867N.01/12–1748
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State1
| Participants: | Mr. Lovett, Acting Secretary |
| Mohamed Kamil Abdul Rahim, Egyptian Ambassador | |
| Mr. Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Director, NEA |
The Ambassador opened the conversation by saying that the last time that he had talked with me was on the occasion of his courtesy call on his arrival, and he felt that time had come when it would be helpful for him to discuss certain problems of current importance. First of all, he said he wished to emphasize his very sincere personal interest in the maintenance of friendly relations between Egypt and the United States. Such had been his long-standing persuasion and, in fact, it was essentially for that reason that his Government had chosen him as its representative in Washington. I thanked the Ambassador and told him that he could be assured that we entirely reciprocated his sentiments and I felt that we could go forward on that basis.
The Ambassador then spoke of the friendship which had traditionally characterized relations between the United States and Egypt but which had recently been clouded by the Palestine situation. He said’ that sentiment on the Palestine situation ran deep in the minds of the Arab people, who were convinced that they were gravely endangered by the introduction into their midst of an alien group with aggressive intent.
I interrupted at this point to observe that it would, of course, be fruitless to enter into discussion of the development of this situation, but I did want to emphasize the realities of the case with which we are now faced. The fact is that there is a very considerable group of Jews who are physically in Palestine and who could not be removed from the scene except by a force of arms which cannot be mobilized against them. Consequently, it is necessary to regularize the situation as soon as possible so that this new group can be enabled to take its place as a responsible entity in the society of nations and so that present uncertainties, such as the lack of clearly defined boundaries, may be eliminated. This objective and dispassionate viewpoint is the basis of United States policy, and it seemed to me that the interests of the Arab States, and especially of Egypt, might well be served by a similar unemotional recognition of fact. What we need above all is peace. As the Ambassador was probably aware, the American Government had in the recent past been giving serious consideration to certain economic projects in the Middle East, and American private interests, particularly the oil companies, were prepared to make vast expenditures in the area which would redound to the benefit of the local population [Page 1673] But nothing could be dohe without peace and that was the reason why we must emphasize that aspect of the situation.
The Ambassador said that he appreciated this expression of the American viewpoint and that he also had been grateful to note what had been done at American instigation for the benefit of the unhappy Arab refugees. He felt, however, that there was one aspect of this situation which merited emphasis and that was the attitude of the Arab peoples themselves, irrespective of what the policies of their governments might be. The reaction to the Palestine situation by the ordinary man on the street in the Arab countries was one of fear: fear of Jewish territorial encroachment, fear of cut-throat Jewish economic competition, and fear that Israel is a center from which Communism will spread its tenacles to the Arab countries. The result of these very deep seated and strongly held fears was that, regardless of what policies the Arab Governments themselves might follow, the Arab people felt that they would be endangered by a Jewish State and would not consent to negotiations premised on the recognition of Israel. Furthermore, it was not true, as the Israelis were seditiously [sedulously?] asserting, that the Arab armies had been defeated. Actually, Arab casualties had not exceeded one percent and no real test of strength had ever taken place.
Referring to the Ambassador’s assertion of the danger of Communism in Israel, I observed that the group from which the present Government in Israel has largely been drawn professes to be strongly anti-Communist, and it was my belief that such was actually the case. Moreover, the stronger opposition elements professed similarly anti-Communist sentiments, and the Communist Party itself was of negligible importance. I said that if the counsels of these more moderate elements were to prevail, it was essential that the solution of the Palestine problem should be by peaceful means Continuing strife would only benefit the extremists.
Returning to the Ambassador’s remark regarding the military side of the question, I said that, speaking as one who had had some slight acquaintance with military matters, I would suggest that it would be unwise of the Arabs to discount Jewish military strength. The Israeli Army is sizeable, well-equipped and has high morale. Furthermore, facilities for production of war materials in Israel have been developed. But the really important point was to get away from any idea of a military settlement and to stress peaceful negotiation. Any attempt to force the issue by a trial at arms would only result in chaos, formidable expenditure and the creation of an opening for bringing in reinforcements from behind the iron curtain. Under such circumstances, Communist influences would indeed have a field day.
To summarize and to emphasize, I said, our policy is to recognize the accomplished fact of Israel’s existence and to seek to regularize the [Page 1674] situation by peaceful means. The United States has a real interest in the Middle East and values the friendship of the Arab countries, but the only way in which cooperation can be renewed effectively is by the return to normal conditions through peaceful negotiation.
The Ambassador said that this exchange of views had been very helpful, but he wished to leave with me the idea that it should still not be too late to rethink this whole problem in order to endeavor to find a more satisfactory solution. Time was no longer pressing and he hoped that the United States Government would think again before taking any further action, such as de jure recognition or a loan. I replied that I doubted if we really had much time at our disposal. Time might indeed be running quite short if a peaceful solution were to be effected.
[Here follow two paragraphs dealing with the question of Italian colonies.]
- Drafted by Mr. Hare.↩