Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/10–3048: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London

top secret   us urgent
niact

Washington, October 30, 1948—12 noon.

4155. Eyes only personal for Secretary from Lovett.

1. Expert election predictions published today forecast substantial Dewey majority of electoral votes by States but considerable improvement in Truman’s position in popular votes, Dewey getting about fifty percent, Truman about forty-five percent. Senate race very close with probable Republican control by very slim margin.

2. Deterioration Palestine situation, increasingly belligerent attitude Israelis, rumored further postponement Israeli elections to December and increasing British concern over condition Arab states causing us deep concern as to immediate next step in light of possible change of Administration. Platforms of both parties strongly support Israel and recent statements of Taft¹ in support Jewish claims suggest that vital matter of UN action on breaches of the truce should be made matter of agreed bipartisan policy if we are to be insured against further loss of international prestige by constant vacillation in an area in which our national security is vitally involved as is our policy of endeavoring to counter aggressive Communist moves.

3. Without some firmly agreed course of action between any succeeding Administration and our present one, I am fearful that action taken over next few days or weeks may set a pattern which, if subsequently reversed, could have disastrous consequences not only in Middle East itself but with our European associates in other vital affairs.

4. Accordingly I suggest following procedure for your consideration:

(a) Secretary discuss broad problem with Dulles Monday with particular reference to step that should be taken in SC with regard vote on UK–China Resolution with objective of recommending to President, in light his message Telmar 119,² action to be taken by USDel.

(b) Above action consistent with bipartisan policy approach which should be followed up by more formal understanding immediately after election if Republicans win. A disclosure of the serious immediate security problem and danger of long-range Russian infiltration through well-known methods are compelling reasons for unified and consistent program of action by this country.

(c) Since Congressional support would be essential, problem could be discussed with Vandenberg by me next week. He returns Washington 3 or 4 November.

(d) Matters of greatest urgency requiring full agreement appear from this distance to be action to be taken in event continued truce violations, position on frontiers—especially Negeb, status Jerusalem, Arab refugee problem, provision of UN supervisory force and makeup any UN police force.

5. I am sure you agree that our past experience with formally approved positions and instructions which are subsequently and suddenly altered or revoked is increasingly dangerous and intolerable. I can imagine what you have been through in Paris. It has been absolute hell here. As I see it, the national election itself, regardless of its outcome, gives us a new chance to review our Palestine policy, agree on a bipartisan approach and plan a consistent course of action which we can stick to honorably and resolutely.

Would much appreciate your views. Best regards.³

Lovett

1. Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio.
2. Dated October 29, p. 1527.
3. This telegram was repeated to Paris as Telmar 124. Secretary Marshall, in reply on October 31, stated: “I agree generally with proposed course and emphatically with present extreme dangers of situation. Will see Dulles Monday on his return from Scandinavia but fear this will not give time for him to consult Dewey and get his instructions before vote on Palestine resolution.” (Telegram 4690 from London, 501.BB Palestine/10–3148)