Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/11–1748

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] November 17, 1948.

I have read the position paper unanimously adopted by our Delegation in Paris on Palestine with much misgiving. This paper is reproduced in Delga 762, November 15 [16]. According to Delga 761, November 16, the fundamental purpose of the paper was to “cement Delegation and prevent explosion and on this point the paper has served most useful purpose”. However, later in Delga 761 Mr. Rusk asks that clearance be given to the paper, together with general instructions permitting freedom of statement in Committee 1 without prior verbatim clearance. I understand from Mr. Humelsine that Delga 761 and Delga 762 were despatched last night to the President at Key West.

According to the statement of the Israeli Foreign Minister before Committee 1 on October [November] 15, Israel:

1. Refuses to relinquish the Negev,

2. Will never accept loss of “its share in the Dead Sea”,

3. Is uncompromisingly opposed being debarred from the Gulf Aqaba,

4. Claims “permanent inclusion in Israel of modern Jerusalem”, and

5. Claims all of Galilee.

Mr. Shertok concluded his sixty-five minute speech by saying that the United Nations should call on aggressors to end war and negotiate peace. He said the Conciliation Commission proposed by the Mediator should be a Good Offices Commission entrusted with the task of prevailing on the parties to meet each other for peace negotiations.¹

I submit that Mr. Shertok’s conclusions seem to be almost identically paraphrased in Paragraph 3 of the Delegation’s working paper, which reads as follows:

“The General Assembly should not adopt a new resolution delimiting boundaries in Palestine. It should, however, call upon the Arab states and Israel to enter negotiations for the establishment of a territorial settlement in Palestine. To assist in such negotiations the Assembly should appoint a conciliation commission which should on behalf of the United Nations exert every influence to bring about a final settlement of all questions outstanding between the parties.”

I further submit that the working paper, although it may have prevented an explosion in our Delegation in Paris, by no means meets the requirements of Telmar 148, November 10, which set forth the President’s instructions on how the Delegation should deal with the Palestine problem in the General Assembly.

The President’s instructions requested the Delegation to seek to combine the President’s fundamental position on Palestine—the territorial dispositions of the November 29 resolution—with the Secretary’s general recommendation of the Bernadotte Plan on September 21. The President’s telegram said:

“Fortunately we are able to continue to subscribe to all the seven basic premises in the Bernadotte Plan and all his specific conclusions, with the exception of his recommendations regarding the boundaries of Israel.”

It would appear that the working paper should at least provide for mention of the fact that this Government supports all seven of Count Bernadotte’s basic premises. A statement to this effect in the preamble of whatever resolution is placed before the Assembly would go far to redress our position with respect to the Secretary’s statement of September 21.

As for the specific operational clauses of the working paper, the first one calls for acceptance by the parties of elements common to the General Assembly’s resolution of November 29, 1947 and the conclusions of the Bernadotte Report. Unfortunately, the only element of these two documents which is in common is the single recommendation in both with regard to the internationalization of Jerusalem. Accordingly Paragraph 1 would seem to be of little practical effect.

The real heart of the Delegation’s working paper is Paragraph 2, which leaves to the Conciliation Commission consultation with the parties to determine to what extent the recommendations of the resolution of November 29 afford a basis for an agreed settlement, and, as to matters not so settled, to what extent Count Bernadotte’s conclusions can constitute such a basis.

Mr. Shertok said on November 15 that the Provisional Government of Israel could not consider the Bernadotte Report as even a basis for discussion. On the other hand, the Arab Governments have on innumerable occasions stated that they would never consider the resolution of November 29, 1947 as a basis for discussion. The Representatives of three Arab governments said yesterday in Paris they would not consider the Bernadotte Plan as such a basis either. Here, again, therefore, it would seem that the principal operating paragraph of the Assembly’s working paper will have little practical effect.

I have a lively fear that the working paper, which is obviously the lowest common denominator which could win agreement among the strong personalities composing our Delegation, will certainly not prove a useful guide for our action in the Assembly, nor does it entirely conform to the directive established in Telmar 148.

I also submit for your consideration the fact that of the five points cited by Mr. Shertok, as listed above, two principal points—the claim to Jewish Jerusalem and to Western Galilee—directly challenge the logic approved by the President in Telmar 148.

However, if the President now approves this working paper he will in effect, in my opinion, have nullified much of the position taken on November 10, and our Delegation will find itself as a matter of practice recommending to the Assembly precisely what Mr. Shertok asked for in the conclusion to his speech of November 15. I recall that the President said to you that “If the Jews hold me to my contract, they will have to keep theirs”.

As for Jerusalem, although the working paper provides that the Conciliation Commission shall present detailed proposals for a permanent international regime to the next session of the General Assembly and, meanwhile, that the city should not be annexed in whole or in part either to Israel or any Arab state, it leaves the interim administration of the city to an arrangement between the Commission and local authorities, which, in effect, would continue the present partition of the town and without any guarantees of free access to it.

Meanwhile, the United States Representative on the Security Council joined with other members of the Committee established by the resolution of November 4 in advising the Acting Mediator to call for the withdrawal of Israeli and Egptian troops, pursuant to that resolution. Dr. Bunche has now established provisional demarcation lines “in full consultation with the Committee” and has set November 19 as the effective date for the establishment of these lines. It is a matter for interesting speculation as to what action our Delegation will take in the event that the parties refuse to heed the call of the Acting Mediator. A possible guide may be found in the concluding paragraph of the working paper contained in Delga 762, which is entitled “Settlement by Peaceful Means”. This paragraph reads as follows:

“The United States and the Assembly should insist by all practicable means that the war in Palestine is over and that the parties should now, with the cooperation of the United Nations, proceed to work out a final settlement by peaceful means. Specifically, no party is entitled or should be permitted to exploit military capability as an instrument of pressure during the course of negotiations. The General Assembly should leave to the Security Council the task of bringing about an armistice at as early a date as possible.”

To sum up, I feel that if the President does approve the working paper he should at least suggest that our resolution endeavor to incorporate more of the ideas expressed in Telmar 148. This could be accomplished by the preamble referring to the November 29 resolution and the Bernadotte Plan, with the operative part of the resolution recommending a territorial settlement to the parties, to be worked out invoking the good offices of the Conciliation Commission.

1. For Mr. Shertok’s statement of November 15, see GA, 3rd sess., Pt I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948, p. 640.