893.00/4–2948
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Ringwalt) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
The memorandum of conversation between Mr. Clark and Dr. Yeh11 makes two points: (1) that there is a sharp division between the Wai Kung, or doctrinaire Communists, and the Tu Kung, or native Communists; [Page 213] and (2) that even with the fall of Mukden there would not be an immediate Communist push south of the Great Wall.
There is of course a historical basis for the contention of George Yeh and C. H. Shen that there is a sharp division between the Communist leaders in China. You are aware that, as a result of the failure of the Soviet-directed Chinese Communists to obtain and retain dominance over the industrial workers in the larger cities in Central and South China, Li Li-san and other Wai Kung leaders were expelled from China in the late ’20s and the Tu Kung led by Mao Tse-tung obtained complete mastery over the destinies of the Chinese Communist Party. Because of the friction between these groups as well as because of the blockade of Yenan by the Chinese Nationalist Forces, the Wai Kung had little influence in China until after V–J Day and the occupation of the greater part of Manchuria by the Communists on the withdrawal of the Russian Forces. During 1946, however, Li Li-san and other Wai Kung leaders returned front Moscow and established themselves in Harbin. To what extent these Wai Kung now control the activities of the Communist political thinking in Manchuria is hard to estimate. I doubt, however, whether they have had much influence over the Communist Army which is fundamentally a Chinese Army with roots in the soil. Even in Manchuria the officer and non-commissioned officer corps is comprised largely of Chinese from south of the Wall. The most famous Chinese Communist military leader in Manchuria, Lin Piao, is from Hupei, and Yun Tse, the Inner Mongolian Communist, has recently established himself as the leader of the Manchurian Mongols centered around Wangyehmiao. In brief, then, it is my personal opinion that the political influence of the Wai Kung south of the Great Wall is unimportant whereas the military influence of the Tu Kung is predominant in Manchuria. I doubt, however, whether the rivalry between these groups is such as to affect materially their close cooperation at least for the present.
With regard to the second point in the memorandum, it seems likely that a substantial proportion of the southern Chinese now in Manchuria will wish to return south if Mukden falls. Certainly there would be no need for such a large Communist military establishment in Manchuria after its conquest had been completed. It is my impression that the Communists would wish to capitalize almost immediately on the prestige resulting from the complete conquest of Manchuria to extend even further their sphere of control south of the Wall. An army to be successful must be active. Perhaps Mr. Yeh is only whistling in the dark.