867N.01/9–1248: Telegram
The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to President Truman 1
urgent
In your letter July 21,2 Mr. President, among other points you instructed [Page 1393] me to report to you on “appropriate time for full recognition” PGI. That time has, I believe, now come.
After more than four weeks intensive study here and further to my telegram to you (70, August 243) that indefinite truce cannot lead to peace without positive action to clarify situation, I am convinced that full recognition by the US now of PGI would accomplish four major US objectives:
- 1.
- Strengthen PGI moderates who want if humanly possible avoid renewal warfare.
- 2.
- Give Arab moderates, especially Abdullah (who knew past months decision battlefield was gravely adverse and who fear renewed warfare might result personal and national debacle), additional reason accelerate move towards settlement.
- 3.
- Remove major obstacle to peace negotiations by demonstrating to Arab intransigents fact that Israel’s existence cannot longer be denied or ignored.
- 4.
- Encourage British relax its non-recognition policy.
Unless US makes up own mind as in original recognition without waiting on British corresponding or related action, I see delay dangerous and possibly fatal to peace hopes. British present procrastination is continuation of His Majesty’s Government’s non-cooperation policy since UNSCOP partition recommendation and reflects same stubborn miscalculation of basic elements in this area. Judged by present results, British experts—except General D’Arcy and General Gort who warned that Jews would defeat Arabs—gravely misled their government and are still doing so. Hence, to wait on British is to invite failure.
Grounds justifying full recognition are found in PGI’s—(a) plans early election constituent assembly, (b) its control of state, (c) its repeated public and official expressed willingness negotiate peace settlement with Arabs.
In urging full recognition now I am aware of possible repercussions in Arab countries, including possible danger to Americans. However, I believe that clear statement to Arab governments given in advance through neighboring missions that such US action be not unfriendly but acceptance of Israel as fait accompli; and notification that US expects fullest protection its citizens would remove or greatly minimize danger. Furthermore, in this connection I wish observe that several other nations have accorded full recognition Israel without suffering danger or damage their missions or citizens in Arab countries.
I have also kept in mind fact that there are important unanswered questions about PGI’s attitude towards (a) Jerusalem, (b) November 29 frontiers, (c) Arab refugees. Despite these questions, I am convinced that de jure recognition in advance UN assembly would increase [Page 1394] chances satisfactory settlement these and related issues during peace negotiations.
Bernadotte and staff’s urgent recommendation peace effort at UN and their conviction that otherwise truce must lead to war within few weeks (refmytel 101, September 104) are additional reasons immediate full recognition. There can be no fruitful peace negotiations until Arab states see that Israel is definitely established.
Although legal differences between de facto and de jure recognition are regarded by some distinguished lawyers as slight, it would be difficult exaggerate practical value US decision full recognition advance UN Assembly.
Mr. President, your and Secretary’s action May 15[14]5 was highest statesmanship because it courageously Set constructive example. Completion now of what you both then began might be decisive for peace in Palestine and Middle East
Department please reply direct to Tel Aviv.
- Transmitted to the Department by Tel Aviv in telegram 104 for “personal attention President and Secretary.”↩
- The text of the letter is incorporated in Mr. (Lovett’s memorandum of conversation of July 21, p. 1232.↩
- See footnote 1, p. 1337.↩
- Not printed.↩
- See Secretary Marshall’s letter of May 14 to Mr. Epstein, p. 992.↩