711.93/1–1548
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to
the Secretary of State
No. 17
Nanking, January 15,
1948.
[Received January 27.]
Sir: I have the honor to report three recent
conversations which have helped me to formulate a suggestion as to a
possible American policy.
[Page 38]
Dr. S. Y. Ch’u is the closest associate of Dr. James Yen72 and always acts for him in his
absence. The latter had cabled me that Dr. Ch’u, who was returning from
the UNESCO73 Conference in Mexico
City, had an important message for me. The substance of this, according
to Dr. Ch’u, is that Dr. Yen had been in consultation with you about
certain measures of social betterment in selected areas which would
involve about six dollars per capita. You were described as being
sufficiently interested to have asked Dr. Yen to stay on in the United
States in order to work this out in further detail. Dr. Ch’u will
probably report the scheme to President Chiang.
Mr. Hu Lin of the Ta Kung Pao has just returned from three weeks in
Szechuen. He described that province as largely dominated by the Ke Lao
Hui, the Szechuen section of an ancient secret society known as the Hung
Pang. In that province it is in the control of the feudalistic landlord
class. It is wooed by all parties but dislikes the Government, though it
would probably resist the Communists if they attempted to enter the
province. These last have infiltrated rather widely as may be seen from
the clarity of their broadcasts which implies a local origin. One
well-known leader, Hsu Hsiang-chien74 when he withdrew from North Szechuen
years ago carried away with him many local boys who having been
carefully trained are now back there as political operatives. Despite
rumors that Liu Po-cheng75 is planning to move westward into
Szechuen, Mr. Hu discounts these on the ground that the Communists have
more to gain at present by consolidating themselves in Central China.
Mr. Hu went on to discuss general conditions in the country. He sees so
many signs of progress that he cannot share in the prevalent pessimism.
There is much more interest in public affairs and this is more
intelligent. In the spread of new ideas, in technological planning, in
everything indeed except in politics, he discerns rapid advance. Even if
this Government should disintegrate and the Communists take over, they
would not last long. The heritage from the past, modified by
newly-acquired skills and disciplines, would assert itself and would
from the present ferment work out new social and political patterns. As
to President Chiang himself he had come to feel that he was too old and
too fixed in his habits to meet the new requirements, especially in view
of those closest to him and their following, all bound together by
essentially the same concepts and by economic loyalties. He thought that
the most hopeful solution would be the election of Marshal Li
Tsung-jen76
[Page 39]
as Vice President next March or
April after which President Chiang might go abroad for several months.
Meanwhile, the Government might be completely reorganized and the
President return refreshed and broadened by this experience to resume
his duties with recovered public goodwill and without the incubus of his
former comrades.
This brings up again the old problem of President Chiang himself. His
personal prestige is lower now than I have ever known it before. This,
together with the worsening military and fiscal situation, widespread
anti-Government sentiment, and the almost universal despairing or
defeatist attitude, all point to the downfall of this Government in the
not distant future unless something radical can be done very soon. Nor
can any amount of American money or military aid accomplish by itself
what is needed. I still believe, however, that if President Chiang could
catch the vision of a radically new social and political approach to the
problem and resolve to act accordingly this, supplemented by American
advisory and material assistance, and publicity capable of awakening his
people as to what the issues really are, would rally popular sentiment
and reverse the present downward trend. No Chinese dares to talk frankly
with him to this effect. I have repeatedly suggested his leading in a
new revolutionary movement of this nature. He listens and smilingly nods
assent but does nothing. More especially in recent months I have been on
guard against seeming to imply that the taking of such advice would
ensure American aid. But something must be done to break through his
inhibitions or matters will get rapidly worse. It occurs to me that if
Dr. Yen could be summoned by him to report on his progress in America
and win him to the idea, and if there could at the same time be a
somewhat more definite assurance of American aid, this might enable him
to make the long-awaited decision. If he remains irresolute or adheres
stubbornly to his habitual methods, the next best course might be the
legal election of a good Vice President and his own voluntary retirement
for an indefinite period.
