893.00/1–1248

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Ringwalt) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)53

Subject: Mao Tse-tung’s December 25, 1947 statement (Copy, as picked up by FBIB,54 attached55).

Reference: Embtel 65, Jan. 9 on above subject.

This statement reflects Communist satisfaction in the belief that the Communist struggle for power in China has passed its turning point—with the “People’s Liberation Armies” now on the offensive—and that the idea of a “third road” (between the Kmt and the CCP) has “now become bankrupt”. It contains an interesting account of [Page 30] Communist strategy and tactics, an outline of domestic policies proposed for the “New China”, and informative remarks on international relations. If you are too busy to plow through Mao’s verbiage you may find time to read the following rearranged résumé of his chief ideas—to which we have appended some of our own comment.

1. Strategy of the Communist Revolution.

A. Agrarian “reform”: Confiscation of the land of the landlord class and its distribution among the poorer peasants is “the basic condition required for conquering all enemies”. “Landlords and rich peasants”, Mao explains, “make up only approximately 8 percent …56 Therefore the object which our agrarian policy opposes is a very small number of people whereas the number … who can and should participate in the (benefits of) agrarian reform … make up as much as 90 percent.” (Comment: By this means the peasants receiving land are given a stake which they must defend by opposing the Government, which represents the old order.)

In many areas CCP workers have oppressed and bullied the people. The Party workers are landlord elements which slipped into the Party during its period of phenomenal growth from a few thousands in 1937 to 2,700,000 in 1947. (Comment: Thus Mao is able to channel against enemies of the Party some of the resentment aroused in the course of implementing the Party’s land and other programs; he at the same time provides himself with a plausible reason for tightening up Party discipline and eliminating wavering elements.)

B. Military Principles (Mao lists ten, which are regrouped below):

1.
We take the annihilation of the enemy fighting strength as the major objective. To do this, first strike scattered and isolated enemies, and later the more concentrated and powerful ones, always concentrating for the task forces having the greatest possible local superiority so that the enemy may be encircled and wiped out. Conversely, fight no battles which do not promise victory, and no unprepared engagements. Thus Communist forces—which numerically are inferior as a whole—have an absolute superiority in every action.
2.
Fight a war of movement. Strike one enemy force and swiftly transfer units to smash another. Fight no battles of attrition. Strive to destroy the enemy in movement. Promote willingness to sacrifice and capacity to endure fatigue so that successive battles may be fought in short space of time with but little respite. Skillfully utilize periods of respite for resting, regrouping and training but make such periods short so that the enemy may have no breathing space.
3.
Develop skill in the tactics of attaching enemy positions, strong points and bases. The broad countryside and small and medium towns, bases and strong-points are to be taken first; later the bigger places. But regard the taking of cities as a by-product of the annihilation of enemy forces; many cities will be abandoned and retaken a number of times before final victory is achieved.
4.
Obtain most of needed arms and ammunition by capture from the enemy.

II. Politico-Economic Domestic Policy of the “New China”.

1.
Confiscate and place under State ownership and control China’s bureaucratic monopoly capital and eliminate the special privileges of imperialism, with which it is allied.
2.
Confiscate the land of the landlord class and develop the agricultural economy step by step from an individual to a collective basis. (Comment: As far as I am aware, this is the first public admission by Mao that the land is not being given to the peasants “for keeps”.)
3.
Permit the functioning of petty and middle bourgeoisie capital in the interests of flourishing production.

III. International Relations.

1.
Anti-American Stand: American imperialism has replaced Japanese and German imperialism and is directing Chiang Kai-shek’s counterrevolutionary war against the Chinese nation, with U. S. military personnel suggesting Chiang’s strategy and tactics. The imperialistic strength of the U. S. is superficial, and is menaced by the volcano of economic crisis. (Comment: I understand that this is the world Communist line on the future of the U. S. economy.) It is this threat which forces U. S. imperialism to attempt to enslave the world, but already Soviet strength exceeds that of the United States.
2.
Solidarity with International Communism: “Communist Parties of 9 European countries have organized an information bureau and published a summons to battle … all anti-imperialist forces of the various Eastern countries should also unite … taking as the objective of their struggle the liberation of the more than 1,000,000,000 oppressed people of the East.”
  1. Drafted by the Assistant Chief of the Division (Rice).
  2. Foreign Broadcast Information Branch of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Omissions indicated in the original.