Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/12–2148

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State¹

secret

[Washington,] December 21, 1948.

Participants:	The Acting Secretary
	Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel
	Mr. Wilkins—NE

Mr. Epstein called on me this afternoon at his request for the express purpose of thanking the United States Government, on behalf of his government, for the continued support and assistance which the United States Delegation had given the Israeli Delegation at the recent meetings of the General Assembly and the Secretary Council in Paris.

Mr. Epstein said Israel particularly appreciated Dr. Jessup’s remarks in the Security Council on December 2² with regard to Israel’s application for membership in the United Nations and regretted that, thereafter, France and Canada had been unable to vote in favor. Mr. Epstein was of the opinion the Cairo news release with regard to the El Faluja pocket in the Negev appearing at that moment—possibly deliberately—had prevented favorable action by the Security Council.³ Nevertheless, Israel appreciated to the full our support and hoped developments in Palestine would soon permit favorable reconsideration by the Security Council and the admission of Israel into the United Nations during the April session of the General Assembly.

I told Mr. Epstein that prior to the recent Security Council meeting we had discussed the question of admission with both France and Canada and, in the case of France, understood they were prepared to vote in favor. We had not, however, been so certain of Canadian support. I agreed with Mr. Epstein the Cairo news release had undoubtedly been a determining factor in the Security Council’s failure to take action.

I pointed out in this connection that we had recently again been approached with regard to the Israeli troops on Lebanese territory and asked Mr. Epstein if he could tell me anything about it. I said that if Israel troops were in the Lebanon it would undoubtedly serve as a basis for further Arab charges in the Security Council which might, as in the case of El Faluja, have a continuing adverse effect on Israel’s application for admission. It seemed to me that it would be helpful if these troops could be withdrawn. Mr. Epstein said he had no recent information and was not informed on the subject but understood Israeli troops were on Lebanese territory because Syrian troops were in occupation of Israeli territory. Mr. Epstein said he realized this was not an answer to my question but that it was the best he could give me at this time.⁴

Mr. Epstein went on to describe in some detail two major problems which now confronted the Provisional Government of Israel. The first of these problems was their relations with the various Arab states. Mr. Epstein hoped the United States Government would shortly be able to take constructive economic steps in assisting the countries of the Near East to raise their social and economic standards. Israel would genuinely support such action. Mr. Epstein said his government was firmly convinced that Israel could not exist as a flourishing oasis in a Near Eastern desert in which political, social and economic conditions were deteriorating. Israel feared demagogues and extreme groups in the Arab countries might take advantage of present conditions to further their own limited objectives. Governments might fall and foreign elements such as Russia might exploit the resulting situation. Mr. Epstein concluded that American aid to the Arab countries would prevent developments of this character and would in the long run benefit the Arab states, the United States and Israel.

Mr. Epstein said the second major problem confronting Israel was their relations with the British. The British had always been a realistic and pragmatic people and were at long last beginning to realize that Israel was established and would continue to exist. Mr. Epstein hoped, on behalf of his Government, that the United States would take every feasible step to assist in the establishment of improved relations between Israel and the British Government. Mr. Epstein considered such improvement as essential because it would assist Israel in improving its own relations with the United States and with the Arab states.

I interjected that my previous experience as a banker before entering the Department clearly showed the British were realistic and pragmatic but preferred to let matters develop slowly and gradually. It occasionally required a considerable period to convince them of a basic change in the situation. I pointed out the Department had exerted strenuous efforts for the past 8 or 9 months to persuade the British Government of our views with regard to the change in the situation in Palestine. I said I believed that we had been successful in this effort.

I then asked Mr. Epstein if he had any news with regard to the proposed elections in Israel. Mr. Epstein said elections where scheduled to be held on January 25, 1949 and expressed the hope that the United States Government would be able to take some action before that date which would strengthen the hands of the moderates in Israel and thus assure control of the government by MAPAI, the central groups and the religious groups. Mr. Epstein did not suggest what type of action the United States Government might take but hoped that we would be able to devise some action. Mr. Epstein added, in response to my query, that Israeli discussions with Export-Import Bank were progressing favorably and did not believe the Department should approach the Bank on the subject at this time.

Mr. Epstein pointed out that as two of the members of the new Palestine Conciliation Commission—France and Turkey—were considered to be pro-Arab, it would be extremely helpful if a “good” American were appointed. Such appointment would give the Israelis increased confidence in the Commission and would be greeted with favor in Tel Aviv. I said that the Department had sent a list of 10 or 15 names to the White House but that a Commissioner had not yet been selected. I said I felt sure a sound, substantial man with profound legal knowledge would be appointed, one who would study the situation and take a direct line.

Mr. Epstein asked me if I thought de jure recognition were feasible at this time. I said I thought not. Mr. Epstein agreed with me.

Mr. Epstein again urged we give thought to some action which would strengthen the hands of the moderates during the proposed elections. I said we would give further thought to the matter. Mr. Wilkins added that, in his opinion, the solution of outstanding military problems in the Negev, particularly El Faluja, and of the question of Israeli troops in Lebanon—in other words constructive steps under the Security Council resolution of November 16—would create a favorable impression upon such members of the Security Council as France and Canada. It might subsequently result [that] the Security Council would be able to take favorable action on the Israeli application for admission prior to the January elections. Such action might strengthen the hands of the moderates and the United States would, therefore, be in a much stronger position to support Israeli admission. Mr. Epstein at first thought such discussions should be solely within the province of the Conciliation Commission but agreed, following further reference to the November 16 resolution, the military commanders could conclude such arrangements immediately. I pointed out excellent progress had already been made in Jerusalem in this respect. Mr. Epstein seemed impressed.⁵

1. Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.
2. For text, see SC, 3rd yr., No. 128, p. 8.
3. The Security Council voted on the Israeli application for membership in the United Nations on December 17. Five affirmative votes were recorded, including those by the United States and the Soviet Union. Syria opposed and Belgium, Canada, China, France, and the United Kingdom abstained. The application was rejected as it failed to obtain the necessary seven affirmative votes (SC, 3rd yr., No. 130, p. 37). For Department comment, see Department of State Bulletin, December 19, 1948, p. 763.
4. The Department, on December 23, informed Beirut of Mr. Lovett’s suggestion to Mr. Epstein regarding the desirability of withdrawing Israeli troops from Lebanon and authorized the Legation to so inform the Lebanese President. The Department requested that no publicity be given to its action (telegram 789, 867N.2390E/12–2348). The telegram was in reply to No. 620 from Beirut, December 16, p. 1670.
5. In a memorandum of December 21 to brief Mr. Lovett for his conversation with Mr. Epstein, Mr. Satterthwaite informed him that Israel had submitted separate loan applications to cover specific projects, as suggested by the Export-Import Bank. The Bank was said to be studying the applications with “a sincere and genuine interest” and proceeding as rapidly as possible. The memorandum concluded with the observation that “The Department is in constant contact with the Bank on this matter.” (811.516 Export-Import Bank/12–2148)