Office of the Historian

501.BB Palestine/10–1348: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret   us urgent
niact
London, October, 13, 1948.

4486. For Lovett’s eyes only from Douglas. When I discussed with Bevin this morning the draft, particularly the last paragraph, of the statement which you intend to make regarding Palestine at your press conference this afternoon, he said that he was unhappy that it should be necessary for either US or UK to mention publicly modifications of the Bernadotte proposals since the new and forceful element behind them was the announced intention of US and UK to support these proposals in their entirety. So accustomed had the world become to seeing US and UK on opposite sides of the fence on this issue that our present agreement will be a vital factor in achieving Arab and Jewish acquiescence.

2. Bevin said, however, that if there are compelling reasons for the US mentioning modifications, to his mind the important thing is that the equilibrium of the Bernadotte proposals should not be disturbed. He and I together went over your statement and after discussion Bevin told me that he would regard its purport as being less disturbing if statement were to read as suggested in immediately preceding telegram No. 4485.1

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3. You will note that changes have been made only in the last two paragraphs to introduce the idea of equilibrium and to remove the hint it is still possible for the two sides, without the intervention of UN, to reach an agreement between themselves.

[Here follows paragraph numbered four regarding conversations between Mr. Bevin and Commonwealth Prime Ministers on Palestine.]

Sent Department as 4486; repeated Paris for Marshall’s eyes only as 742.

Douglas
  1. Dated October 13; it advised that Mr. Bevin had acquiesced in the following wording of the last two paragraphs of Mr. Lovett’s proposed statement at his press conference on October 13: “The two parties are, therefore, far apart in their respective views. The only hope for a solution of the Palestine issue lies in the wisdom of the United Nations.

    “In our opinion, the Bernadotte plan provides a sound basis for the adjustment of their differences before the United Nations. It should not be too difficult to reach a solution even though the United Nations may find it wise to make minor modifications which do not disturb the equilibrium provided for in the Bernadotte recommendations.” (501.BB Palestine/10–1348)

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