S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351
Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to the National Security Council
NSC 27
Subject: U. S. Military Point of View for the Eventuality of United Nations Decision to Introduce Military Forces into Palestine.
[Page 1322]The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the possible military implications of the resolution submitted by the United States and adopted with amendments by the Security Council of the United Nations on 15 July 1948. In this resolution the Security Council has declared that failure by any of the governments or authorities concerned in military action in Palestine to comply with the Security Council’s order to desist from further military action and to this end to issue “cease fire” orders to their military forces and paramilitary forces would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the United Nations Charter requiring immediate consideration by the Security Council with a view to such further action under Chapter VII as may be decided upon by that Council. The Council has also declared that, subject to further decision by the Security Council or the General Assembly, the truce shall remain in force until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached.
The following views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter are forwarded to the National Security Council for their consideration:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently stated their opinion that it would, from the military viewpoint, be most inadvisable for Soviet or Soviet satellite armed forces to be permitted to enter Palestine or for United States forces to be committed there.
The entry of Soviet forces into Palestine would have the most far-reaching strategic implications in that the Soviets would then be entitled to land or sea lines of communications, either of which would entail the very serious consequence of Soviet entry into other Near and Middle East areas, and in that there would be no limitation on the number of Soviet forces that might enter Palestine with or without justification by the developing situation. The way would thus be open for Soviet military domination of the Near and Middle East, which would exert tremendously harmful influence on and even jeopardize our global strategy and resources in the event of war with our most probable enemy. The foregoing would also apply eventually to the entry of any Soviet satellite armed forces into Palestine in view of their close relationship with and control by the Soviets.
As for commitment of United States forces in Palestine, the consequences, from the military viewpoint, would be very grave indeed if action anywhere in advance of adequate military readiness on our part should lead to major military commitment; that is, actual major use of armed forces. Participation in enforcement of peace in Palestine by United States armed forces, no matter of what strength, must be viewed as the quite probable genesis of a series of United States deployments to Palestine which might ultimately attain such proportions that our military responsibilities in other parts of the world, which are vital to United States security, could not be either promptly or effectively met.
In view of the worsening world situation and the international appreciation of our current lack of military preparedness, it would be militarily unsound to endanger our world military position, as well as that of other nations dependent upon us for support (most importantly [Page 1323] and specifically those concerned in the European Recovery Program). by initiating such a series of deployments to Palestine in advance of adequate capability of major effort there, and in advance of provision to meet those other commitments which are vital to us and other courses of action on which we are embarked.
As for the adequacy of our present capability of major military effort, a reasonable estimate of the number of United States troops that would be required to enforce, or assist in enforcing, peace in Palestine indicates that substantially our entire present ground reserve, both Marine and Army, would be involved either initially or later. In other words, there would be no troops available for deployment to any other area at least until such time as the strength of our establishment had been sufficiently replenished through the operation of Selective Service. Until then, the United States would have to accept the loss of the bulk of its general reserve, as well as the training cadres necessary for the preparation of the units, soon to be organized, and the others which would be required.
Also, the logistical support of troops committed in Palestine would require a major effort within the Zone of the Interior and this in turn would have important bearing on our ability to carry out existing and projected programs of military assistance for our potential allies.
On the other hand, it is obvious that entry of Soviet forces into Palestine and commitment of US forces there would constitute a highly satisfactory arrangement from the Soviet military viewpoint. Only a small percentage of available Soviet armed forces would be necessary and these would open the way, as pointed out above, for Soviet military domination of the Near and Middle East, whereas this relatively minor effort on the part of the Soviets, as also pointed out above, would necessitate commitment of U.S. forces to an extent that would both seriously limit our current efforts to strengthen our military posture and result in non-availability of our present limited forces for emergency employment elsewhere. Thus, Soviet freedom of military action not only would be retained, but also would be improved, while that of the United States would be immediately restricted, and to an unpredictably serious extent.
In short, since our policies in a number of areas and countries are at least partly based on our ability to provide troops and military equipment, either currently or under certain future contingencies, the non-availability of such troops and equipment as a result of United States participation in Palestine peace enforcement might render these policies meaningless because incapable of military support.
At present, an extremely pertinent case in point is the Berlin situation, which in itself undeniably demands as a matter of military prudence not only every effort to hasten the strengthening of our military posture but also the husbanding of every military resource we now have.
It is thus apparent that the situation which now confronts the Joint Chiefs of Staff is one in which the ultimate extension of United States policy in the sequence of events it has already initiated through resolution of the Security Council will lead to two results: the introduction of U.S. forces and of Soviet or Soviet satellite forces into Palestine, either of which the Joint Chiefs of Staff again reaffirm would be seriously prejudicial to our national security.
[Page 1324]The Security Council resolution of 15 July, which involves consideration of the use of armed forces, is an accomplished fact. However, further United States support in subsequent steps, such as consummation of agreements under Article 43 and Article 106, would be necessary in arriving at a decision by the United Nations to use such forces. The United States is not now firmly committed to the provision of United States military forces to be used in support of the resolution, nor to acquiescence in the employment of any United Nations’ forces. Therefore, there exists no firm commitment on the part of the United States to provide armed forces.
In summation, it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it would be incompatible with the security interests of the United States to have either United States or Soviet or Soviet satellite forces introduced into Palestine. They therefore recommend that the United States policy neither endorse nor permit a decision by the United Nations to employ military enforcement measures in Palestine.1
- The National Security Council undertook preliminary discussion of Secretary Forrestal’s memorandum on August 19 and assigned to the Department of State responsibility for considering the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commenting on them at the next Council meeting (note of August 23 by the Executive Secretary of the Council, Admiral Sidney W. Souers, to the Council, NSC 27).↩