893.00/6–148
The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark)
Dear Lewis: We have been very much interested in the theme developed in your telegrams regarding Marshal Li Chi-shen, culminating in the Embassy’s 947 of May 26. At the same time we have been somewhat surprised at the potential strength and influence which are ascribed to Marshal Li and his movement.
It has been our impression that Marshal Li was a figure of integrity and some ability but that he lacked the qualities of forceful leadership necessary to guide a movement against the present group in power at Nanking. Except for the Democratic League members, who in 1944 looked to Marshal Li to lead a separatist movement in southeast China and who apparently still look upon him as the savior of China, we know of few Chinese who have given any indication of taking seriously Marshal Li’s pretensions to leadership and power. He has been in Hong Kong for at least two years; he established his Kuomintang [Page 268] Revolutionary Committee toward the end of 1947; and his record of opposition to the Generalissimo and the present Kuomintang leadership dates back to the late 20’s when he was under virtual arrest in Nanking for a year or more and to 1934 when he led a short-lived rebellion in Fukien against the Nanking Government. It is difficult to understand why he should suddenly emerge as the “man on horseback” at this juncture. While it seems possible that he might in time become the head of a larger movement against the present Nanking leadership, his past performance and the indications of his capabilities do not seem to offer hope that he himself could provide the spark and leadership for such a movement.
We are aware that our detachment from the actual scene and our dependence upon reports from the field and upon background knowledge gained in previous years may have led us astray in our thinking on these developments. Therefore, we should appreciate any further light you can throw on this possible development which would tend to substantiate the thesis that Marshal Li’s emergence as the leader of the government would probably be widely welcomed in Nationalist China by all elements except those most closely associated with the Generalissimo.
The announcement of the new cabinet gives almost perfect confirmation of plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. We shall look forward to your interpretation of the changes. There certainly seem to be no real changes except possibly for the worse in the person of Ho Ying-chin. It is barely possible that his long sojourn in the United States and his new-found Oxford Grouper leanings may have produced a new man. At any rate we shall learn in due course the extent to which China and the United States have benefited from his exposure to this country.
With all good wishes.
As ever,