501.BB Palestine/11–1448
The Israeli Foreign Minister (Shertok) to the Secretary of State, at Paris
Aut. 04–10
04–41
Dear Mr. Marshall: In our conversation yesterday you thought that I was unduly critical of the British in suggesting that their prime interest as sponsors of the November 4th resolution of the Security Council lay, not in their concern for the stability of the truce regime, but in their desire to achieve a definite territorial settlement, namely the exclusion of the Negev from the territory of Israel. You felt sure that the two issues were being kept separate.
After we left, I learnt from Mr. Eban that, in a recent conversation with him, Mr. Hector McNeil freely argued that the adoption of the November 4th resolution was essential to secure the implementation of the Bernadotte Report. Mr. Eban reported at the time the gist of that interview to members of your Delegation. Mr. McNeil’s statement came as a clear admission of the British political and territorial interest behind the sponsorship of a resolution designed, on the face of it, to stabilise the truce. My apprehensions as to the real motives of the British attitude thus appear to be fully justified.
It came to my knowledge only after our interview that the Security Council sub-committee had in the meantime decided, by majority, to endorse the Acting Mediator’s plan for the withdrawal of the forces in the Negev. If you would bear in mind what I put before you in my two cabled messages, and what I submitted yesterday orally, I am sure you will appreciate the utter gravity of the issue which has now been created. Conflict with the Security Council, or for that matter with any organ of the United Nations, is the very last thing we would wish to see ourselves involved in, but when avoidance of conflict entails the sacrifice of most fundamental national interests, I fear that we are left with no choice.
[Page 1582]I take this opportunity of most earnestly repeating the plea that the Security Council should now concentrate on the resolution enjoining an armistice and the initiation of peace talks, and that this over-all resolution be taken to supersede and render superfluous the ad hoc arrangement proposed for the Negev. Insistence upon the latter can only reduce, and may even wreck, the chances of success of the former, whereas more forbearance on the minor issue, now that a fresh start is being made to tackle the problem in its major aspect, must enhance the effectiveness of the new approach.
I feel deeply alarmed by the apparent determination to pursue the November 4th line to the bitter end, and would venture to express the hope that, under your enlightened leadership, and in the interests of all concerned, the United Nations and we may be spared this unnecessary ordeal.
Yours very sincerely,