893.00/4–2548: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 25—7:37 a. m.]
747. In early morning hours April 25 Cheng Chein and later Li Tsung-jen announced retirement from vice presidential race, leaving Sun Fo as sole remaining candidate. At Assembly meeting this morning, amidst considerable disorder on part delegates, meeting was adjourned without any action being taken. This morning local vernacular press carried stories retirement both candidates, and Li’s supporters issued statement in form advertisement that his withdrawal is in interest [of] securing national harmony and to secure vindication from scurrilous rumors being circulated to effect that he intends force [Page 206] Generalissimo leave country. At morning Assembly meeting, with Yu Yu-jen acting as chairman, delegates stated that Li’s retirement from race could only be effected with concurrence his supporters, and appealed to chairman for agreement. Yu Yu-jen, weeping copiously, stated that whole affair was regrettable and that new set of elections should be held.
As we have previously reported, Li has been under heavy pressures from Generalissimo to withdraw candidacy and Li has consistently refused. Li’s associates say that Li is interested in vice-presidency as platform for criticizing shortcomings of Government and suggesting: remedial measures, and that he will retire from army and do so as private citizen if his campaign fails. Li’s supporter, Governor Li Pin-hsien of Anhwei, has been target of organized student demonstration and local vernacular paper supporting Li arid critical of Sun Fo has been wrecked by mob, reportedly led by delegates supporting Sun Fo, without interference from police. Presumably reliable source informs us the Generalissimo has summoned Pai. Chung-hsi8 and directed him on pain secret court martial to switch support from Li to Sun Fo.
Our initial reaction these developments is that Li has been subjected to extremely heavy pressure from party machine and Whampoa army clique. He defies this pressure by resignation candidacy, thus putting-self in position being sought by office rather than seeking office, in compliance traditional Chinese practice, and so focusing attention general public and all interested parties on opponents’ maneuvers prevent his position. In free and uninfluenced election Li would almost certainly have majority vote. Bulk of delegates, desirous effecting efficient government and frustrated by machine control Assembly, equate Li’s election with satisfaction their aims. Effect of latest developments on temper delegates may be judged by remark of one, “this is worse that [than] Tsao Kun’s election,9 at least he paid for his”.
We repeat, at this stage tempers both sides running high, and eventual course action adopted by either unpredictable. However, there is no doubt but what Kmt is severely split over matter of principle, in distinction ordinary party cleavage on matters self-interest. Principle at stake is efficacy present leadership and its policies. It is not difficult to conceive of situation where attempts would be made reject this leadership, or where leadership, including Generalissimo and closest supporters, would prefer retire in response popular demand, [Page 207] since Generalissimo has not formally accepted presidency and is understood not yet to have made up mind accept.
In present circumstances ultimate consequences difficult foretell. Reliable sources state resolution situation will be forthcoming next 24 hours. Will continue report significant occurrences.
- Chinese Minister of National Defense.↩
- For election of Marshal Tsao Kun in 1923, see telegram No. 332, October 5, 1923, from the Minister in China, Foreign Relations, 1923, vol. i, p. 511.↩