Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

IO Files: US(P)/A/C.1/5

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Henry S. Villard of the Advisory Staff of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly

secret

[Paris,] September 26, 1948.

Participants:	Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, Egyptian Delegation
	Henry S. Villard, United States Delegation

I took Fawzi Bey to lunch in the country yesterday and spent the better part of the afternoon discussing Palestine. Fawzi Bey’s attitude seemed essentially reasonable, in contrast to the aggressiveness of the Saudi Arabian Delegation, and I gathered the impression that his main preoccupation was that of saving face for the Arab states in a settlement of the Palestine problem.

Fawzi Bey said that if the General Assembly attempted to push through a solution based on an all-out acceptance of the Bernadotte recommendations, the Arab Delegations would refuse to have anything to do with the matter and would regard the solution as one imposed upon them. There would thus be no real solution of the problem, since the Arabs could not acquiesce flatly in the Bernadotte Report. The main objective should be, rather, to achieve a solution on the basis of conciliation and negotiation. To accept the Bernadotte Report hastily, merely because everyone was tired of Palestine and wanted to dispose of the subject quickly, would be a fatal mistake, for this is a crucial moment in the history of the Palestine question. If the Assembly voted a solution in which the Arabs could not acquiesce, the struggle would go on for years.

Fawzi Bey outlined his views as to the most acceptable procedure from the Arab point of view:

1. There should be a general discussion of the Bernadotte proposals in Committee 1, carefully steered by the Chairman in order to avoid pressure for an immediate decision.

2. At the proper moment a very small sub-committee should be appointed of carefully chosen nations to work for a negotiated settlement on the basis of the Bernadotte proposals, under the leadership of one or more “neutral” states. Possibly Belgium might qualify in this respect, with the addition perhaps of certain states which had abstained on the partition vote, together with one which had voted for and one which had voted against partition.

3. The role of such a sub-committee would be to conciliate opposing viewpoints on the Arab and Jewish sides and to bring forth a solution which both sides could accept under the urging of other members of the General Assembly.

It was pointed out by Fawzi Bey that both parties to the controversy have extremists in their midst and have publicly assumed positions from which they cannot officially retreat. Nevertheless, the possibility remains of finding a middle ground on which agreement could be reached without serious loss of face, particularly in the light of over-all General Assembly opinion. The best way of finding this ground would be outside of formal debates in the Assembly or in the heat of Committee 1 proceedings.

I asked Fawzi Bey what he regarded as the main objection to the Bernadotte proposals from the Arab viewpoint. In the order of their importance he said they were as follows:

(a) Boundary line for Israel. The main difficulty would be in drawing a line so as to incorporate as many Arabs as possible in Arab territory and as many Jews as possible in Jewish territory. The Arabs object to giving Galilee to Israel. I asked Fawzi Bey whether, in all the past attempts to draw a boundary, a line satisfactory to both parties had ever been suggested. Admitting that it had not, he nevertheless thought that some agreement could yet be reached. In this connection he noted that. Galilee and the port of Jaffa had previously been assigned to the Arabs, whereas now these areas were to be given to Israel.

(b) Status of Jerusalem. Fawzi Bey found the Bernadotte suggestion in this respect too vague, but said he was open-minded. Exactly what plan was in mind? The administering authority for the city must be very carefully selected in Arab opinion because of the danger of infiltration by the Jews and gradual taking over of the administration by them.

(c) Haifa and Lydda. Specific details of the free port status of these places would have to be worked out and agreed upon.

(d) Conciliation commission. The Arabs were doubtful of the efficacy and usefulness of this body. Again, Jewish infiltration and influence were feared by the Arabs.

Fawzi Bey made it clear that in the Arab view, the primary basis for a settlement would be the return of Arab refugees to their homes in Israel. It was essential that these people should be permitted to return to live where they have previously taken root, and monetary compensation would not serve as a substitute. He seemed to feel that in general the Bernadotte recommendations were satisfactory in this respect.

It was significant that during our entire conversation, Fawzi Bey made no objection to the existence of the State of Israel. He observed that the idea of a unitary state for Palestine was now outmoded, nor would the Arabs desire such a solution. A settlement would have to be reached “on the basis of present facts”. While the Arabs could not of course officially accept the existence of Israel, I had the feeling that Fawzi Bey’s entire objective is to achieve a settlement on the basis of negotiation in regard to the points enumerated above, and that if this can be done quietly the Arabs would be prepared to take a conciliatory line.

Finally, I asked Fawzi Bey what he thought the Russians would do. He replied that he had no information on this score, but that he felt sure the Soviet Union would play the game to serve their own interests—which would be to prevent any workable arrangements between the Arabs and the Jews.