Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/8–348

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

confidential

[Washington,] August 3, 1948.

Participants:	The Secretary
	Dr. Naji al-Asil, Iraqi Representative to the UN
	Mr. Ahmed Mohammed, Chargé d’Affaires of Iraq
	Mr. Satterthwaite, Director of NEA

After a preliminary exchange of courtesies concerning Dr. Asil’s pending departure for Baghdad, and some conversation on other subjects, the question of Iraq’s continued active participation in the United Nations and its support of Count Bernadotte in both his mediation and truce efforts were discussed. Mr. Satterthwaite remarked that he had already expressed to Dr. Asil the earnest hope that Iraq would not fail to continue to play an active role in the United Nations, since, however bitterly it might feel about Palestine, Iraq had many other interests in which the UN could be helpful to it. He also hoped that Iraq, in the interest of the peace and security of the Near East, would strongly support Count Bernadotte. He had also assured Dr. Asil of the continuing interest of the United States in the welfare of Iraq.

I said that I wished, in supplementing Mr. Satterthwaite’s remarks, to emphasize the great importance which the United States attaches to the UN. The UN was the only real hope we had of maintaining peace in the world. If it failed the world would be faced with an indescribably difficult situation. The UN had as yet not had a fair chance to get started. In my opinion it might be as long as 25 years before it had really developed its greatest usefulness. In spite of reports to the contrary, the United States had never failed to refer to the UN any problem which it was capable of handling.

While recognizing the deep and even bitter feeling felt by the Arab States over the situation in Palestine and the extremely complicated and perhaps insoluble nature of that problem, I asked Dr. Asil to consider the many other important problems confronting the UN in addition to the over-riding one of the conflict between the East and the West as exemplified by recent developments in Berlin. If this latter conflict were not solved, the problem of Palestine for the Arab States would become relatively insignificant.

I also mentioned the immense burdens imposed on the United States which no other nation seemed either willing or to be expected to bear. It was, to take a single example, costing us one billion dollars a year to try to get Japan back on its feet. I nevertheless hoped that the United States could be of assistance to Iraq and the Near Eastern countries in the development of such government projects as that of the Tigris Valley, which we discussed at some length. I also expressed the belief that Congress, possibly in this session, but more probably in the next, would so amend the Act permitting the entrance into the United States of displaced persons that some of the pressure for immigration into Palestine would be removed.

Dr. Asil said that he was in full agreement concerning the importance that should be attached to making a success of the UN. He also felt very strongly that Iraq should give the UN its full support and would so inform his Government.

Referring to the Palestine problem, Dr. Asil discussed various phases of its development since the first World War. By inference, he criticized the Arab States for having on two occasions failed to reach a satisfactory solution, the first time because the Arabs of Palestine refused to accept a proposal made by King Faisal a few years after the first World War and the second time over a question of sixty or seventy-five thousand immigrants at the Round Table Conference of 1939. Dr. Asil said, however, that the Arab States felt very strongly that at some point the Jews must be told by the United States or the United Nations that, with respect to Palestine, they could go so far and no further. It would otherwise be impossible for them ever to reach an agreement. He had the feeling that so far only the Arabs had been told that they could go so far and no further.

I told Dr. al-Asil that we would carefully analyze the points that he had made and see if we might be able to comply with his suggestion. The interview, which was exceptionally cordial considering the nature of the main topic of conversation, lasted fifty-five minutes.

1. Drafted by Mr. Satterthwaite.