USUN Files

Memorandum by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, at Paris

top secret

Subject: Conversation with Michael Wright on Palestine

1.
Michael Wright had spent Sunday1 with Mr. Bevin and had come over at Bevin’s request in regard to Palestine and particularly the report which I transmitted to you last night and this morning.2
2.
(a) As regards the immediate issue, i.e., the movement of antiaircraft equipment, ammunition and reinforcements to the U.K. air establishment at Amman, I explained to Wright that you were not now in a position to make any comment.
(b) Speaking very personally not on behalf of my Government and not as a reflection of your views, I explained to him why it seemed to me preferable for the British to postpone this step probably for at least another 24 hours when we might have a clearer view of Israeli’s attitude toward the Security Council resolution and the Bunche proposals.
3.
After some discussion, I suggested to Wright that he cable London informing the Prime Minister:
(a)
that I was returning to London tomorrow afternoon and that I would personally transmit your comments;
(b)
that in talks here with the representatives of Israeli it was indicated that they would probably accept the Security Council’s actions; and
(c)
that it was my very personal view that it would be better for the British to postpone their contemplated steps to reinforce their installation at Amman until I arrive in London tomorrow afternoon.

This Wright is doing.
4.
Wright said that Mr. Bevin had asked him to reiterate his assurances that the U.K. had no desire whatsoever to throttle Palestine; that at the appropriate moment, if the Israelis behaved appropriately, the U.K. was prepared to extend de jure recognition and to take all the steps necessary for a full recognition of and friendliness toward the state of Israel. If, however, the Israelis failed to comply with the Security Council, Mr. Bevin felt that the arms embargo imposed on the Arab states should be lifted and no loans should be extended to the Israeli Government and that financial sanctions should be employed. In this connection, he said the imports to Israeli were now being financed by the U.K. through the release of sterling for this purpose.
Wright was also asked by Bevin to repeat:
(a)
that he attached great importance to internationalization of Jerusalem; and
(b)
that he was deeply concerned with the dilemma in which the U.K. would find itself if the Israeli mounted a strong attack against the Arab Legion. Wright said that it was Mr. Bevin’s strong inclination in this event not to stand aside and see the Arab Legion swept away.
5.
Wright suggested that when I return to London tomorrow afternoon and meet with either the Prime Minister or Sir Orme Sargent (acting for Mr. Bevin and Mr. McNeil in their absence), they would seek information on the following points:
(a)
Have we put as strong pressure on the Israeli to comply with the Security Council as the British have over the course of the last many months been putting on the Arabs?
(b)
Have we explained to the Israeli the folly of any further violation of the truce which they may commit?
(c)
What are our views on the Bernadotte proposals and have we advised the Israelis to accept them?
(d)
What is our position in regard to the imposition of sanctions if the Israelis flout the authority of the Security Council?
6.
Wright repeated the British anxiety over U.S.–U.K. cooperation and he implied that they were very apprehensive that the great progress which has been made toward establishing a common line of action might be dissipated at a very critical moment.

While I did not comment on any of the points mentioned in paragraph 5 above, I did impress upon Wright that very great progress toward a U.S.–U.K. concerted position had been made and that we should not be discouraged because at this particular moment the situation did not seem to be wholly clear; that we could really only assess the far reaching events which we had both achieved by clinging to a perspective of the ground we had covered over the course of the last 12 months.3

Lewis W. Douglas
  1. November 14.
  2. See Martel 134, supra.
  3. The memorandum (bears the following endorsement in Marshall’s handwriting: “I discussed this with Douglas. GCM”