893.00/3–548: Telegram
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 8—10:41 p. m.]
114. News correspondent (American) yesterday informed me that she and colleague had received from source connected with Li Tsung-jen story purporting to give basic reasoning behind Li’s candidacy for Vice President (ReContel 24, January 13).2 Projected political move contemplates development by three general stages as follows:
- (1)
- Threat in military situation might cause Generalissimo accept reforms proposed in veiled terms in Li’s initial announcement of January. Chiang’s approval of candidacy would indicate he approved reform project, whereas his support of Yu Yu-jen’s3 candidacy would indicate refusal.
- (2)
- In event acceptance of program and Li’s election to Vice Presidency, negotiations would be undertaken to reach some understanding with Communists bring cessation civil war.
- (3)
- [In] Implementation such hypothetical understanding, Chiang would probably have [to] resign temporarily.
Informant stated story possibly given out intentionally for publication with certain attached conditions: First part might be given fully, second part suggested, third part not mentioned at this stage of matter. Li source implied it was assumed Generalissimo had not yet made up mind whether throw support to Li or Yu but another [Page 133] newsman reports that UP correspondent (Chinese) Nanking has informed Shanghai office that Chiang has definitely decided to back Yu. This would fit in with report conveyed Contel 115, February 9 to Embassy.3a In light existing circumstances following deductions seem warranted:
- 1—
- Li group in making present publicity moves motivated by desire bring American public opinion to bear on situation, it being assumed there exists American support for reform move.
- 2—
- Group plans major reorientation of policy if they get Li into Vice Presidency.
- 3—
- Such policy would possibly be with reference to military as well as political and economic affairs.
- 4—
- It is still uncertain whether truce arrangements with Communists would be possible or whether group as alternative move might contemplate strategic reorientation and adjustment of military position.
- 5—
- In any event it is evident from logic and what is known regarding position of Chiang and reputed plans that Chiang’s removal from scene is contemplated. Plan probably actually proposes such removal would be permanent.
Indications are Li’s move is well planned project for giving successor leadership to optional government thru facilities offered by institution constitutional processes. His plan probably has more powerful supporters than those whose names have thus far been mentioned. Generalissimo’s support of Yu Yu-jen would seem on face of things sufficient to give stamp official Kuomintang approval but it is to be noted that Li and his group may well have considered this possibility that candidacy of such figurehead as Yu and pushing of Li candidacy by “undemocratic processes” would in itself create situation favorable to certain types political moves by Li group and that perhaps some alternative move has already been formulated.
As observed by quoted news correspondent, it is to be anticipated that Generalissimo’s resistance to projected reform will be in direct ratio to strength of his conviction that American aid is forthcoming.
Sent Department as 114; repeated Nanking as 178, Tientsin and Shanghai 110.