501.BB Palestine/10–548
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State1
Subject: Palestine—The Bernadotte Report
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| Mr. Moshe Shertok—Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government of Israel | |
| Mr. Aubrey Eban—Representative of the PGI to the United Nations | |
| Mr. Fraser Wilkins—U.S. Delegation |
Mr. Shertok called on me this morning at his request.
Mr. Shertok said that a great deal had happened during the past five months and it was now clear that the State of Israel had been able to establish its government and to defend itself against its enemies. He believed the Arab States which had invaded Palestine after May 15 were convinced that the State of Israel was established and that the Jews could not be pushed into the sea.
Mr. Shertok continued that the Jews have recently received two blows: one was the Bernadotte Report and the other was our support of Count Bernadotte’s specific conclusions.
Mr. Shertok said that their principal objection to the Bernadotte Report lay in the assignment of the Negev to the Arabs for three reasons:
- 1.
- Loss of a desert area which the Jews could develop for the absorption of immigrants. Israel planned to irrigate the Negev and to develop it agriculturally. Israel had, for example, already established approximately thirty settlements in the Negev. The Negev was the potential land reserve of Israel. The Arabs, if they had it, would never develop it as has been the case for centuries.
- 2.
- Loss of access to and utilization of the Dead sea The General Assembly November 29th Resolution had specifically provided for Jewish access to the Dead Sea and for control of approximately one-quarter of it at its southern end. Count Bernadotte’s Report now took this source of mineral wealth away from them. It was important that the Palestine Potash Company, which was a Jewish enterprise, remain in Jewish territory. Israel ought to have the opportunity of making use of the Dead Sea as a vital factor in its own economy and as a factor in developing economic relations with the Arab States.
- 3.
- Loss of access to the Gulf of Aqaba. The General Assembly November 29th Resolution by giving Israel all of the Negev gave them access to the Gulf of Aqaba and thereby to the Red Sea. The waters [Page 1453] of the Gulf were well stocked with fish. Israel planned to develop a fishing industry there. Israel planned rail and highway communications between the southern end of the Dead Sea and the Gulf. Mr. Shertok stressed the latter point as of importance because they wished to avoid, if possible, Suez Canal toll charges and feared “Egyptian surprises” (presumably Egyptian interference with Israeli shipping) which would make it necessary for Israel to have a port on the Red Sea in addition to ports on the eastern Mediterranean.
I asked Mr. Shertok for his views regarding Galilee. Mr. Shertok said that although the General Assembly November 29th Resolution had not assigned Western Galilee to Israel, they had subsequently won it by force of arms. They still needed all of Galilee for reasons of defense. Galilee alone would not be adequate for the settlement of immigrants to Israel.
Mr. Shertok pointed out that the Arabs frequently argued that a Jewish State which followed a policy of unrestricted immigration would soon press for additional territory. Mr. Shertok believed, on the other hand, that if the Negev were lost to them Galilee would not be adequate to absorb immigration into Israel. Mr. Shertok also added that the Arabs frequently argued that a Jewish Negev would be a wedge driven between the Arab States. Mr. Shertok was of the opinion, however, that a Jewish Negev might be considered as a link in a chain including a Jewish State and the Arab States following a settlement of the Palestine question and the development of friendly political and economic relations.
Mr. Shertok concluded by stressing the small size of Israel under the General Assembly November 29th Resolution, the further reduction in size under the Bernadotte Report, and the necessity for Israel’s having adequate area in which to live and grow.
I said that I agreed with Mr. Shertok’s view that the Arab leaders now seemed to be taking a more realistic approach toward the Palestine case, but observed that the reaction on the other side had been as I expected. I pointed out that the Arab leaders were now confronted by the problem of bringing the Arab peoples to accept the realities of the present situation. I said that I had been criticized by both Arabs and Jews for our support of the Bernadotte plan which was probably the best evidence of our impartiality. I told Mr. Shertok I would like to discuss the points which he raised with my associates. I would not, therefore, reply now but would see him again shortly.2