501.BB Palestine/12–2748
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Robert M. McClintock
Mr. Bromley1 phoned at 11:10 this morning to say that a telegram had just been received from the Foreign Office in response to the British Embassy’s report of its conversation yesterday with Mr. Satterthwaite and myself, the results of which were summarized in the Department’s telegram No. 4928,2 for Jessup in Paris. The Foreign Office telegram said that a report had been received by the Security Council from Dr. Bunche3 which made clear that there had been “unprovoked aggression from the Jewish side”. In view of this, the Foreign Office was disappointed that the Department had not taken a more responsive attitude yesterday but was persuaded by our suggestion that it would not be useful to introduce a new resolution seeking to reaffirm the resolutions of November 4 and 16. The Foreign Office was hopeful that the problem could be dealt with in substance by existing machinery but did very much wish that the State Department would be able to join it in taking appropriate measures, if warranted by the facts.
I told Mr. Bromley that we were yet in ignorance of Dr. Bunche’s report and did not know what the facts might be. When we were in [Page 1693] possession of the facts we would determine our attitude in the Council and elsewhere. I said once more, however, that we were most concerned to maintain our position as a useful member of the Conciliation Commission and that, accordingly, the British should not look to us to make dramatic speeches in the Security Council. I added further that the situation seemed very complex according to the newspaper reports and that in my own mind it was by no means clear as to who was aggressing whom. I concluded by remarking that according to today’s press, Mr. Eban of the Jewish Foreign Office had indicated that his government still wanted peace by negotiation but would resort to all-out warfare if no negotiations were possible. I suggested that we might take this statement as our text for the morning sermon and see what might be done to help the parties negotiate a peaceful settlement. I suggested that this need not be done on a completely broad front but could be accomplished piecemeal as, for example, by negotiations between Abdullah and the PGI. I added, however, that Mr. Bromley’s Arab clients had an infinite capacity for political blunder and that I was not sanguine as to the auspices.