In further reference to my telegram no. 59 of January 9, 1948, 2 p. m.,
regarding a conversation between General Chang Chih-chung and the Soviet
Military Attaché, General N. V. Roschin, the following was reported to
me yesterday by General Cheng Kai-min.77 General Roschin
before he left China called on Mr. Shao Li-tse78 and told him that the civil war in China ought to
be stopped, that this could be done if the Chinese Government would
invite Russia to mediate. The Government leaders have inferred that this
indicates that Russia either fears attack by the United States or is
herself preparing for
[Page 40]
war. On
either theory she wishes to avoid a war on two fronts by establishing
better relations with China. They are convinced that a buffer state in
Manchuria has already been organized.
The same source reported that two divisions of Government troops had been
entirely annihilated at Hsin Li Tun near Mukden.
I venture to enclose a memorandum entitled “An Appraisal of Chinese
Communism”, which may be of interest to you.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Ambassador in China (Stuart)
An Appraisal of Chinese Communism
It must be freely acknowledged that there is much to be admired in
Chinese Communism. The almost unanimous enthusiasm of competent
western observers who have at different times visited their
headquarters or traveled through their territory cannot be entirely
explained away by their own leftist tendencies, nor by the
restrictions placed upon their movements. The leaders of the Party
have through long years given ample evidence of their unselfish
devotion to their cause, their steadfast acceptance of hardships and
dangers, their ability to win the allegiance of a constantly
increasing following, their skill in organizing, training and
inspiring this following, and their genuine concern for the material
welfare of the rural population—all of this in striking contrast
with the traditional weaknesses of Chinese officialdom and with many
present-day Government employees. They have conclusively
demonstrated that Chinese can be aroused, indoctrinated and
organized into a cohesion that overcomes the tendency to separatism
stemming from considerations of face, family, private gain, social
amenities, political cliques, etc. If they were willing to take part
therefore in a coalition government, or to function as a political
party without military force, they could contribute notably to
purifying and vitalizing the political life of their country. During
the recent negotiations aiming to achieve the former of these
solutions they seemed more than once to be very near the point of
agreement but were deterred by their deeply rooted suspicions
reinforced by personal animosities. Even then, however, they made no
secret of regarding this as a temporary measure on their part, their
ultimate objective being a communized China. Thinking in retrospect
over the experience gained from those lengthy conferences I am now
reluctantly convinced that whatever concessions they might have made
would have been merely tactical and would not have
[Page 41]
prevented them from unswervingly
pursuing their dominant objective.
Despite all that may be admitted to their credit the factual record
in China would seem to include the following extremely serious
objections in their aims and methods. The consequences of their
success in these would be destructive of all the higher values in
China’s cultural heritage and of the present democratic movement
with its essential share in securing a stable peace in a world of
freedom-loving peoples.
- (1)
-
Ideological intolerance. There can be no
freedom of thought or action in communist-controlled territory.
The policy of promptly liquidating any who differ from them or
are merely neutral, or are even under suspicion, is consistently
practised. The control of information and reading matter and the
dissemination only of their own partisan news and propagada is
as nearly absolute as conditions permit. The implications of
these restraints on intellectual freedom and of this systematic
molding of opinion are enormous. It is apparently regarded as
essential to the system and not merely as a war measure. Any
organization that might neutralize or challenge this
totalitarian control of knowledge or belief is relentlessly
stamped out, despite facile assertions by their spokesmen to the
contrary. In China the most obvious evidence of this is perhaps
the Christian Movement. Making due allowance for the political
aspects of Roman Catholicism and of American missionaries, there
is sufficient testimony to the suppressive tactics used against
native Chinese workers to justify the opinion that Christian
activities as usually conducted are incompatible with Chinese
Communist policy. For the present purpose this is referred to as
an easily verifiable illustration rather than for other reasons.
The same principle would doubtless apply to any other agency
that encouraged independent thought.
- (2)
-
Ruthless violence. The proof of this is
so abundant and so generally known that none need be cited here.
