761.00/8–648: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
3567. 1. Bevin asked me to call late yesterday and spent one and half hours expounding deep concern of British Cabinet re security situation in the Middle East in general and Palestine in particular (Embassy’s 3545, August 51).
2. Bevin opened by saying that if we get out of our Berlin difficulties it will be because the USSR finds Western Europe too hard to tackle at this time. Past performance has shown that USSR when thwarted at one point soon transfers its attentions to another. Middle East is normally a “soft spot” from point of view of its social, economic and ethnic difficulties. Such groups as Kurds offer ready targets for Soviet activities. To this pattern has been added Palestine conflict which threatens joint US–UK strategic objectives in Middle East and [Page 1292] in which there is clear evidence that USSR is displaying keen interest. Evidence of last is supply of arms to Israel through Czechoslovakia, activities of Stern gang, and Menahem Beigin’s2 speech August 3 in Zion square Jerusalem, during which Beigin said that fighting underground will resist any international regime that attempts to wrest Jerusalem from Jewish control. Whatever political orientation may be, it would be naive to suppose USSR would refuse to take advantage of a personality such as Beigin and of the apparent determination on I the part of Jews generally not to let truce work.
3. Likely pattern for Soviets according to Bevin, would be to foster resumption fighting in Palestine. This would result in drawing more Iraqi troops into conflict there and thus create auspicious moment for USSR to arouse Kurds in Iraq and to increase activities Soviet agents in northern Iran. These steps might or might not be followed up by Soviet military action. But even without firing a shot Bevin thinks there is good chance that by such carefully timed activities USSR could achieve what US and UK least desire—chaos in Iraq and Iran.
4. British Intelligence reports made available to us indicate that Jews already have an appreciable airforce, are far better armed than the Arabs and British military estimate from this and cumulative effect of aggressive Jewish declarations that it is not unlikely that “within the next few days” Jews on grounds of some Arab provocation, real or manufactured, will reopen their offensive with the objective of seizing more territory. Jewish offensive at this time stands every chance of success because arms embargo has prevented Arab Legion from replenishing its munitions. Bevin thinks it likely Jews may be so ill-advised as to attack Transjordan. If so, Bevin said, Britain’s treaty ‘obligation to Transjordan is unequivocal and would have to be honored.
5. Bevin said that Palestine situation is just as serious as Berlin and that in Palestine also “if US and UK go slack, we lose”.
6. First of measure which Bevin believes desirable is agreement with US on road ahead in Palestine. He hoped fervently that USG would agree to British proposals set forth in my 3484, August 2. He feels situation has deteriorated rapidly even in past week and he now hopes Mediator will make his final proposals in very near future. He still believes Mediator should know views of US and UK before publishing his proposals. (I told Bevin that I understood Department is formulating reply to my 34843 on an urgent basis.)
7. Bevin said there were other urgent steps which he felt should be taken. One might be strong warning to PGI by USG with regard to effect on world public opinion of Jewish impediments placed in way of Mediator’s work: Effect of outright Jewish aggression would be even more grave. He thought that United States Government might [Page 1293] wish to request Mediator for an appreciation of present Jewish intentions. He thought that in larger picture there is very little reality in disavowals by PGI of IZL and Stern activities. From point of view of Arabs and ME peace they were Jews with same objectives, only difference being that one group is more activist than the other.
