501.BB Palestine/3–1748: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
304. Following is delayed account of sixth meeting of permanent members on Palestine held in Gromyko’s offices from 10:30 to 1 yesterday morning.
Lie said he had presented to Jewish Agency the question on the possibility of their agreeing to a truce. He had received that morning a reply from Shertok indicating that they felt it necessary to refer the question to Palestine and expressed the hope that they might be granted a brief delay for a reply.
Tsiang said he had individually interviewed the heads of the six Arab states delegations here to ascertain their attitude towards a truce. They had individually agreed in their replies to the effect that if partition is suspended they will agree to a truce, otherwise not.
Tsiang went on to say that he wished to repeat what he had said before, that a military truce would have no validity without a political truce which equaled in effect suspension of partition.
Gromyko suggested that we study the nine points suggested by the Jewish Agency when we met with them. He thought some of these points might be agreed upon by the conferees and adopted by the SC. In response to a question by Tsiang he said he had in mind particularly the Jewish Agency’s points 3, 4 and 5 relating respectively to a threat to peace, a call on the Arab states to stop recruiting, etc., and a call on the Arab states to stop warmongering.
I then distributed copies of paper we had prepared and read to them the point[s] concerning the finding of a threat to the peace and the necessity for SC action.1
[Page 733]Gromyko said he was not in a position to agree to any joint document but that it might be possible for the conferees to agree on some of the fundamental points, the first being that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. (This was point 5 of US paper.) The second point Gromyko suggested on which we might agree was that the SC as one (he emphasized one) of measures to be taken should order (he emphasized order) the Arab states to stop sending assistance of any kind to the Arabs in Palestine, and to take measures to withdraw elements which have crossed into Palestine. If agreement could be reached on these two points this would be a step forward. It would not exhaust the requirements of the situation but would nevertheless be a step forward. He said that the crossing of these groups into Palestine was “absolutely abnormal and dangerous.”
I indicated that it would be very fortunate if the four of us could agree on strong, firm SC action to maintain the peace. With reference to the second part of the resolution passed by the SC on March 5, it would be fortunate if we could also work out something constructive regarding instructions to the Palestine Commission.
I said boiled down to the cold facts, we must find a way of getting these parties together because they must live together without force to hold them together. I did not mean to imply that we had abandoned the GA resolution. Our objective was to find a way, if possible, for peaceful implementation of the plan involving yielding on both sides so that the plan could go into effect without war.
Tsiang said he wanted to be cooperative but that with regard to finding that a threat to the peace exists, he felt that this finding must not be one-sided. It must apply to the infiltration of arms and armed forces by sea, as well as by land. He said it would be impossible to get a truce if a finding of a threat to the peace were one-sided. We must aim at the reduction of arms and armed forces by both sides. By making our action impartial we would promote prospects of an effective truce. He repeated that while he would like to see a truce be an effective truce, he did not see how we could bring this about if we had only a military truce without a political truce. He added that everyone knows the present situation is caused by the partition plan.
Gromyko said that paragraph 4 of our paper relating to the difficulty of peaceful implementation meant to him that the plan would be doomed at once automatically. Gromyko then went on to repeat in effect his arguments that there is at present a threat to peace in Palestine and that one of the steps that should be taken would be to [Page 734] order that those states responsible should stop their actions at once and take measures to withdraw their forces from Palestine.
Gromyko then digressed to express at length his views to the effect that we had spent all our time this past week only discussing the question of consultation with the Jewish Agency, etc., and that we were just beginning today to discuss the substance of the matter.
I said that assuming that there is a threat to the peace now, if we directed a finding against the Arabs we would put an end forever to the possibility of getting peaceful implementation of the partition plan. I wondered whether there was no longer any hope of yielding by the Arabs on three essential points, namely, immigration, sovereignty and territory. I emphasized that we would never be able to maintain a situation permanently by a ring of bayonets.
I went on to say that of course there were a whole series of actions under Chapter VII provided for in Articles 40, 41, and 42, as well as 106, which might be taken if there were a finding of a threat to peace under Article 39. If, however, we adopted such actions now, would we not cut off the possibility of bringing the parties together?
