor details are reported because the Li Chi-shen revolt may gain rapidly in strength in view of the increasing unpopularity of President Chiang even among government officials and the general expectation of his approaching fall from power. In such an atmosphere [Page 338] many who would otherwise be loyal may question the value of such fidelity and many more will follow their opportunistic instincts. In short we must be prepared for the possibility that this movement may gain rapidly in volume once it has announced its program and succeeded in forcing the President’s retirement. Its declared aim is in effect a reform within the Kmt and the enforcement of the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen. Whether the Vice President would become President by constitutional procedure we can only speculate.
American interest in this movement is primarily perhaps in its bearing on the spread of Chinese Communism. General Barr and his associates envisage a two and a half-year plan in which to rid China of armed rebellion. Even assuming that the Chinese leaders accept and are able to act according to the advice given in carrying out such an over-all plan, any realistic appraisal of its feasibility must include the present fiscal and psychological factors. On the other hand, a revolt within the Kmt that in order to achieve success compromises too easily with the C.P. may prove disastrous. In this turbulent situation I shall do my best to learn of further developments and to keep you informed.
Respectfully yours,