Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/10–1448: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, at Paris

top secret   us urgent
niact

London, October 14, 1948—3 p. m.

753. Re Delga 319,¹ repeated London as 1058.

1. I do not have at my disposal the substance of what was apparently Lovett’s telephone conversation with Rusk, nor do I have a copy of Telmar 63.² In these respects I am, therefore, in the dark.

2. It will, I think, be difficult enough, even under the most favorable circumstances with the US and UK standing shoulder to shoulder, to obtain a ⅔ vote in favor of the Bernadotte proposals in the GA. I fear that the language of Cohen’s proposal would give the public impression that there is a cleavage between the US and UK, thereby making favorable action of the GA more difficult, if not unlikely. Should the GA fail to endorse the plan, we will be in a position as critical as, if not more serious than the one in which we found ourselves many months ago.

3. While I can well understand Cohen’s desire to have language along the lines of his proposal, I would not be candid with you were I to refrain from saying that it goes much farther in its implications than the proposed language agreed to by Bevin yesterday with, I can assure you, a not inconsiderable amount of effort, tact and persuasiveness.

4. I was unable to see Bevin this morning, because of the Commonwealth meeting which he had to attend. I did, however, see Wright. His very strong view was that the language of the last two paragraphs, of the statement which was discussed with Bevin yesterday is dangerous enough. Even it, on the eve of GA consideration, is a public recognition by the US that amendments to the Bernadotte plan are necessary. It may therefore encourage a variety of corroding proposed modifications which may eat away at the “reasonable, equitable and working basis for a settlement” which the Bernadotte plan attempts to provide. Nevertheless, if it is absolutely essential from US point of view that such a statement be issued with the three changes which the Secretary suggests, the UK will understand.

5. We have labored patiently and tediously to undo the mistakes which both the US and UK have made in the past. We have brought together what were two widely divergent approaches to the problem. We have convinced the UK of the stability of our position, and therefore have inspired their confidence in us. Similarly, the UK, largely as a result of our efforts, has accepted partition and acknowledged the existence of Israel, thus giving us reason for reposing faith in their cooperation on the agreed line of action. To run the risk of undoing what has been so tediously and laboriously accomplished by a statement along the lines of Cohen’s proposal would, I think, be taking chances with fate. I can give you assurances that the Cohen proposal would turn back the clock many months, interfere with joint US–UK action, cause a rebirth of doubts as to the stability of US policy, and hazard the outward recurrence of a serious menace to our national interests.

6. I most earnestly hope that if any statement at all is issued it will not come from the White House. I recognize, of course, that the intimate advisers of the President would much prefer that he, himself, make a pronouncement. But he himself would be the first to realize that no political position, however high—no public office, however great its prestige, is worth gambling with the vital interests of the US.

7. I would not be serving you, the President, and my country to the best of my ability were I to withhold what I realize is a blunt but considered statement of my best opinion.³

Sent Paris (for the Secretary—eyes only) as 753; repeated Department as 4503.⁴

Douglas

1. Dated October 13, p. 1470.
2. Dated October 12, not printed; but see footnote 5, p. 1467.
3. Mr. Lovett did not make the proposed statement at his press conference of October 13. The only matter regarding Palestine that arose at the conference was the attitude of the United States toward the new Arab government. Mr. Lovett stated that “the United States had already recognized the State of Israel but was not in a position to recognize this Arab government. Asked if [the] United States would recognize it in the Arab section of Palestine, Mr. Lovett replied in the negative and said that we were not in a position to recognize it at all because it has not conformed yet to the normal attributes which have been stated before.” (Memorandum by Mr. McDermott, News Division Files)
4. This telegram is printed from the text as repeated to the Department, marked “For Lovett (Eyes Only).”