The Consul General has the honor to transmit a copy of a memorandum
prepared by Vice Consul Allen C. Siebens on June 24, 1948, setting forth
inter alia information gleaned from Japanese
sources on the receipt by Manchurian communists of supplies of probable
Soviet origin.
While the information set forth in the memorandum on the above-mentioned
is largely circumstantial and pertains to the movement of goods a year
ago, it nevertheless substantiates to some slight degree the bruited
supply of arms and military equipment by the Soviet Union to the
Manchurian communists.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Vice Consul at
Mukden (Siebens)
Present:
- Mr. Shiroyu Okudaira; Mr. Teiichiro Tani, Translator;
Allen C. Siebens, Vice Consul.
Background:
Mr. Okudaira, Japanese national, arrived at Mukden in late May having
come on foot from Changchun with a group of some 48 Japanese who had
left that point for Mukden in order to join the Japanese
repatriation group which was at that time being organized at Mukden
and which has since left for Japan.
[Here follows account of his “personal history”.]
IV. Sino-Soviet Military Trade.
Okudaira’s comments on this subject were the most interesting he
made. He stated that during his year’s service at Mutankiang with
the Communists (May 1946–June 1947) he was called upon a minimum
average of once a week to assist in the unloading of military supply
trains. This unloading always was done at night, after midnight,
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at a terminal particularly
adapted to the unloading of vehicles because of its high platforms.
This terminal was otherwise not used for the handling of freight.
The trains were unloaded by Chinese and Japanese laborers and the
supplies were received by Soviet agents of the Far Eastern Trade
Bureau, who handled documentation pertaining to the shipments. These
trains consisted of about 30 cars each, and carried tanks, vehicles,
artillery, small arms and ammunition. Okudaira was ignorant of the
disposal of these supplies after they were taken from the railway
depot because after their unloading was accomplished he was always
ordered back to his billet.
He described the tanks unloaded as having been mostly Japanese small
and medium tanks but as having also included a few old-type Russian
medium tanks. The vehicles unloaded he described as consisting of
about one-third Russian trucks and two-thirds American trucks
(characterized by Okudaira as “Dodge”) and jeeps. He identified
these American vehicles by the letters USA which almost all of them
bore. The small arms and ammunition he judged to be all of Japanese
make because they came in standard Japanese ordnance supply cases.
He was unfortunately unable to make an estimate of the approximate
total of automotive equipment which he assisted in unloading, but
alleged that it was well over 300 in each category (tanks, trucks,
jeeps).
Okudaira was a little hazy about the source of these supplies. He
initially stated that they came from the Vladivostock area, but
later admitted that he could not be sure that they had not been
loaded at a point in Manchuria, such as Suifenho. He stated that
during the time of his stay in Mutankiang the east–west
Manchouli–Suifenho section of the Changchun railway, which had been
changed from standard gauge to Russian broad gauge by the Red Army,
had been reconverted to standard gauge by the Communists except for
the Mutankiang–Suifenho section, which remained broad gauge. It was
over this section that the forementioned military supply trains
came, and these trains he stated to be definitely Russian. He
brought out that the locomotives bore Russian markings and that in
his group the trains were generally known to have been made up at
Vladivostock. After questioning, he stated that the Japanese
ordnance material might have come from Suifenho, where the Japanese
had had such supplies in storage, but that he felt sure the
automotive equipment and at least some of the artillery had come
from Russia. He indicated that all the equipment carried on flatcars
came tightly covered with tarpaulins.
I asked Okudaira about other railway traffic through Mutankiang, but
was unable to obtain definite information. He had not been engaged
in work at the railway yards except for the night unloading
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of military supply trains.
However, he stated that to his certain knowledge a considerable
number of trains per week left Mutankiang with grain shipments for
the Soviet Union.
Conclusion:
The information given by Okudaira is more than a year old and the
product of an untrained observer with only average intellectual
curiosity. His personal history and remarks are submitted largely
because they make a limited contribution to the rather inadequate
picture which is presently available to us concerning conditions in
Communist territory. Okudaira’s best contribution is his account of
the receipt of military supplies by the Chinese Communists with the
assistance of the Russians. On the basis of his remarks and general
attitude, the following information can be ascribed rather high
validity unless his entire report is a fabrication, which I consider
unlikely: 1) Okudaira did in fact participate for a rather extended
period in the somewhat secretive night unloading of military supply
trains coming into Mutankiang from the east, 2) these trains were
Russian trains, 3) they delivered American and Russian vehicles
which very probably came from the Soviet Union.
As regards the immediate origin of Japanese made equipment delivered
at Mutankiang, it is difficult to draw definite conclusions. It is
possible but not probable that it was gathered at a point east of
Mutankiang but within the Manchurian frontier. In the case of small
arms and ammunition it appears the least unlikely that this may have
been so, since the Japanese have been reported to have stored such
items in the Suifenho area. On the other hand, with respect to
Japanese tanks and artillery, there is room for belief they were
part of war booty first taken to Siberia by the Red Army and then
returned to Manchuria. According to Okudaira there were no large
concentrations of such equipment in the Suifenho area during the
Manchukuo regime, and inasmuch as it is known that the Red Army did
take to Siberia substantial amounts of Japanese war material, it
appears not unreasonable to suppose that the forementioned artillery
and tanks were part of this booty and being returned to Manchuria
together with a certain amount of Russian and American-made military
vehicles, good vehicles being a type of material which the Japanese
did not have in large amounts and which would have to be made
available to the Communists from sources of non-Japanese
manufacture.
A possible explanation for the operation of Russian railway rolling
stock into Manchuria as far as Mutankiang is that, coming into
Manchuria on the Changchun railway from the east, Mutankiang is the
first station offering marshalling yards adequate to accommodate
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railway freight handling
on a substantial scale, the facilities at Suifenho being rather
limited. Therefore any freight transactions between Siberia and
Manchuria in that area, if to be effected with any efficiency, would
necessitate handling at Mutankiang, as apparently was done, or at a
suitable point in the Soviet Union. This latter procedure, in
addition to having called for the adaptation of Manchurian railway
stock for broad gauge operation, a procedure which while not
difficult may at the time have presented cumbersome technical
problems, would have opened the way for operation of Chinese trains
in Soviet territory, a development which the Russians probably did
not desire, especially since the procedure which actually was
adopted is so simple.
Okudaira’s statement that agents of the Far Eastern Trading Company
and not the Communist military received the military supply trains
at Mutankiang suggests that the Soviet government had a definite
financial interest in cargoes on these trains. His statement that
considerable grain export railway traffic was going through
Mutankiang offers supporting evidence for the general contentions,
made on the basis of a considerable number of piecemeal reports,
that the Chinese Communists are exporting large amounts of grain to
the Soviet Union. Under present conditions it seems logical to infer
from these data that at least during the time of Okudaira’s stay at
Mutankiang the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Government were
implementing an agreement to trade grain for arms. The existence of
this traffic has been reported in various somewhat vague forms many
times in the past, and Okudaira’s statement, while presenting
information which is somewhat deficient and which because of its
source must be treated with reservation, adduces evidence
corroborative of these reports.
