893.00/5–1448
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 25.]
Sir: I have the honor to attempt an appraisal of the most recent political happenings. I had intended to do so earlier but there has been so little finality that it seemed better to wait for something more decisive upon which to base my observations. Meanwhile we have tried to send factual reports with brief interpretative comments. Even now the uncertainty and confusion continue but this seems to be almost normal in China.
The one significant result from the National Assembly was the election of Li Tsung-jen despite the determined opposition of the Generalissimo and his henchmen. Every form of pressure was employed regardless of the promise of free elections, and President Chiang has lost much face as well as for perhaps the first time in his experience as Party Leader been unable to assert his will. The rejoicing over this has been wide-spread even within the Government, for Li is generally regarded as the symbol of constructive reforms.
The supremely important question now is as to whether President Chiang can welcome Li as his helper in these progressive plans and himself lead in proclaiming and effecting them, or whether he will resent Li’s triumph by ignoring him and attempting to frustrate his efforts. My advice to him during my latest visit has already been reported in Embassy’s telegram no. 832 of May 7, 1948. Thus far the signs are not reassuring. His treatment of various individuals or groups who voted for Li—including the two minor parties—is being interpreted as vindictive, and the resignation of Chen Li-fu as punishment for failure. Whether this is fair or not it reveals current opinion. Personally I still hold to the belief that he wants to do the right thing but is so steeped in the Chinese tradition of autocratic rule and in his own training and habits, so obsessed with the suspicion of Communist instigation in all resistance to his undisputed sway or criticism of his policies that he simply does not know how to change. If anything can help him to do so it will be sympathetic counsel, but this will have to be very specific and outspoken to break through his crust of preconceptions, his iron will and unacknowledged fears. Chinese are continually asking me to say things to him which they admit none of them would dare to. I shall continue to go as far as seems prudent, and my anxiety over the failure of the American aid to accomplish what is intended unless there are drastic reforms gives me an added right.
[Page 234]The Vice President-elect and I have deliberately stayed away from each other to avoid rumors or misunderstandings, but he has been busily at work on a program of reforms which he intends to present to the President for approval. If Li is not satisfied with the response, or if he is convinced after sufficient trial that he cannot get action, he will break away and lead an independent movement. I shall try to get the text of this program as soon as it is available and am meanwhile preparing some concrete suggestions to take up with the President as soon as the principal offices will have been definitely filled. There is now quite a little political shifting around, the only new note being that one or two men have refused to accept the posts offered unless given promises of non-interference.
For several weeks political affairs have so preoccupied the Gimo that not much attention could be given to military issues, increasingly critical as these are becoming. Of course no one else dares to take any initiative, least of all those whose tenure of office is in suspense. The only improvement is that, after months of empty talk about preparing replacement training camps, T. V. Soong37 has come here and secured authority to arrange at once for the training of three divisions in Kwangtung, four in Taiwan and two in Nanking, those in the two former places being entirely under him with the help of General Sun Li-jen.38 If the worst happens these newly-trained and equipped troops can help hold the southern provinces, or under more favorable conditions they can be sent north and be replaced by other weary and depleted divisions. Governor Soong’s authority has been extended to include Kwangsi, Fukien, Kiangsi, possibly Hunan, and Taiwan in the matter of military training.
Summing up therefore the situation as it appears today the possible trends would seem to be:
- (1)
- President Chiang will start off the assumption of his new title and the enforcement of the Constitution with the more democratic and progressive measures which give him his only chance to neutralize the swelling discontent and to lead in a popularly supported campaign against the Communists.
- (2)
- The movement of which Li Tsung-jen is the spearhead will openly challenge his procedure and rally all public-spirited, non-Communist elements in a Kmt internal revolt. Chiang would probably be allowed to continue in his new office, stripped of all emergency powers. This might lead to some sort of negotiated settlement with the Communists: (a) a coalition government; (b) a territorial division; (c) the Communist Party become legally recognized under American or international protection.
- (3)
- Neither one of these will be sufficiently prompt or effective to prevent the disintegration of the Central Government, with local [Page 235] chieftains and the Communists as the strongest, most highly disciplined and unitedly determined factor. The present Government might retreat south of the Yangtse and recuperate strength for another revolution stemming from Canton.
- (4)
- Some unpredictable change in international relations may alter any of the above trends for better or worse.
There is nothing to add to reports reaching you in other forms as to Embassy matters except to assure you of the valuable asset Mr. Livingston Merchant39 is proving to be. This is especially fortunate in view of the prospective activities connected with American aid.
Respectfully yours,