501.BB Palestine/8–2748: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
top secret
London, August 27,
1948—9 p. m.
3878. Strictly personal for Secretary and Lovett eyes only. This refers to my immediately following telegrams numbers 3879, 3880 and 3881.1
- 1.
- Although Bevin received Cabinet approval (see my 3879) August 26 for working out with USG Palestine settlement along lines my 3880 and the circle of persons in London having knowledge of US–UK talks on this subject has thus been widened, he told me that even in British Cabinet special security precautions were taken. Only Cabinet members immediately concerned have seen document transmitted my reftel. To other Cabinet members its substance has been mentioned in general terms only.
- 2.
- I am taking special precautions to preserve secrecy at this Embassy and trust Department is doing the same. For reasons which I know you will understand Bevin is particularly anxious that circulation this correspondence be limited only to those who necessarily must study it and that every precaution be taken to prevent leakage and published or rumored speculations re British position.
- 3.
- When I told Bevin today (paragraph 1, 3879) that I would communicate his latest views to Department, I expressed personal view that prospects of early US agreement would be improved if I could communicate something of his views re recognition of Israel by HMG.
- 4.
- Bevin said that, for the eyes of the Secretary and Lovett only, he would be glad to make clear his own thinking re recognition PGI. What he would say would not be an undertaking and the question has not been discussed in the Cabinet nor has any decision been reached. However, it was his view, which he thought the Cabinet might support, that if, as a result of the plan now under discussion between the US and UK, Israel is firmly established within frontiers drawn by UN, if the remainder of Arab Palestine is disposed of satisfactorily, and if the international character of Jerusalem is preserved, he believed that the UK would extend full de jure recognition to Israel without delay. While he could not speak for the Commonwealth, he thought the majority of Commonwealth nations would do the same.
- 5.
- Bevin said that in principle he did not like the “halfway house” of de facto recognition. Moreover, if HMG were to recognize de facto, this would create a period in which Arabs would bend every effort to change the attitude of HMG. If HMG extended de jure recognition, however, this would be a final act discouraging to such efforts.
- 6.
- Bevin said, in connection with the foregoing, that much would depend upon how “the Jews played the game.” If the Jews continue to stress their aggressive intentions and to be mainly responsible for breaches of the truce (as his reports lead him to understand) it would make it much more difficult if not impossible for him to carry out his idea of full de jure recognition.
- 7.
- Re recognition Bevin expressed view that de facto recognition Israel is powerful weapon in hands USG. He thought that if PGI should show signs of aggressive intentions or be intransigent re Mediator’s proposals and all else failed he hoped USG would consider threatening PGI with the withdrawal of US de facto recognition.
- 8.
- I told Bevin that we have already taken steps to make clear to PGI (Department’s 3339 August 232) our determination to preserve truce and through it peace in Palestine. I said PGI is under no illusions that US would refrain from imposing sanctions against PGI if this were warranted. Bevin expressed his appreciation for what we are [Page 1354] doing in this regard and said he hoped we would continue to follow developments in Israel closely.
Douglas