Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/3–1348: Telegram

The united Mates Representative (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret
us urgent

New York, March 13, 1948—1:30 a. m.

284. For Lovett from Austin. Following is account of meeting of permanent members today at Parodi’s offices between 2:30 and 5:30 p. m. [, March 12?].

Despite his position concerning “consultations”, Gromyko stayed throughout the meeting. Silver and Shertok represented the JA and the greater part of the meeting was taken up with their response to questions reported to Department yesterday. We had supplied JA with copy of these questions yesterday afternoon to assist their preparation.

Tsiang opened the meeting by saying he was under obligation as President of the SC to call a meeting for Monday, March 15, at 2:30, in conformity with the 10-day limit established in the SC resolution of last Friday.

Gromyko made a statement at the outset saying he wished to confirm his previous statements concerning the whole question of consultation, and to repeat that each word in his statement stands.

I countered by asking him what suggestions he would have for peaceful implementation of the plan of partition. He replied that my question does not relate to the subject, and I observed I thought the whole purpose of our meeting was to study the implementation of partition. I then asked the President whether he contemplated having a meeting to determine what we were going to report to the SC.

Tsiang in reply made clear that he was not present in his capacity as President of the SC. He said we had no chairman in our group and no rapporteur and he confirmed a brief statement by Gromyko to the effect that each of us would make his own individual statement in the SC, that is, his own evaluation of the situation.

(Tsiang’s observations on this point indicated clearly that there was no hope of getting any joint report by him as we had hoped, reporting the consensus of the views of at least three of us.)

I then asked Tsiang if his observations meant that our consultations were to be, therefore, wholly without any effect. Gromyko observed that I was attempting to confuse two things, and he asked me if the US proposal for consultation which I had made at our first meeting still stands. He apparently had in mind the general idea of consultation with the various groups. I told him that his question was no question at all and said I thought our mandate was clear under the resolution of the Council. I asked whether we were going to have an opportunity among ourselves before returning to the SC to discuss what each of us felt about this whole matter. Tsiang said he thought we might have a further meeting on Monday morning for the purpose of determining how far apart the four of us were and how near together. He emphasized that this would be to facilitate the smooth proceedings of the SC. He suggested that we meet at 10:30 Monday in his office. No objection to this was expressed but Gromyko made some deprecatory comment.

Tsiang then made a statement which started off in effect by agreeing with Gromyko’s position that the Council’s resolution under which we were operating means consultation among the permanent members to consider the question of peaceful implementation. He would like, however, to see all four of us start with the same data, and for this reason it would be certainly useful for us to hear the principal parties. On the other hand, we must abide by the resolution but it would certainly be more fruitful if we could get at the fundamental issues and facts.

Gromyko reiterated that he could take part in no consultations; that those who wished to do so would have to take responsibility and bear the full consequences of complications and delay in dealing with this Palestine matter.

Parodi said that at least three of us had agreed yesterday to invite Rabbi Silver to attend our meeting. He was now here with us at our invitation the only purpose of which was to be helpful. Parodi’s intervention gave Tsiang an opportunity to ask Rabbi Silver to go ahead.

After an expression of the usual amenities, Silver said that they were surprised at the question concerning possible modifications in the partition plan. Since this matter seemed to be in our minds, he thought it would be helpful if they were to restate their position before attempting to answer the various questions. He would like to indicate why the JA does not regard any reopening of the subject as helpful, why the present plan represented the irreducible minimum for them. He said that the proposed plan was to them the only practicable solution which had been arrived at after many other plans had been proposed and had failed of acceptance. The present plan was no easy solution but the whole question is a very difficult one.

Silver then emphasized that any solution which the UN would endorse and approve will require enforcement and this by now should be an axiom. He hoped that their position would not be interpreted as intransigeant. Events and circumstances, however, make this plan mandatory and imperative.

He then said that he had certain suggestions concerning SC action which he would like to make later if the group so desired. He at this point turned the floor over to Dr. Shertok who answered seriatim the questions directed to the JA as follows:

Question No. 1:

Shertok emphasized that the partition plan is acceptable to the Jews. This was repeatedly stated during the GA and there had not seemed to be any occasion for a formal statement to this effect during the present phase of the matter. He said that world Jewish public opinion overwhelmingly supports this plan. Any views to the contrary are relatively insignificant.

There could be no more effective form of ratification of the plan for the Jews than the setting up of the provisional council of government which the Jews were only too eager to begin doing. Shertok then criticized the mandatory power as being responsible for delays in setting up the PCG.

Question No. 2:

Shertok said this really involved two closely interrelated questions: (a) Can the plan be implemented by peaceful means and (b) can it be implemented by agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine? In respect to (a) he gave a flat no, if by agreement is meant formal public agreement in advance of implementation.

