Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/8–948: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup) to the Secretary of State

top secret
urgent

New York, August 9, 1948—1:30 p. m.

1003. We are becoming more and more concerned by reports from our missions abroad based on radio intercepts, etc. (see for example Haifa’s 293, July 31, Haifa’s 298, August 5, London’s, 3561, August 6,¹ Jerusalem’s 1177, August 7), indicating Israel becoming increasingly intransigent with regard to Jerusalem, Mediator, observers, the Truce Commission, fighting personnel and war material.

Heavily discounting probably prejudiced sources, there have been enough of these reports and from enough widely separated points to indicate at least some truth in what ordinarily might be put aside as rumor.

Basis for whatever truth there may be in these reports is probably a combination of (a) wholly natural and understandable desire of Israel to press present advantages as far as possible, and (b) pressure by the Irgun and other dissident elements in favor of extreme positions may be greater than we had imagined.

Appeasement of dissidents will not help Israel’s cause but quite the contrary.

If reports of intransigence are not true, then prompt action by PGI to disavow these reports is essential in their own interest and in the interest of peace in Palestine.

If on the contrary reports have any substantial basis of truth, then

in our judgment Israel may damage its own cause irreparably and the precarious peace in Palestine will be very difficult to maintain.

If the reports we are getting are true and if the PGI persists in the line indicated, we must envisage the possibility that Israel may be in the same position before the SC that the Arab states were in following the end of the first four week’s truce. This would be very embarrassing to us in terms of (a) our relations with Israel, (b) our relations with the Arab states, (c) our relations with the UK, and (d) our position in the SC and in the UN”.

In view of the seriousness of this problem and its implications we hesitate to take any action with PGI representatives here, however personal and informal, without instructions from the Department.

We feel, however, that some action is essential and we suggest that it be taken with Epstein in Washington along the following lines after prior clearance, we venture respectfully to suggest, with the White House:

(1) US is the best friend that Israel has or is likely to have for some time to come.

(2) As Israel’s best friend we feel they should know we have received a considerable number of reports from widely varied sources indicating an intransigent attitude with regard to: (see points above).

(3) If these reports are not true than prompt action by the PGI seems essential not only to disavow these reports but also to demonstrate by wholehearted cooperation with the Mediator, the Truce Commission, and the observers that the attitude of the PGI is in fact cooperative and peace loving.

(4) If there were any substantial degree of truth in these reports we would as Israel’s best friend be very much concerned from the viewpoint of (a) peace in Palestine and (b) Israel’s own future.

(5) The risk to peace is obvious.

(6) With regard to Israel’s own position the risks they run involve (a) a very thin margin of support for them in the SC (b) recognition by other states (c) membership in the UN”.

(7) On the question of membership we have informed them we would support them. This position is based on their constructive, cooperative, peace-loving attitude in connection with extending the truce. If the reports we have been getting since then are true and the attitude reflected is persisted in, we could scarcely avoid having to reconsider our position. Even if we continued to support Israel for membership it is very doubtful whether they could under the circumstances command the necessary number of votes either in the SC or in the GA.

(8) We hope therefore that the PGI is in a position to disavow categorically as rumors reports as to their hostile, uncooperative and even intransigent attitude.

(9) We hope further that the PGI will continue by positive acts of cooperation with the Mediator, his observers, the Truce Commission, etc., to maintain its reputation for cooperative and fair dealing in all matters relating to the demilitarization of Jerusalem, the maintenance of the truce including the importation of war materials and paragraphs 3 and 4 of the May 29 resolution concerning fighting personnel and men of military age, and the eventual settlement.

(10) We hope further that if dissident and extremist Jewish groups and individuals are responsible for any lack of cooperation that the PGI will deal firmly with them rather than yield to the temptations of expediency and appeasement.

Referring again to Haifa’s 293, and to various cables from our Military Attaché Damascus and other sources concerning the shipment of war materials to Israel and in some cases to the Arab countries, we feel strongly that in order to avoid being in a very weak position both ethically and politically that information of this character should be made available to the Mediator.

Jessup

1. None printed.