893.00/5–748: Telegram

The Ambassador in China ( Stuart ) to the Secretary of State

832. Our best information at the moment is that Generalissimo has refused to agree to reforms demanded by Ho Ying-chin and has commanded Chang Chun to remain as Premier and form new Cabinet.23

Nevertheless, when I called on Generalissimo May 6 he indicated agreement with various points I felt it desirable to raise with him, In first place, he promised support for Jimmy Yen’s reconstruction plan24 and agreed with me when I enlarged upon the fact that the Communist issue could not be settled merely by military means; that unless there were drastic reforms in Government policy convincing the people that their lot was better than it would be under Communist control, no amount of military effort or American aid could be successful. He continued to agree when I expressed my belief in the extreme gravity of the outlook in the military, financial and economic fields, and particularly in respect of morale among the people as well as with the Government. The only hope, it seemed to me, lay in radical reform that would convince the people that the Government had stopped merely speaking and intended to act. Now that he had been elected President, I said, the constitution was coming into effect, American aid was beginning to arrive, and he had a superlative opportunity to take the requisite leadership and that if he didn’t do so now, it might soon be too late for him to play any part in the steps which must inevitably take place. His expression indicated that he [Page 226] understood I had the revolt surrounding Li Tsung-jen in mind. I went on, with the Generalissimo agreeing, that in my opinion the great majority of Chinese, even the more radical student element, did not want China to be communized, but that they were dissatisfied with the present Government. It became, therefore, a question of winning this large majority by demonstrating that the Government was more modern, up to date, democratic and liberal than the Communists who, I stressed, represented the last vestige of out-moded totalitarian and dictatorial political organization. As I saw it, and he seemed to agree, the problem was primarily spiritual rather than military or material and that somehow the spirit of the populace and of the troops would have to be aroused or all his plans and all the American assistance would be useless. Mme. Chiang, who was present, agreed most emphatically with this and I believe will exert her influence toward improving the situation.

In response to his request for specific suggestions, I remarked that the Premier’s 10-point program25 seemed to offer a framework for action and that now was the time to give proof that these points were not just a literary essay, but represented an intention of the Government which would be implemented without further delay.

The above doesn’t sound too hopeful, yet we are afraid it represents the present attitude of the Generalissimo. He will assent, as he did, but we find it difficult to believe that he is any longer capable of the leadership necessary to instill new spirit into the people or that he has any intention of really instituting necessary reforms.

Stuart
  1. Premier Chang and his Cabinet had resigned en bloc on May 5.
  2. For information on this subject, see vol. viii , “U.S. Economic Aid to China” (Ch. III).
  3. See note from the Chinese Embassy, January 28, vol. viii , “U.S. Economic Aid to China” (Ch. I).