893.00/6–448: Telegram
The Consul General at Mukden (Ward) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 5—9:25 a. m.]
244. Communist plans in Northeast uncertain to Government military leaders. Communists’ strategy appeared clear in early May when several units moved westwards and others were in process preparing westward movement towards Chinchow and eastern Jehol areas. All observers both foreign and Chinese believed Communists then preparing seize or isolate ports used as supply bases Mukden and thereafter consolidate gains in Manchuria or southwards Peiping, Tientsin areas along Mukden, Peiping rail line or from Chengteh area. Without apparent reason Communists halted westward movement and moved units northwards closely surrounding Changchun from North, East and West. At present, Embassy has information from highly reliable sources Communists have 9 independent divisions and 1, possibly 2, regular Communist columns (total number troops 100,000) who in position attack Changchun whenever desired. Communist 3d column, one of best, now between Ssupingkai, and Changchun apparently moving northwards. Communists’ 2d column, [Page 273] another of their best, stationed at Ssupingkai, whence it can move northwards and westwards. Communists’ 1st column, which had recently moved westwards to Chinchow area, now reported moving northwards towards Changchun. Communists’ 10th column, north Mukden in Tiehling-Kaiyuan area, feinted westwards (my telegram 297 to Embassy, repeated 228 to Department) and then drew back to former positions. One division this column nearest Mukden now also reported moving northwards. At present only one Communist column remains in area north Mukden as far as Ssupingkai, and equivalent two columns area south of Mukden to Yingkow.
Informed Chinese and foreign military observers unable explain Communist moves Changchun area. Chinese are hoping all Communists will be centralized for all-out attack on Changchun. Such attack would undoubtedly succeed in capture of Changchun, but Government and neutral observers believe would be so costly to Communists that would be some time before they could again reorganize into potent fighting machine to threaten remainder northeast. Any such withdrawal for all-out attack on Changchun would also permit easy juncture Government forces cut in toward Mukden and resultant overland supply, lack of which appears be only cause Wei Li-huang’s87 possible early defeat in Northeast. Chinese therefore do not believe their hope for all-out Communist offensive against Changchun will be realized.
For reason or reasons definitely unknown to Government here, [Coms] have not waged anticipated spring offensive. Troops have had ample time for rest, regrouping and resupply. Roads dry at present and any further delay will necessitate fighting during summer rainy season which will hamper cart transportation used by Communists. Several theories as to Communist inactivity advanced (mytel 240 to Embassy, repeated 174 [175] Department, April 28)88 one of which is based on information received from persons returning Communist occupied territory and from Communist radio broadcast that Communists are facing serious supply problems’. Spring planting from Harbin south to Ssuping has been spotty and below planned level. Liquidation well-to-do farmers has resulted in loss effective use farm stock and farming tools, plus loss productivity of group possessing intelligence and initiative necessary direct large agricultural operations. When Communists began spring offensive year ago, Government had already planted crops. Communists captured most productive agricultural area during summer months and reaped Government harvest. Reports received by Consulate and Embassy indicate tremendous quantities foodstuffs shipped from northeast to [Page 274] Russia during winter months, possibly in exchange for needed Jap arms and ammo. Consequently, now confronted with cereal deficiency. Their recruiting for armed service has been so effective that young farm manpower has been depleted and Communists now find they do not have crops planted or surplus grains available for next winter. In addition, if Manchurian operations are successful, any future operations in North or Central China would have to be supplied from North. This statement based on numerous reports received of the increasing supply problem being faced by Communists in North and Central China. Recent arrivals from areas south Mukden state Communist liquidation well-to-do farmers, plus seizure of their draft animals for military purposes has been so thorough, that humans now performing tasks formerly performed by beasts of burden. This will necessarily reduce crops normally expected. Arrivals from Ssuping state Communists have now received orders to purge bourgeois agricultural elements, and instead are endeavoring court their cooperation, but this policy is bringing about distrust and impairing loyalty of land hungry groups upon whom Communists have relied for their main strength.
Another theory, less tangible, but which should not be ignored, is that Communist inactivity may be Soviet inspired in belief that forced truce may be effected near future. Adherents this theory refer to recent arrival of Soviet Ambassador,89 known to have issued peace feelers before his return Russia some time ago, as basis for belief he has instructions from Moscow to effect truce advantageous to Soviet Union.
Above theories are conjectures based on inconclusive fact. It may be some time before Communist plans can be clearly discerned. Meanwhile Mukden enjoys complete absence military activity. Any shift Communist troops this area will require time and would have to be on such a scale that Government would have ample notice any Communist attempt attack city. Nevertheless Communist troops highly mobile and can within very short period organize thrust against Mukden and its environs. Furthermore, deteriorating food situation within Mukden defense island may create local restiveness or demoralization which could be exploited by sudden Communist thrust against this area. Although local situation calm, security not such as to warrant complacency.
Department pass Nanking 317.