8. Bevin said he wished me to put to Department in accord with our understanding that US and UK will consult each other, the pressing problem of measures for the defense of British RAF installations in both Iraq and Transjordan. Jews have already bombed Amman and British military feel that if fighting is resumed British installations in Transjordan will be liable to attack. This danger also exists in Iraq but in this instance attacks are more likely to take form of 1941 troubles4: Following defeats suffered by Iraqi Army in Palestine, for which UK is certain to be assigned blame, the Iraqis will attack RAF. British installations must be ready for use in event Soviet move from north. Bevin said that up to present these installations have been armed and equipped on a “training” as opposed to an “operational” basis. British Chiefs of Staff feel strongly there is urgent need to bring in ammunition and equipment for storage in these installations. His Majesty’s Government has no intention to transfer these stores to Arabs for use in Palestine unless Transjordan territory is threatened with attack and to obviate charges of this kind His Majesty’s Government would welcome observation by Mediator. At all times munitions would be guarded by regular British RAF units. Bevin would like it clearly understood, however, that in event Transjordan is threatened with attack His Majesty’s Government must be free to release to Arab Legion, which is responsible for guarding British installations, munitions and stores from these dumps to repel aggression. In Iraq Bevin would wish to be free to make stores available to Iraqi units only in event of their being engaged in suppressing internal disorders. Here again stores could be subject to Mediator’s supervision. If, as Bevin strongly hopes, United States Government will agree that providing for defense of British installations in Transjordan and Iraq is reasonable in the light of possible Soviet moves in the area, Bevin has in mind informing Mediator of British intention to move in munitions for defense of British installations under Mediator’s supervision.
9. Last mentioned, but in view of His Majesty’s Government most serious of all problems facing US and UK in ME is, according to Bevin, situation in Jerusalem (Embassy’s 3527, August 5 [4]5). Bevin [Page 1294] said His Majesty’s Government favors strong demilitarization and internationalization of Jerusalem. Judging from recent Israeli statements Jews seem determined that neither shall take place and Jewish purpose is strengthened by failure of Mediator to receive French, Belgian and US guards for which he has asked so urgently. I need not go into Bevin’s description of situation in Jerusalem since it is identical in substance with that of Consul General Macdonald as repeated to me in Department’s 3055, August 36 and in his 1157, August 4 to Department. Bevin said he understood United States Government is unwilling to supply men for Bernadotte’s guards even though US attitude in this regard probably would be decisive in formulation of Belgian and French attitudes. He asked what United States Government now proposes in the circumstances, since all evidence indicates that earlier US proposals re cooperation of well-disciplined units of Arabs and Jews is impracticable.
10. I spoke along lines Department’s 3049 and 3055, August 3. Bevin expressed view that supplying guards to Bernadotte would not require special SC action but would be “cooperation with the Mediator,” as indicated in paragraph 5, July 15 SC resolution and instruction to Truce Commission in immediately following paragraph. He did not deal with Department’s other points, but said simply, “well, what can we do now?”
11. I promised to put his thinking (and I have never seen him in a more solemn—not petulant—mood) to the Department and to seek its views re foregoing on an urgent basis.
12. Re Bernadotte’s guards, whose presence as UN instrument seems likely to be restraining influence on both sides, it occurs to me that Department should consider proposing that if French and Belgian Governments will supply contingents for guard duties United States Government will undertake to transport men from France and Belgium to Palestine, and to supply vehicles, communications equipment, medical facilities, maintenance men, et cetera, in Palestine. On this basis there would be handful of non-combatant US uniformed personnel in guarded area as token force which would give proof of US cooperation with Mediator without risking possibility US personnel would shoot either Jews or Arabs and with reduced likelihood of our men being targets. If internationalization and demilitarization of Jerusalem is really at stake, as I understand it is, it seems to me that we might consider seriously something approximating the suggestion which I have just outlined.
- Not printed.↩
- Leader of the Irgun Zvai Leumi.↩
- Dated August 2, p. 1266.↩
- For documentation on the anti-British coup in Iraq in 1941, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iii, pp. 486 ff.↩
- Not printed; it gave the view of Mr. Burrows, then acting for Mr. Wright in charge of Palestinian affairs for the British Foreign Office, that the situation was if anything possibly more dangerous than that described in Jerusalem’s telegrams 1146 and 1147, August 1, pp. 1264 and 1265 (501.BB Palestine/8–448).↩
- This was a repeat of No. 793 to Jerusalem, p. 1275.↩