It seems to be true wherever they penetrate, usually, however,
not perpetrated so much by the troops on first arrival as by the
political agents who follow after. The cruelty in torture and
slaughter is often unbelievably extreme. These indignities and
the agonies of the victims reveal and cannot but foster a
callous disregard of human life which condemns the whole
procedure. The destruction of railways and other public
utilities, the looting of homes, the exactions upon helpless
people for money or labor, all cause a vast welter of suffering
for innocent people and indirectly upon the whole national
economy. Government troops are constantly guilty of similar
plundering and oppression, but in violation of regulations,
whereas with the Communists it is a calculated policy and under
instructions from the highest authorities. They
[Page 42]
would doubtless argue that this is
all a regrettable feature of total war and necessary for their
own survival. But even if they succeed in overthrowing the
present Government, the time when they might expect to have
voluntary submission from the whole population lies far into the
future and these brutal methods of reprisal, terrorism and
economic wreckage will continue to be employed to maintain
themselves in power.
- (3)
-
Falsehood and deception. There has been
no lack of these in Chinese political history but never before
have they been scientifically and systematically employed on the
doctrine that the cause justifies any means to achieve its
triumph. In broadcasts and printed matter vituperation has
become a fine art. The effects are apparent, for instance, in
the popular conception of American policy in communist territory
and in the virulent hatred of Americans which this inflames.
Whatever our failings may be, the discrepancy between communist
official misrepresentation and the truth will be recognized by
any informed person. The employment of secret agents in every
form of disguise permeates the whole social fabric of Chinese
life and the Kuomintang itself. This is of course an accepted
device in warfare, but there is in this training for espionage
and subversive activity among one’s own unsuspecting relatives
and neighbors a sinister quality which vitiates moral character
at its core. This insidious technique breeds suspicion and fear
and it explains, if it does not wholly excuse, the more clumsily
despotic methods of the Kmt.
- (4)
-
Soviet connection. The myth that Chinese
Communists are merely agrarian reformers has been finally
disproven by Mao Tse-tung’s latest pronouncement.79 In this his commitment of his Party to
close association with the Soviet Union and to international
communism is unmistakable. The use of pictures of Lenin80 and Stalin,81 of the same line in propaganda are also
indications of this. The older leaders are perhaps more Chinese
in their nationalistic outlook than the younger educated
recruits who are described as more unreservedly
pro-Russian.
- (5)
-
Chinese popular sentiment. In the best
known books and articles on the subject in English much is made
of the contented attitude of the local populace to the communist
regime. This is doubtless on the whole correct. These writers
were mostly at Yenan where they saw the system at its best and
where the majority of the community had traveled there from
choice. Or they had visited areas
[Page 43]
from which all dissidents had fled or been
purged. The typical rural population has little interest in
political theory and asks only that there be a minimum of
oppression and a chance to toil quietly for its livelihood. But
there is another side much less publicized. There may be
occasional refugees from national to communist territory, but
the overwhelming majority of these are in reverse. All
classes—not only the relatively well-to-do—flee before the
communist terror and prefer to live in poverty and squalor free
from this menace. Those whom I have queried as to their
observation agree without exception that the common people, left
to their own choice, would unquestionably prefer their National
Government to what they know of Communism. From a wholly
different standpoint 90 percent or even 95 percent of the
students are reported not to be in favor of their country being
communized. This is the more significant at a time when about
the same percentage are thoroughly dissatisfied with the present
Government. They represent the most radical, the most
idealistic, the most highly sensitized element of the
population. Many of their more restive or adventurous fellows
have gone over to the Communist side, usually in the belief that
this is the only way out for China. Those who remain are in a
state of bleakly negative despair. And yet they repudiate
Communism. It is to me a surprising phenomenon.
- (6)
-
The Corollary. This would seem to be in
substance that the Government cannot hope to exterminate
Communism by military means nor to bring the Party leaders to
any peace terms that it could accept. It can only win by a more
dynamic policy of upholding constitutional rights and of proving
its intention to benefit the economic and other welfare of the
people. But in doing so there is convincing evidence that
popular support could be aroused for a constructive
revolutionary movement in fulfillment of the Three Principles
which it is pledged to put into effect, and with modern methods
that put the primary emphasis on social, educational and
administrative reforms, with troops chiefly for policing and the
preservation of law and order.
J[ohn] L[eighton] S[tuart]
Nanking, January 14,
1948.
