501.BB Palestine/8–948: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
3208. For the Ambassador. You will be interested to know in light of your 3590, August 9,1 that the Secretary on August 9 received Dr. Ralph Bunche, Personal Representative of UK SYG, who is No. 2 on Count Bernadotte’s team in Palestine.2 Bunche called for purpose of giving Secretary Bernadotte’s views as to immediate requirements of Mediator and his tentative notions as to long-range settlement of Palestine, problem.
Although Bernadotte would have preferred a regular UN armed guard for Jerusalem he suggested as alternative that corps of military observers supplied by Belgium, France and US be augmented by 300 [Page 1309] additional military observers, all of whom were to be enlisted men. Bernadotte desired these additional observers for duty in preserving strategic positions evacuated by Jews and Arabs by mutual agreement, such as Mt. Scopus, Victoria Augusta Hospital, and water pumping station at Latrun. The Secretary informed Bernadotte’s representative that although he could not speak for Defense establishment he saw no reason in principle why this govt could not supply its requested contingent of 125 enlisted men as military observers, it being understood that France would match this number and that Belgium would send 50 men to complete total. Secretary has now inquired of Forrestal if necessary contingent cannot promptly be sent to assist Bernadotte. You may tell Bevin that, although final decision has not been reached, Dept does not anticipate much difficulty in this regard and it is hoped that our share of additional enlisted observers will very promptly receive orders to proceed to Jerusalem.
As for long-range settlement, Bernadotte is not eager to offer suggestions until he is assured that US and UK govts are in agreement on general lines of an equitable settlement. Bernadotte of course realizes that Jews on one hand will make exorbitant demands and Arabs will refuse to countenance officially existence of Jewish State. Nevertheless Mediator is said to feel that if UK and US are in agreement and if these govts can reach a general line in accord with his views (upon which he does not insist), chances are that both Jews and Arabs, although violently protesting, may quietly move along lines of eventual settlement.
Bernadotte’s preliminary views are similar to those which we have informally discussed with Bevin through your auspices. Bernadotte thinks that Jews should be given valuable lands in western Galilee which they now hold by virtue of military conquest but in return for this acquisition should permit Arabs to take over most of Negev. As for Jerusalem, Bernadotte feels that UN organization contemplated by resolution of November 29, 1947, is not only cumbersome and troublesome but essentially unworkable. Rather, he visualizes Jerusalem under nominal Arab sovereignty but with local autonomy for the Jewish population and with an international commission appointed by the UN to receive possible complaints from the Jews or, for that matter, the Arab population. Although Bunche was not specific on this point he seemed to visualize Transjordan profiting largely by the arrangement with possible territorial compensation to Egypt in the lower part of the Negev.
The Secretary did not make any comment on Bernadotte’s territorial suggestions but, as you will have perceived from Deptel 3187, Aug. 12, these views, with the exception of Jerusalem (Cf. Par 9a Deptel 3187), are similar to those which have already been arrived at on working level in Dept. As you know, however, top clearance from [Page 1310] the White House has not yet been received at this stage in formulating opinions as to the most practical solution of the Palestine problem.3
We should be glad to have Bevin’s suggestions as to how—provided there is a meeting of the minds as between ourselves, UK and Bernadotte—a territorial solution can most profitably be arranged. We do not at this stage of our thinking feel that it would be useful for General Assembly to debate a possible frontier. Not only would such debate become surcharged with emotion and cross-currents of self-interest, but it would involve basic principle, which we endeavored to make clear in Austin’s speech of February 24, that recommendations of Assembly are not enforceable by UN agency. In a preliminary way we feel that if our two govts are in agreement Bernadotte might in his report to SC merely state what to him, on basis of facts and justice, seems to be most equitable frontier for Israel. If our two govts were in agreement a statement by Bevin and the Secretary supporting Bernadotte’s suggestion would have great weight. No additional action would be taken however and it would be left to diplomatic means to achieve an eventual agreement between Israel and Transjordan, later to be acquiesced in by other Arab states. Once this point were reached, blessing of UN would be easy.
It is important to emphasize to Bevin and others in FonOff that foregoing views are highly tentative and are given you in an endeavor to advance our mutual thinking on this problem with all possible swiftness.
For your own info we agree with Bevin that Palestine situation is serious, as he emphasized in conversation reported your 3567, Aug. 6, but feel that his references to Russian threats against Iraq are somewhat of the red herring variety. As for his notion of building up RAF munitions in Iraq and Transjordan, as reported in para. 8, your 3567, we feel that you should caution him to go very slowly. From this point of view danger of Britain appearing as military guarantor of Arabs against Jews, which would invoke popular outcry here for US to lift arms embargo in favor of Israel, is much greater than Bevin’s qualms over Soviet machinations against Iraq.
- Not printed.↩
- The remaining participants in the conversation were Andrew Cordier, Executive Assistant to Secretary-General Lie, Fraser Wilkins, and Robert MeClintock, the last of whom prepared the memorandum of conversation (501.BB Palestine/8–948).↩
- For further information on the conversation with Dr. Bunche on August 9, see telegram 634, August 24, to Stockholm, p. 1340.↩