893.00/6–2148
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 2.]
Sir: I have the honor to forward an English translation of the Chinese language statement41 by Mr. C. Y. Li of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee in Hong Kong. Mr. Li, requesting that it be given secret treatment, gave this document to an officer of the Consulate General in Hong Kong, who forwarded it here for processing on April 10, 1948.
Mr. C. Y. Li’s statement of his position, which is understood to be that of Marshal Li Chi-shen and the KmtRC generally, is distinctly disappointing. As the program of a purportedly liberal group which says it intends to try that most difficult of political feats, a coalition with the Communists, it does not inspire confidence. There is, indeed, little trace of a positive program here and still less of a quality of mind that could extemporize one. The attitude towards the Communists shows no adequate understanding of them at all; the references to recent history are seriously distorted, chiefly in implication and by wholesale omission of relevant facts; the polemics against the Gimo are merely frantic, heat without light; and the crying-up of Li, Feng, and Ts’ai never goes beyond just that into a statement of what positive course of action can be expected from them, barring a call for peace in the civil war and airy references to the San Min Chu I.
[Page 313]The failure to examine basic premises is doubly disquieting since Marxism obviously affects Mr. Li’s thinking from two directions: his immediate CCP42 contacts and the beclouded socialism of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. This consequent reduction of range in both perception and thinking is poor equipment for the task the KmtRC has set itself. At no time in this document does there appear any confirmation of what the KmtRC leaders have repeatedly told us: that they understand the Communists and the problems of working with them. The ancient argument that the CCP is not really Communist because Marxism cannot be applied to agrarian China is so naive, presented soberly today, as to be startling. If the KmtRC does not understand the change that has taken place in Marxism during the past half century (the growing influence of Blanquism—management of revolution by the hard disciplined core; creation of a totalitarian state machine capable of maintaining itself and of using the Marxian ideology to make it seem inevitable; and the actual pruning-away, in theoretical crisis after crisis, of many of Marx’s own ideas), they are not going to last very long in any sort of coalition with the Reds. The fact that Mr. Li chants the party line so faithfully indicates how unequal the struggle would be, and how short.
In view of the above doubts, we are very much interested in finding out whether or not this statement actually represents the program of Marshal Li and his group. There is certainly a rough similarity, but we would like to have specific points questioned to find whether it is really a point-for-point résumé of what he thinks. Both Marshal Li and Mr. C. Y. Li have emphasized that, once we could see the KmtRC’s actual program, we would be impressed and in favor of it. The enclosed statement is consequently all the more disappointing. There is, however, the possibility that the KmtRC leaders are better practical revolutionary politicians than they are theorists. Another conceivable reason both for the vagueness and for some of the sentiments expressed in Mr. Li’s statement is that it may be intended to please, or at least not alienate, the Communists now swarming in Hong Kong. The program here presented ought to have the effect of making the Reds underestimate the KmtRC’s game, they should have been forethoughtful enough to explain the strategy to us when the statement changed hands.
The most impressively realistic point made by Marshal Li in his talks with officers of the Embassy and the Consulate General in Hong Kong was that the Chinese Communists are to all intents and purposes Russian Communists, and that a coalition with them would be strictly upon a basis of expediency, rather than one of fundamental [Page 314] agreement. Since these sentiments do not appear in Mr. Li’s statement, we are most interested in clarifying the KmtRC attitude in this particular.
Respectfully yours,