Gromyko observed that in effect any effort to find a means of peaceful implementation by modification of the partition plan was not carrying out the partition plan and was merely causing delay. He said the undeniable facts must be taken into account, first, that the mandate terminates on May 15; there would then be bloodshed and war (maybe a small one) he said, and we must not allow such a situation. Second, the actions of those responsible (implying the Arab states) must stop.
Parodi questioned Gromyko rather closely on whether Gromyko felt that the partition plan could or could not be carried out by peaceful means.
Gromyko replied that he did not know whether it could be carried out by peaceful means or not. We must, he added, adhere to the plan as it is with no modifications.
I raised the question of whether a new vote on paragraph 1 of our original resolution relating to acceptance by the SC of the GA’s request, subject to the authority of the Charter, would serve any useful purpose in order to determine how far the SC is willing to go.
Gromyko replied that the SC could take effective steps without formal approval of this paragraph 1.
Gromyko then went on to say in effect, let us get down to brass tacks. Do we agree that the situation in Palestine and its continuation constitute a threat to peace? If we agree to this, then do we agree on an SC order to the states responsible to cease their actions and withdraw forces already in Palestine?
Parodi said he wanted to make his position entirely clear. He was conscious of the great responsibility we had; he knew we were working [Page 735] for implementation of the partition plan which he, incidentally, did not like very much. We also had the responsibility for the maintenance of peace. In effect, he said he was not prepared to go too far too fast. He said that at present there is a sort of threat to the peace. He is not sure that this would be the time to proclaim it. He thought we should agree today to give a warning and be prepared to go further later should this seem necessary. He thought that a clear warning to the Arabs would counteract their impression that the SC is going backwards. If we went further than this the difficulties of Arab cooperation would be increased immeasurably.
I said that if we avoided naming the Arabs or directing a finding of threat against them we would preserve the possibility of peaceful development.
At this point Gromyko weakened in his position and said that it might be okay not to name the Arab states. He said, “if we are not able to adopt a more concrete decision, maybe we could adopt a less concrete decision.”
After we then spent a few moments discussing the form and details of a possible report to the SC on this point, Tsiang intervened with a strong objection that he could not approve a finding of a threat to the peace as it was being conceived and if this matter came to a vote in the SC he would have to abstain. He went on to say that we cannot under the Charter authorize any one party to implement a resolution by force. If the SC uses force that is one thing, but we cannot allow a private organization to use force. Tsiang then insisted that any finding of a threat to the peace be modified in such a way that Jewish as well as Arab elements be included.
After some further discussion of the differences in the various points of view I suggested that it would weaken the position of the conferees if an attempt were not made to report to the SC that afternoon as had been scheduled. It was agreed that at the Council meeting the president would merely say we needed a little more time for our consultations and would suggest that after hearing Chamoun’s speech the SC should adjourn having in mind a further meeting of the conferees in lie’s office following the SC meeting.
Our meeting broke up at this point with Gromyko observing that he felt he would have to express at the SC meeting that afternoon his dissatisfaction with the progress of the consultations since we had spent all our time talking about the American proposal for consultations with the Jewish Agency, etc. I told him if he found it necessary to do this I would certainly reply.
- The paper, in the nature of a development of facts
regarding the situation in Palestine, had been transmitted to the
Department by New York in telegram 299, March 15, 9:15 p. m., not
printed. Point 6 read: “A threat to international peace exists in
the infiltration of hostile elements into Palestine from the outside
whose purpose is to prevent by force the implementation of the
General Assembly resolution.”; point 10 read: “As a result of the
consultations of the permanent members regarding the situation with
respect to Palestine, they recommend (a) that
the Security Council should make it clear to the parties and
governments concerned that the Security Council is determined not to
permit the situation in Palestine to continue as a threat to
international peace, and (b) that the
Security Council should take further action by all means available
to it to bring about an effective truce in that country at the
earliest practicable moment.” (501.BB Palestine/3–1548)
For the text of the paper as subsequently revised, see telegram 953, March 18, to London, p. 739.
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