Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/11–2248: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

top secret
us urgent

Washington, November 22, 1948—5 p. m.

Gadel 551. We approve language suggested for para. 5(b) as contained in Delga 862, Nov. 20.

We have given careful study to Delga 859, Nov. 20, as well as Delgas 848, 849 and 857,¹ providing recent Israeli comment on UK draft resolution and Israeli idea of a “simplified resolution” which might serve to meet immediate requirements in this GA.² We do not feel receptive to Israeli suggestion for such a resolution at this time. We are now on record as supporting the general principles contained in Bernadotte’s seven basic premises with amendments. Careful reading by Israeli representatives of Jessup’s statement Nov. 20³ will show that attitude of US is favorable to them but that this govt is publicly on record as feeling that Bernadotte Plan is a basis for negotiating a settlement and conciliation of differences between the two parties.

On the other hand we feel that British position is unduly rigid and in fact somewhat unreal. Conditions which prevailed last Sept and which prompted Secretary’s statement of Sept. 21 in support of Bernadotte Plan have materially changed as result of military operations and political conditions in countries concerned. In consequence we feel that British will defeat their own purpose, which is a prompt and definitive territorial settlement, by clinging stubbornly to every dotted I and crossed T in Bernadotte Plan.

On question of negotiations mentioned para. 1, Delga 859, Nov. 20, we feel it would be useful to tell McNeil and Beeley that neither of our govts, should “freeze” to fixed positions. We favor at least recognizing desirability of direct negotiations (your suggested new para. 2) because one party to conflict—Israel—has consistently expressed willingness to negotiate and because two of other parties—Transjordan and Egypt—have apparently undertaken clandestine conversations with Israel.

We have no thought of either UK or US putting pressure on Transjordan as victim of a Near-Eastern Munich. However, we fail to see why our two govts should not in a friendly way counsel with the parties in an endeavor to work out a meeting of the minds. If there were such an agreement arrived at secretly and soon, it would then be possible to join with British in securing passage of a GA resolution which would give international confirmation by UN to agreement privately reached, thus saving face of Arab leaders. If this should not prove possible, appointment of proposed Conciliation Commission would establish machinery for a continued effort to reach final settlement.

In fact it seems to us that present time is propitious for a settlement. There are two recent significant indications of Israeli statesmanship and moderation which serve to substantiate this opinion. One is Israeli deference to Mediator’s order for withdrawal from Negev to Oct. 14 positions. The other is important initiative taken by Jewish Commanding Officer, Jerusalem, as reported Jerusalem’s 7491 [1491], Nov. 21, to Dept, repeated Gadel 9. From Arab point of view (providing Bevin does not encourage them to wishful thinking by veiled promises of Brit, aid in form of rearmament) it should be obvious that in light of their own military weakness relative to Israel present moment offers opportunity of reaching a quick settlement which in view of present GA interest in problem need not be on terms disadvantageous to them.

We for our part would be prepared to give most urgent advice to PGI to continue counsels of moderation which it exhibited in accepting Acting Mediator’s request for a withdrawal in the Negev. US stands willing to be of service to parties if they feel that a go-between is necessary or would be willing to see any other friendly govt perform such service. All concerned would welcome a definitive settlement now rather than prospect of dragging out this acrimonious interchange for another year under auspices of a committee optimistically named “conciliation.” Furthermore, an agreed settlement now would be bailed with acclamation by other members of UN and would stand out as principal achievement of third session UNGA.

As concluding paragraphs of Delga 859 aptly point out, Israelis want negotiations and no Bernadotte Plan, British want Bernadotte Plan and no negotiations. US position is to bridge gap between these two extremes. We regret however that it is not possible to accept British endorsement paragraphs as suggested final para. Delga 859.

Repeated to London as 4397 for Ambassador.⁴

Lovett

1. None printed; telegrams 848 and 849 are dated November 19 and 857, the following day.
2. The Israelis opposed the British view that the General Assembly determine territorial lines and favored their demarcation through negotiation between the parties. Their “simple resolution” called for extending the Security Council’s armistice efforts and the appointment of a conciliation commission which would assist the parties in reaching agreement (Delga 849, 501.BB Palestine/11–1948).
3. See editorial note, p. 1617.
4. Filed with this telegram is an information copy bearing the following marginal notation in Mr. McClintock’s handwriting: “Cleared with Clark Clifford, 6:30 pm Nov. 22.”