893.00/3–848
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Ringwalt) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)13
Subject: Possibility of Soviet Mediation in China.
The Embassy’s analysis, in its telegram no. 432 of March 8 (copy attached14), of the question of Soviet mediation in China is a well reasoned presentation. CA has the following additional comment to make on this subject:
The Soviet mediation offer may have been made in anticipation of increased U. S. aid to the Chinese Government. The USSR may have hoped, for propaganda purposes, thus to place the USSR in the position of working for peace in China while the US was encouraging civil war. The offer may also have been based on a Soviet desire to forestall the extension of US aid which might enable the Chinese Government to meet the Chinese Communists.
The Embassy states: “Failing American economic aid on an impossibly large scale, failing active American military aid and failing [Page 146] competent Chinese leadership and planning, there may be revolt within the ranks of the Kmt and acceptance of the Soviet offer to mediate.” Somewhat paradoxically, the Embassy also states: “The situation is not yet beyond redemption and if we were to increase our aid to the National Government sufficiently, to turn the balance in its favor, despite the bankruptcy of its present leadership, mediation might be avoided.”
One important factor must be considered in connection with the US attitude toward Soviet mediation. If we advise the Chinese Government against accepting such mediation, we should be open to charges of responsibility on two counts: (1) We should then be held responsible by the Chinese Government for the extension of the military and economic aid necessary to ensure a National Government victory over the Chinese Communists. (2) Our opposition to mediation in China would be certain to leak out in China and we should be held responsible in the eyes of many Chinese for the continuation of civil war. Communist propaganda would portray the USSR as a peace-loving nation and the US as a “war-monger”, themes which would probably find ready acceptance in China.
We believe that the US should not place itself at this juncture in the position of opposing or favoring Soviet mediation or a compromise that might be reached between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists. To do so would place on us the responsibility for the consequences of rejecting or accepting mediation or compromise.
In this connection attention should be called to another aspect related to Soviet mediation. The US has become involved in China to a considerable extent as a result of the war against Japan and the events arising out of that war. Our mediation effort was merely another phase of the attempt to bring peace and stability to China and to help that nation become a stabilizing influence in the Far East. This involvement has led to charges of interference in Chinese internal affairs and to the growth of anti-American feeling both within the Government and in non-Communist circles outside the Government. The Chinese have traditionally turned against foreign powers which became involved in Chinese internal affairs. Soviet attempts at mediation might thus lead to Soviet involvement and Chinese resentment of undesirable consequences growing out of such mediation might accrue to the USSR.