Implementation by peaceful means on the other hand could not be answered so simply. The Jews had always reckoned on a measure of physical opposition, but on the other hand, a large measure of acquiescence by the Arabs of Palestine. If they were left alone to go ahead, they felt that considerable sections of the Palestinian Arab population would be willing to acquiesce and cooperate. The factor which has completely changed the picture is the armed intervention of neighboring states which constitutes the most blatant form of aggression under the resolution and the charter. This aggression involved not only the neighboring states but also the Arab League which has a separate interest of its own.

Question No. 3:

The JA endorsed the answer clearly implied in the first part of this question. Their readiness to form the PCG includes putting in working order and carrying out such tasks as might be put upon it under the resolution. They were constantly and actively working out the taking over of various administrative services, etc.

Here again the problem of transfer from the mandatory government was of great importance and lack of cooperation from the mandatory amounted to a request that the Jews give birth without a pregnancy. The Jews could not predict a smooth process in establishing the PCG, and unless Arab aggression is checked, they would be faced with a more difficult situation after May 15. Even assuming however, that they are facing a turbulent period, they are confident they will be in a position to assert the authority of the Jewish state and maintain essential services. This presupposes the establishment and equipment of the militia contemplated in the plan. It also contemplates that restrictions on the importance [importation?] of arms would be lifted. If given what they have asked for, they believe they would be able to defend the Jewish population and territory.

This does not mean that they have abandoned the idea of an international force. They still believe this is necessary but it is a question for the SC to decide, particularly the permanent members.

If no international force is provided, this would mean much more serious losses both to Arabs and Jews.

Question No. 4:

Shertok said that they had had a great many conversations with Arabs, not only in Palestine but also outside.

Within Palestine they had not had any conversations with the AHC but with a number of Arab notables, many of whom had come to the Jews.

Soon after the UNSCOP report was made public, they had approached the SYG of the Arab League who rejected categorically, without reservation, any attempts to confer. The JA has the minutes of this conversation which they will make available in confidence, reserving the authority over its publication. Shertok also said that months ago a letter was sent to the SYG of the Arab League, to which no reply had been received. This letter would also be made available, if desired.

Shertok described at some length the tremendous potential opposition to the AHC among Arabs in Palestine, who did not, however, have sufficient courage in their convictions to be willing to fight for them.

Question No. 5:

Shertok said that all essential elements of the plan are essential. The combination of essential elements make up the irreducible minimum acceptable to the JA. This includes statehood, sovereignty, territory, control of immigration, a seat in the UN.

He said the JA would “view with alarm any attempt to tamper with any element of the plan”. It was like tampering with a single block of a wall. In the process of tampering, the whole structure might collapse. The JA could not be party to any such attempt.

Question No. 6:

There are no modifications in the present plan which would commend themselves to the Jews. There were a number of modifications in favor of the Jews which would be, of course, acceptable, but they did not imagine we had such modifications in mind. They might be willing to give up territory here and take on more territory there, so long as the result did not amount to less territory.

Shertok saw no possibility of any modifications which would make the plan acceptable to the Arabs. He said that nothing less than complete subversion of the plan would satisfy them.

Question No. 7:

Shertok gave a flat no to this question as it is put. The particular form of economic union, as presented is not considered essential by the JA. It amounts to a substantial curtailment of sovereignty. It was finally reluctantly accepted as (a) part of the whole scheme and (b) because it has some appealing aspects. They accepted economic union, but did not ask for it. Economic union is not an obstacle to the creation of the Jewish state, nor is it a valid reason for failing to set up the Jewish state.

The UNSCOP report provided for economic union as a condition of establishment of the proposed state. As Shertok recalled it, it was proposed by the US in Committee 1 that a mere undertaking to cooperate in economic union, if and when established, was sufficient.

Question No. 8:

The answer is definitely yes. The Jews would cooperate in the administration of Jerusalem by the UN, considered, however, as a part of the plan. It was a hypothetical question, but if it were contemplated that Jerusalem might be administered by the UN quite apart from the plan, this would create a serious obstacle to cooperation. He reserved the position of the JA with regard to a change which the TC has made in the provisions of the GA resolution concerning proportional representation in the municipal council for Jerusalem. The TC had changed the fixed quotas, resulting in 18 Jewish members and 19 non-Jewish members.

Question No. 9:

The question of guarantees for the Arabs in the Jewish state has not been raised by them. Shertok made a rather lengthy statement to the effect that the Jews were ready for any paper guarantee that can be formulated, but they preferred trust in their good faith and self interest. It was obviously a basic principle in the self interest of the Jews to treat the Arabs fairly. There were too many Jewish hostages throughout the world. They would be living in a glass house in Palestine under the severe light of world public opinion.

I asked Rabbi Silver about his suggestions for SC action, and he read them to the group. The text of these recommendations follows in next telegram.¹

Parodi then asked if the SC should address a solemn appeal for a truce between all parties until the termination of the mandate, what would be the reception of this appeal by the JA. Would the Jews be able to control their own people and what would be the reception by the Arab community?

