Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351

Department of State Comments on NSC 27¹

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

NSC 27/1

The Joint Chiefs of Staff summarize their views on Palestine, as set forth in NSC 27, as follows:

“It would be incompatible with the security interests of the United States to have either United States or Soviet or Soviet satellite forces introduced into Palestine. They therefore recommend that the United States policy neither endorse nor permit a decision by the United Nations to employ military enforcement measures in Palestine.”

The Department of State has been keenly aware of the dangers involved in the entry of Soviet or Soviet satellite forces into Palestine and the Middle East. United States diplomacy in the Security Council prevented the USSR from sending military observers to Palestine for the use of the United Nations Mediator, Count Bernadotte. It was suggested to the Mediator that only the governments represented on the Security Council Truce Commission for Palestine (Belgium, France and the United States) should supply military observers. An attempt by the USSR to challenge this formula and to secure the adoption by the Security Council of a resolution which would have enabled the USSR also to send military observers was defeated, there being only two votes (USSR, Ukraine) in the Security Council in favor of the resolution.

As for participation of United States forces in maintaining peace in Palestine, the Department of State has repeatedly refused to consider any unilateral military responsibilities in that country. In addition, the Department has firmly resisted the repeated requests of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the United Nations Mediator for armed contingents of U.S. forces to make up a special guard for Jerusalem to insure the demilitarization of that city.

The considerations adduced in the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not, however, exhaust the problem. Although there appears to be no immediate prospect that USSR armed forces will be moved into Palestine, there is a constant threat of Soviet infiltration into that area which could seriously impair the security of the United States. The following examples indicate the nature of the threat:

(a) In open defiance of the Security Council’s resolutions of May 29, 1948, and July 15, 1948, the Czechoslovakian Government has permitted the movement of fighter aircraft, bombs, and other war material from an air base at Zatec to Tel Aviv. Further, there is evidence that the Czechoslovakian Government is now training mercenaries of various nationalities, but predominantly Czech citizens, for parachute and other landings in Israel.

(b) It is known that dissident Jewish groups such as the Stern gang and the Irgun Zvai Leumi are receiving assistance from Soviet forces and that such groups constitute a serious threat to the authority of the present Provisional Government of Israel. Although the USSR, as indicated in (a) above, supports the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine, it likewise seeks to strengthen Communist influence within Israel. The possibility that Soviet or Soviet satellite personnel and arms will be made available to these dissident groups might result either in an overthrow of the present government or in an orientation of its policy against the interests of the United States.

(c) There is evidence that considerable effort is being made by Eastern European governments, particularly by the USSR, to encourage disorder and unrest in the Arab states, presumably with the purpose either of overthrowing certain Arab Governments or of forcing upon them an anti-western policy. Encouragement of separatist sentiment within the Arab States, as in the case of the Kurds, is a part of the same effort.

Apart from the specific threats indicated above, United States security would be seriously prejudiced by large-scale fighting anywhere in the Middle East, but particularly in Palestine. Continued warfare between Jewish and Arab forces would undermine the gains which have been made in Greece, Turkey and Iran, might permanently alienate the Arab world from western influences, and might impose upon the United States a basic re-examination of its own world security position.

With regard to the United Nations aspects of the problem, the Security Council is required by Article 39 of the Charter to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace …” As a permanent member of the Security Council, the United States is subject to this obligation. It cannot be maintained that the situation in Palestine is not a threat to the peace. Such a finding by the Security Council does not in itself imply the use of armed force by the Security Council. Under Articles 39, 40 and 41 a wide range of Security Council action is available for the maintenance of international peace, without recourse to the use of armed force. For example, the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council on Palestine and neighboring Arab countries has been largely responsible for the present truce in Palestine, however imperfectly the truce might appear to operate. Modification of this arms embargo in favor of the party abiding by Security Council decisions is a powerful weapon of enforcement. Financial and economic embargoes are other measures which might be used if necessary.

United States policy toward Palestine is based upon the maintenance of the present truce, a negotiated settlement (which will include an independent state of Israel, some form of governmental structure for Arab Palestine and an internationalized Jerusalem) and a gradual reestablishment of the ties of friendship and common interest between the peoples and governments of the Middle East and the United States.

It is accordingly clear that the United States has thus far followed a policy of preventing the introduction of United States or Soviet or Soviet satellite forces into Palestine. United States policy has thus far neither endorsed nor supported a decision by the United Nations to employ military enforcement measures in Palestine. It is, however, quite possible that some situation may arise in the Middle East or in Palestine requiring the use of armed forces to protect the vital security interests of the United States, or to prevent the deterioration of the situation in that area to a point requiring an even greater commitment on the part of the United States. Obviously any decision involving the use of United States forces would have to be made at the highest governmental level, in the light of all existing circumstances, including the availability of armed forces and our military commitments elsewhere.

The Department of State believes, meanwhile, that the best chance for reestablishing stability in the Middle East under present circumstances lies in bringing to an early and successful conclusion the present mediation effort of Count Bernadotte, who was appointed pursuant to the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of May 14, 1948. The cooperation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in promptly furnishing observer personnel and equipment represents a major contribution to the processes of peaceful settlement.

1. Mr. Rusk, in a memorandum of August 26 to the Secretary of State, transmitted a draft of the Comments and noted: “It is obvious from NSC 27 that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were formulated without benefit of all the facts bearing on the Palestine problem and upon the role of the United States in the United Nations in dealing with this problem.” (501.BB Palestine/8–2648) A “final” draft, superseding the comments transmitted with Mr. Rusk’s memorandum, was prepared by Messrs. Rusk and McClintock on August 30 and cleared by Mr. Satterthwaite.

   The National Security Council noted the views of the Department on September 2. The following day it formally circulated the paper among its members as NSC 27/1, under a cover sheet entitling the paper “A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of State on U.S. Military Point of View for the Eventuality of United Nations Decision To Introduce Military Forces into Palestine” and dating it September 3, 1948. For NSC 27, dated August 19, see p. 1321.