Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/11–1848: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

top secret   us urgent
niact

Washington, November 18, 1948—5 p. m.

Gadel 522. We have given immediate consideration to UK draft resolution whose text is set forth in Delga 796, Nov. 17,¹ and to proposed amendments to that resolution suggested in Delga 797, Nov. 17. It is of paramount importance that Delegation’s action on any draft Palestine resolution in Com. I conform absolutely to basic policy considerations established by Telmar 148, Nov. 10.

Taking commentary in Delga 797 first, we have following four comments:

(1) We confirm your interpretation of US policy to British as meaning that Israel should not have both Negev under Nov. 29 resolution plus Galilee under Bernadotte plan.

(2) On British objection to leaving Palestine settlement to negotiation between parties, we feel that their own insistence on “compulsion” can be used as an argument in favor of GA “compelling” parties to negotiate. Your substitute for paragraph 2, UK draft, would afford such compulsion.

(3) As for British apprehension lest failure to endorse would be interpreted by public opinion as retreat by UK and US govts from positions formerly adopted, we are impressed by statement of Acting Mediator Bunche Oct 15² that Bernadotte himself did not regard his recommendations as hard and fast, take-it-or-leave-it plan, but as a basis for negotiating a settlement and conciliation of differences between the two parties.

(4) Without “expressing general sympathy” or approval British draft, we concur that you should vote for resolution as a whole (refer last para Delga 797), provided our amendments are carried. We assume however first vote after amendments will be paragraph by paragraph, and that final draft will conform to policy in Telmar 148. Otherwise you should abstain from voting on such final draft. We concur with your statement to British that we cannot agree to any resolution which permits any alteration in Nov 29 frontiers of Israel without consent of Israel.

Following are Dept’s comments on Delegation’s proposed amendments to UK draft in Delga 796:

• Paragraph 2: We accept your suggested amendment.
• Paragraph 3: We accept your suggested amendment.
• Paragraph 5: We accept initial paragraph and paragraph (a), however paragraph (b) should read as follows:

  “That certain adjustments in the territorial arrangements of the GA resolution of 29 Nov. should be considered through negotiations directly or through the UN Conciliation Commission; should the Jewish State desire to remain in occupancy of Jaffa and Western Galilee, compensatory arrangements should be made in the Southern Negev, which should then form a portion of the Arab territory of Palestine.”³

Other drafting changes in British text contained in Delga 796 seem unobjectionable and an improvement over draft contained in Delga 351, Oct. 16. However, it would seem useful to include Paragraph 10 of draft contained in Delga 351 immediately preceding Paragraph 10 of Delga 796.

Although Dept has not seen text of Delegation’s proposed speech it desires to emphasize that Telmar 148, Nov. 10, is a basic policy statement of the President and that any speech of Delegation must be in precise conformity with that policy.⁴

Repeated to London—eyes only for Ambassador.

Lovett

1. Not printed.
2. Before the First Committee of the General Assembly; see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948, p. 160.
3. The Department, on November 19, altered a portion of the wording of paragraph 5 (b) on the recommendation of the United States Delegation at Paris in a telephone conversation the night before. It directed that the seven words immediately following the semicolon, from “should” to “remain” be changed to “if as a result of such negotiations the Jewish State remains” (telegram Gadel 533, 501.BB Palestine/11–1948).
4. Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: “Read to Key West 4 p. m.” At 11 p. m. the same evening, the Department notified the United States Delegation at Paris that although it had been impossible to clear Gadel 522 with President Truman, the Delegation was to treat the communication as a binding instruction (Gadel 527, 501.BB Palestine/11–1848).