893.00/6–948: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 9—1:54 p. m.]
1044. In June 5 conference at Embassy, Badger8 discussed his views on present military situation in China and expressed conviction that Communist occupation Manchuria and North China would increase strategic advantage of Soviet Union in Far East to point where American interests would be threatened and to point where, in event war between Soviet Union and United States, eastern defenses of Soviet would be impregnable. He also stated his belief that Government armies now lack capability of preventing Communist occupation Manchuria and North China, mainly because of lack of efficient planning and effective leadership, and that provision of high level American planning staff would turn tide in favor of Nationalists. He concluded by saying that he feels it incumbent on him, by virtue of his assignment as ComNavWesPac, to report this situation to the Joint Chiefs and to recommend that an American planning staff be assigned to the Chinese Government to participate direction of the Nationalist military operations against the Communists.
[Page 283]On June 8. Barr9 received telegram from Wedemeyer10 requesting AAG comments on military, political and economic situation and recommendations on American participation in Nationalist military effort on planning level. We believe Barr will recommend assignment American staff for operational planning and formation field teams to check on implementation of plans and gather information for planning purposes. Wedemeyer requested comments “to prepare briefing for Secretary of Army11 who is appearing before Senate committee”.
From the above we conclude Joint Chiefs becoming concerned over deterioration Government military position in north and prospect that Communists will soon occupy North China and Manchuria. We gather that recommendations of Barr and Badger are likely to be sympathetically received by Joint Chiefs, who are aware of military significance of North China in American strategic requirements, and equally aware of fact that military shortcomings of Government are mainly along lines of failure of Nanking Supreme Staff to conceive and implement adequate plans. We are aware of implications of action suggested by Badger and Barr and agree with them that such action is necessary if deterioration situation in China is to be stopped and tide turned in our favor. Onus of establishing “field teams” suggested by Barr might be lessened by use of strategically located assistant military attaches for that purpose.