Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/12–3147: Telegram

The Consul General at Mukden (Ward) to the Secretary of State

Mukden, December 31, 1947—6 p. m.
[Received January 2, 1948—12:38 a. m.]

408. Inasmuch crypto work Mukden in arrears, this message sent to Dept with request be relayed Nanking as 546, Tientsin as 140, Changchun as 393, and Peiping as 115.

Summary military situation Mukden December 30. Sources Wang Hwa-yi, ESD,² Assistant American Military Attaché, and miscellaneous. All material except personal opinion verified by more than one source.

Present situation Mukden serious but not critical. Communist strategy becoming apparent. Communists have massed all troops in northeast in Mukden–Hsinmin–Chinchow–Changwu–Faku areas. Total strength estimated 6 columns or 27 divisions. Very few Communist troops remaining Changchun–Kirin sector or areas east Mukden, one Communist column in [Anshan?]–Yingkow areas. Some days back large Communist units remained as potential threat outside outer Mukden defense perimeter while small mobile forces infiltrated through Govt lines and made spot attacks localities close proximity Mukden.

Obvious Communist intent create impression Mukden seriously threatened and cause Govt transfer all good troops to immediate Mukden area. Strategy having desired effect. Local civil officials and large property owners became exceedingly perturbed at sound gunfire and demanded added protection. Immediate fear seemed to be public uprising and fifth column activities within city rather than belief any mass Communist breakthru. As result Communist strategy units Govt new First Army [at] Changchun being withdrawn southwards together with much artillery and transportation (Changchun telegram 455 to Embassy³). These troops will move directly to Mukden, bypassing intermediate Communist strong points. Govt abandoned Ssupingkai December 30 by withdrawing efficient American trained and equipped Seventy-First Army to Mukden. (Virtually whole Communist fifth offensive centered around attempt recapture Ssuping which Communists now able take without engagement, giving them very valuable east-west railway.) Govt withdrew outposts outer defense line around Mukden and have settled in defensive positions awaiting Communist attacks. Kirin governor Liang Hua-hsun, now Mukden, has been ordered by Chen Cheng^3a return Kirin. Govt intelligence reported no appreciable number Communist troops Kirin area, Liang thereupon ordered by Chen send all good troops Mukden. Liang presently engaged this move.

Thus Govt has met Communist threat Mukden by consolidating its troops against Communist massing. From standpoint number of troops, equipment and fire power, Mukden now stronger than during many months past. Logistically and in long range planning Govt considerably weakened past several weeks by Communist move, Changchun and Kirin isolated and unless rout evolves and no other plans immediately thesis cities will soon be without efficient defense forces.

PNEH⁴ and Chen Cheng believe massing Communist troops near Mukden preliminary move in overall strategy by Communists rather than any serious intent attacking Mukden and do not anticipate attack on Mukden. They believe attacks too costly to Communists and not now sufficiently militarily or politically important warrant expenditure equipment, and men necessary Communist military conquest. Communist main purpose cut off Mukden from food supply adjacent areas and force depletion presenting [present?] meager reserves in city. Second objective when this accomplished remove bulk forces to Hsin-min area and effectively destroy Mukden–Peiping rail line, precluding troops, military supplies, and food reaching Mukden next 3, 4 months. Validity this believe substantiated fact Communists have not [now?] drawn bulk forces from immediate area Mukden and have presently concentrated them Hsinmin area. Third objective: Inasmuch all Government troops now or will be Mukden–Hsinmin areas, Communists move suddenly northwards and take Changchun and Kirin while holding position at Ssuping to prevent Government reinforcements being sent. In summary Communists’ immediate objectives in order importance:

1. Deplete Mukden food reserves and prevent other food supplies reaching city and at same time remove all obtainable rural food supplies outside Mukden outer defense lines.

2. Capture Hsinmin and completely destroy Mukden–Peiping line westward to Shansi.

3. Capture Kirin and Changchun. Mukden power administration officials instructed by Nanking not destroy Hsingfengman dam near Kirin but if necessary evacuate area. Turbines and generators to be operating and Government technical personnel to be present when and if Communists seize dam. This probably known Communists thru efficient intelligence network. Desire of comfort, prestige and economic advantages to be derived possession this dam may incite Communists make additional effort take Kirin area.

Mukden believed secure even though Communists decide all-out attack. Mukden defense extends depth all directions with well constructed fortifications controlling terrain. Sufficient first class troops man these defensive positions and will be supported by large numbers of inferior troops for reinforcement or replacement. Two airfields Mukden will probably be held as long as city in good hands. Both fields well defended with constructed fortifications placing them out range small arms fire. Food and ammunition supply for troops sufficient in Mukden without resupply withstand 3 months’ siege. Another 3 months’ supply Hulutao plus considerable civilian food. Consensus opinion Chinese military, American military and ConGen, unless some unusual and now unforeseen event occurs Mukden no danger being taken present offensive by military conquest. If civilian food shortage continues, internal trouble can be expected but well-fed military should be able cope this situation. Leader recent first food riot executed day following incident and no further major riots reported.

Officials cognizant fact merely holding Mukden not sufficient. Also realize cannot hold indefinitely without incoming supplies. Problem facing Government present time best way opening supply line. Chen Cheng not yet made decision. He is inclined believe should risk hazard and commit all force into attack, attempting get vastly superior number Communists into major engagement and neutralize them with superior Government fire-power. Principal opponent this strategy Wang Hua-yi who appears one of few persons enjoying Chen’s confidence. Has pointed out to Chen even Government victory such circumstances could still cost Government considerable number troops [and] cannot afford lose because Communists have much superior manpower and in event go undefeated would mean immediate abandonment all northeast. Wang’s thesis which he believes Chen will follow: Concentrate all possible forces Mukden–Hsinmin–Chinchow areas and open rail line Mukden-Hulutao. That China [Chen?] has acceded this idea some extent indicated his orders Government Fifty-second and part new First Army upon arrival Mukden be immediately sent Hsinmin. Two divisions Government 92d Army (Tientsin telegram 346 [356?] to Embassy⁵ being sent Chinchow. When all troops in position, coordinated attacks Chinchow and Hsinmin eastwards and Mukden westwards will be launched. Only two sources troops necessary for execution this plan: 1. Disregard it, hope for time and move troops in force northeast, launch major counterattacks (this would necessitate holding Changchun and Kirin as springboards) or [garble] troops, Changchun and Kirin area open supply route Mukden coupled with limited offensive operations necessitating virtual abandonment Changchun and Kirin in event Communists turn suddenly northward.

Inasmuch Hopei troops seemingly not available, Govt inclined follow second plan. Government feels time working their favor. Captured Communists inadequately clothed and many if not almost all suffered frozen hands or feet. Government believes if intense cold continues Communists will be unable launch heavy offensive and better-clothed Government troops will be able carry out limited offensive and reinforce Changchun and Kirin before Communists have opportunity strike in force. Little likelihood situation Mukden area will be changed in immediate future. Ease of tension Mukden will depend opposition Communists meet in anticipated effort take Hsinmin. One outcome recent events has been increasing admission upper echelons official circles Mukden, unless heroic and prompt measures are taken by Nanking toward strengthening Government grip on northeast, fall this area to Communists is certain even though such fall does not occur for many months.

Ward

2. External Survey Detachment No. 44, attached to the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in the Western Pacific.
3. Sent as telegram No. 261 to the Department, December 26, 1947, not printed.
4. Chief of Chinese General Staff commanding in Manchuria.
4. President (Chiang Kai-shek’s) Northeast Headquarters.
5. Repeated to the Department as telegram No. 312, December 27, not printed.