Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/3–848

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)¹

top secret

[Washington,] March 8, 1948.

Subject: Big Five Consultation on Palestine Situation—First Meeting.

I telephoned Mr. Rusk at 3:20 p. m., to inquire the outcome of this morning’s Big Five consultation in the office of Mr. Gromyko on the situation in Palestine, responsive to the Security Council’s resolution of March 5.

Mr. Rusk said that the results had not been fruitful. Mr. Gromyko had been completely negative to the idea of setting up a working group or of taking testimony, in effect, from the interested parties such as the Palestine Commission, the Jewish Agency, the Arab Higher Committee, and the Mandatory Power. While he did not object to individual members of the Big Five consulting with the parties at interest, he was adamant in his insistence that the Big Five should not consult as a group with the parties. Mr. Gromyko contended that the consultation contemplated by the Council’s resolution was limited to direct consultation between the USSR, US, UK, France and China.

Mr. Rusk plans to consult with the French and Chinese Representatives this afternoon and will report later on these conversations. In a preliminary way, however, he raised the question, “What should the Department advise if the Russians persisted in their present attitude?” Would it be better to terminate Big Five consultation quickly, report back promptly to the Security Council, and then give our speech on the situation after May 15?

I told Mr. Rusk that it seemed perfectly obvious that the Russians would persist in their attitude and that I would report the results of the morning meeting to Mr. Lovett.

It seems to me that it would be unfortunate for the Big Five to go through perfunctory motions of consultation and then pitch the ball back at the Security Council. It seems to me that the following line of action could be tried:

1. The United States, France and China should ask questions of the United Kingdom as Mandatory Power. This would, in effect, constitute Big Four consultation and leave the Russians standing out as intransigents by their own choice.

2. The United States, France and China, collectively if possible, and severally if not, should query the Palestine Commission, the Jewish Agency, and the Arab Higher Committee on the situation in Palestine within the terms of the Assembly’s resolution of March 5.

3. Following this “taking of testimony” we will be in a much better position to come back to Big Five consultation. We can then freely ask questions of the USSR and other permanent Members of the Security Council. More important, if the Soviet Union asks the United States leading questions such as whether we are still in favor of partition, we could, on the basis of the testimony previously gathered, express valid doubts.

4. Following this Big Five consultation a report could be made to the Security Council by March 15, after which the ground would be better prepared for Senator Austin’s proposed statement.²

1. Addressed also to Mr. Henderson.
2. Ambassador Austin furnished a detailed summary of the First Meeting of the permanent members of the Security Council on the Palestine question in telegram 256, March 8, 3:25 p. m., from New York, not printed. At one point in the meeting, he “stressed that we proposed to proceed with partition plan as the basis and find out whether there are any modifications in detail which would be acceptable both to the Jews and Arabs and therefore make it possible to implement plan by peaceful means.” (501.BB Palestine/3–848)