893.00/5–2648: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:03 a. m.]
947. It is our opinion that emergence of Marshal Li Chi-shen as leader of Government would probably be widely welcomed in National China by all elements except those most closely associated with Generalissimo, Deptel 744, May 18. As we have previously reported, there exists among politically conscious individuals general apprehension that the present Government’s lack of effective leadership [Page 258] facilitates rapid spread of Communism. Communist military successes, growing economic distress and unrest in National China, Generalissimo’s maneuvers in installation of constitutional government, his current difficulties in finding acceptable Premier and his selection of political nonentity to this post all contribute to and reenforce this fear. Among less politically minded masses, suffering from maladministration and inadequate leadership blame for plight is, to increasing degree, placed on Generalissimo and associates. Generalissimo has lost much prestige of late. In this situation, change in Government leadership would be welcomed by a steadily increasing number provided new leaders could attract popular confidence and advance popular policies. Inspired leadership is desperately needed. Marshal Li Chi-shen is generally recognized as competent administrator whose patriotism and personal integrity are above question. He would probably gain confidence of politically minded elements and his policy of mediated end to civil war would attract support from all those who have lost faith in ability of present Government to force favorable military decision. Given these factors, given his military connections and fact that he is senior military commander in China after Generalissimo, and considering his close relations with provincial political leaders, we believe it entirely possible that his movement may prove the rallying point for dissident elements in Kmt and, should it move from Hong Kong to national territory, may attract sufficiently strong support to enable it to offer effective government.
As to question of relative effectiveness present Government and hypothetical government under Marshal Li in halting spread Communism, Department will appreciate that too many factors are involved to permit firm prediction. However, it remains our belief that the present Government lacks capability to halt spread communism and will continue to lack this capability unless, as seems unlikely, it can find the inspired leadership needed to rally the people and restore to national armies a will to fight. The Generalissimo cannot be expected to provide that leadership as he seems incapable of change and gives every evidence of an intention to persist in the personal rule which has resulted in present sad state of affairs. Unless, therefore, we are willing to become dangerously involved in responsibility for governing China and directing the civil war, which we do not recommend, we look for further disintegration of the Government’s position until it is replaced by revolution from within, such as that sponsored by Li, or until it is replaced by the Communists. At this stage it is impossible to forecast positively that government under Marshal Li could be more effective and efficient than present Government in utilizing national, political, military and economic resources against Communists. Nevertheless, such government would have greater measure of public support and confidence and broader [Page 259] base and might be expected to attract and use more talents than present regime. Whether this would be sufficient to task at hand is not susceptible to prior determination. However, the record of Li Chi-shen, Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen in the days when the Liang Kuang71 were models of provincial government gives cause for encouragement.
In present government, role of General Li Tsung-jen is strictly limited by constitution to presidential succession in event president loses office. Even this right of succession is only implicit. As previously reported, vice-presidential office gives General Li no more than platform publicize views. His support in National Assembly would lend authority these views if this support could be organized. However, far as we are aware General Li has not organized his support. He is despondent, stating he can see no way to effect changes in Government since Generalissimo controls finances and army. Thus, emergence of General Li’s effective political influence is probably dependent on outside factors such as Marshal Li’s Kmt reform party. Circumstances in which this group would come into power would determine ultimate leadership, but General Li would probably be subordinate to Marshal Li. Also on basis their past relations and present association, it is probable that they would cooperate closely and with Pai Chung-hsi it is likely that they would accept subordinate role.
Those present at interview were Marshal Li, Li Tso-hsien, associate of Marshal Li, Vice Consul Richard Service and Frederic Schultheis, Embassy Attaché. Marshal Li was aware of presence of Embassy officer in Hong Kong and requested interview to describe his views. Interview took place at home Li Tso-hsien, whose relation with Marshal Li are described in Hong Kong unnumbered despatch of April 5.72 Marshal Li requested that knowledge of meeting be kept from other dissident groups Hong Kong.