Shertok replied that the Jews would wait a certain number of hours to see the effect of this appeal on the Arabs. If the Arabs complied, there would be no violence. If the Arabs did not comply, the Jews would resist. While waiting, they would make preparations for defensive, protective measures against possible attack. There would be no attacks on the British if steps were not taken to prolong the mandate. His personal interpretation of the Arab attitude would be they would ask whether the UN intended to abandon the partition scheme or implement it. In the latter case, a simple appeal would have no effect.

I asked what the effect would be of an order by the SC under Article 40 of the charter. What would be the Arab states’ attitude as members of the UN. Shertok replied that such an order, if it were specifically addressed to the Arab states, would be likely to be more effective than a general appeal without direction at all. Shertok went on to say that a pernicious doctrine was being spread in the Middle East that UN will not follow through. Therefore, the Arabs have nothing to worry about. An appeal or order would have to be backed by a show of force and great willingness to use force if necessary.

In respect to a question by Tsiang, Shertok said that the whole question of territorial modifications had been gone through in great detail time and time again. The Jews had already made very great sacrifices and he could not conceive of any territorial modifications which would make for acceptance by the Arabs.

In respect to a further question by Tsiang, Shertok said that the Jews insisted on control of immigration because this was a question of sovereignty. He went on to say that it is the most essential part of the whole scheme. The most fundamental root is that the Jews must have the keys to their own homeland in their own hands. There must be a place for Jewish persecutees in need of a home which would be solely in the control of Jews. And exclusive control of immigration was the most powerful argument in persuading the Jews to accept the partition plan.

On the other hand, the Jews recognized the necessity for sound planning. They had in mind a rate of immigration of 80,000 to 100,000 a year, subject to variation depending on the economic situation of the existing population, Arab as well as Jewish.

In respect to a question from me concerning the absorbative capacity of the Jewish state, Shertok replied that they contemplated about one million in the next decade.

Silver interjected to indicate that there was time when there was a great reservoir of Jewish immigration, especially in eastern and central Europe, amounting to 7 or 8 million Jews. This reservoir had given rise to Arab fears that Palestine would be inundated. Six million of these Jews had perished during the Nazi regime. They would expect, perhaps, as many as 700,000 or 800,000 Jews from Europe and perhaps 200,000 or 300,000 from other areas, principally the peripheral Arab states. There was no cause for any fear of inundation.

In response to my question concerning the emigration of Jews from Palestine, Shertok said that under the Turks, emigration had about equalled immigration. In the late 20’s and early 30’s, there had been a small backwash of emigration which had virtually ceased in 1932 and there was no emigration thereafter until after the war. The volume of emigration at this time is insignificant. In respect to a question by Tsiang, Shertok and Silver indicated that the ratio of Arabs to Jews in all of Palestine would be roughly half and half with two million Jews and two million Arabs. Tsiang asked whether there had been a rise in anti-Jewish feeling in the Arab states. Shertok replied that the Jews had at best been tolerated by the Arabs through the ages. They were second or third class citizens subject to all sorts of formal disabilities, the classic example being in the Yemen.

There were no more questions and Rabbi Silver and Shertok left the meeting.

Gromyko then attacked Lie for the press coverage of yesterday’s meeting, in particular, Gromyko insisted that he had never said he would not attend a meeting at which the JA was represented. He had simply made clear that he would not participate in consultations with representatives of the JA or the AHC, etc.

After some discussion, it was then agreed that a new attempt should be made to have representatives of the AHC appear and answer the questions proposed to be directed to them. It was agreed also that Lie would present these questions to Nakkleh, the only AHC representative in NY, informing him of the meeting Monday morning. It was apparent that Gromyko would attend this meeting, making clear, however, that he was not participating in consultations with the AHC.

Following meeting, members of my staff took Lie to our offices, as a matter of convenience, where Lie met Nakkleh and handed him the questions explaining briefly that he had been asked to do so by the group of 4 permanent members and explaining the circumstances.

Nakkleh received the questions and said he would cable or telephone them to Jerusalem. In doing so, however, he wanted to make his own personal position clear, namely, that he was not participating in any consultations in so doing.

During this brief interview, there was a very unpleasant interchange between Nakkleh and Lie. Nakkleh charged Lie and the secretariat with a prejudiced position in favor of the Jews and Lie retorted he had not come here to be insulted. After Lie left, Nakkleh stayed behind and staff officers repeated to him once more our position re consultations with the AHC.

As Lie left, he told us privately that he was convinced of our sincerity in our efforts to find a way, if there is any way, of implementing the partition plan by peaceful means. He was therefore doing everything in his power to support this effort by us. He was afraid we would find, however, that it would be impossible to implement the plan by peaceful means. Therefore, it would have to be enforced. Otherwise the UN would go downhill rapidly to nothing.

Austin

1. No. 285, March 13, 2 a. m., not printed.