Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/12–1048: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State

secret

London, December 10, 1948—6 p. m.

5197. Delga 1120, December 8 to Department. While Embassy has not considered it appropriate to discuss with Foreign Office pros and cons US recognition Transjordan as suggested by Bunche and will not do so even informally unless Foreign Office raises matter, Embassy is of opinion that UK now more than ever would welcome this gesture towards Transjordan by US as definite contribution to Middle East stability at difficult juncture. Factor in this connection which had to be considered hitherto was effect of US recognition Transjordan on neighboring Arab states where there is strong likelihood that US action would be interpreted as bribe for Transjordan coming to some arrangement with PGI (Provisional Government of Israel). However British disillusionment with other Arab states now runs deep (Embassy’s 5137, December 7) and present British hope is that stature Abdullah will be increased by all means. Foreign Office feeling is that since other Arab states burned their bridges in Paris their reactions to aggrandizement Transjordan become much less important than previously. Consequently, Embassy is fairly confident that US recognition Transjordan, particularly if accorded very soon thus setting PGI and Transjordan on more equal footing prior inevitable negotiations, would be welcomed warmly by UK.¹

2. Department’s guidance requested.²

Sent Department 5197, repeated Paris for Gadel 1022.

Douglas

1. Mr. Stabler, on December 10, suggested the desirability of de facto recognition of Transjordan at this time, noting that “Transjordan has now reached virtual armistice agreement with Israel as result recent cease fire talks in Jerusalem and appears willing continue these conversations on military level, although at same time envisaging their extension at suitable moment to political level (paragraph 1 mytel 138, December 2). There is, however, some reluctance to go further at this stage but believe such could be overcome if Transjordon felt it had support of United States as well as British Governments which would give it equal footing with Israel and Egypt, the other prime factors in reaching solution in Palestine.” (Telegram 149 from Amman, 501.BB Palestine/12–1048)
2. The Department, in reply on December 14, stated it was advisable “not deviate from present plan, which calls for extension full recognition Transjordan and Israel Govts as soon as permanent Govt elected in Israel.” (Telegram 4655, 501.BB Palestine/12–1048)