Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/8–248: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret

London, August 2, 1948—2 p. m.

3484. 1. Bevin and Wright have mentioned to me several times recently that British views re road ahead on Palestine in best interests world peace and future UN were being developed in Foreign Office for early discussion with USG through this particular telegraphic channel. They indicated their hope that by clearing ideas beforehand, US and UK will be able to work together in bringing about a definite and lasting solution of Palestine problem.

2. The broad outlines of British thinking have now been conveyed to me personally and at my suggestion, with which Bevin agreed, the details have been filled in at the operating level. Lest there be distortions through reporting errors, this message through paragraph 14, has been cleared textually by Wright who asserts that it is an accurate presentation of provisional thoughts of HMG as developed by Bevin and Foreign Office.

3. Notwithstanding the passions aroused in Palestine the presence there of the British gave Palestine problem a comparatively static quality on world scene. Last November the UNGA delegates were confronted by a single entity known as Palestine. After May 15 however, Palestine entered the dynamic phase of Arab-Jewish fighting at end of which Palestine picture has altered radically in that

(a). UNGA resolution of May 14 relieved UN commission of its task of implementing November 29 resolution and appointed a Mediator to seek a peaceful solution without laying down on what lines he should act;

(b). The Jewish state is well-established behind its line-of-force frontier;

(c). The Arabs are establishing authorities on their side of line;

(d). Jewish immigration has taken place on a considerable scale;

(e). Jewish forces have convinced Arabs that Jews cannot be driven into the sea;

(f). Establishment of Jewish state has resulted in about 250,000 Arabs fleeing from their homes in Jewish territory;

(g). Oil resources of Europe are threatened gravely by stoppage Haifa refinery;

(h). SC and UK are confronted with bitter Arab resentment against the West heightened by circumstances in which SC imposed present truce;

(i). Jewish military successes have increased in Arab eyes likelihood that Jews will not respect any frontier laid down for Jewish state.

4. Uneasy as present truce may be, present Arab-Jewish frontier has dramatic reality in that neither side can be dislodged from its present position without fighting. The British at one time entertained ideas of a Jewish national home very different from the functioning state of Israel, and we, too, have entertained at different times different ideas. However, in British view new facts (paragraph 3 above) must be faced as facts and taken into account in formulating a realistic new approach by all parties concerned: the Arabs, the Jews, the US, and UK and especially UN. Provisional British thinking re this new realistic approach, on which they hope for an early expression of US views, is as follows:

5. HMG believes best solution Palestine problem in circumstances would be one along lines Mediator’s previous proposals minus idea of union between two states (see paragraph 16 below) and including some form international responsibility for Jerusalem by which Jerusalem possibly, but not necessarily, might be placed under Arab sovereignty. As British see it, such a solution would mean an independent sovereign state of Israel, providing most, if not all, of Galilee and an Arab territory (including Negev), the political future of which would be left to the Arabs. Haifa would be either a free port or under some form of international responsibility. Future of Jaffa would have to be determined. Arab-Jewish frontier would be subject to some form of international guarantee to reassure both sides. (In this specific connection British think best course would be for Mediator to recommend that UN should lay down that frontier could only be changed by UN and that any attempt to do so otherwise would be a breach of the peace.) Among other factors which British think might be involved are:

(a). Solution of problem Jewish DP’s in Europe and Arab DP’s in ME;

(b). Some equation of outside economic help so that neighboring Arab states will not become depressed areas dangerous both from point of view of Communism and economic well-being of Israel.

6. HMG gravely doubts that either Arabs or Jews will accept for some time to come a settlement on these lines and believes it would be more rational for US and UK to work in the immediate future, as they did in case of truce, on problem of securing Arab and Jewish acquiescence to such a settlement: If need be, this settlement might have to be enforced, as truce was by UN.

7. If Mediator is successful in securing agreement both sides to any set of proposals no problem will, of course, exist, but HMG does not believe this will happen and that when Mediator, towards end of August, presents to Arabs and Jews a set of modified proposals, the second set will likewise be rejected. When this happens, HMG believes that Mediator will find it necessary to refer matter to UN (either UNGA or SC).

8. Foreign Office has given much thought to character of resolution upon which UN might act. Resolution might be either positive (thus attempting to settle question once for all), or provisional, designed to smooth way for a more positive resolution later upon which UN body might act at some future time. Embassy’s immediately following telegram contains outline working paper prepared by Foreign Office to clarify its own thinking re possible provisional resolution.

9. Advantages of positive resolution are:

(a). It would remove possibility of further dispute over location frontier;

(b). UN guarantees of frontier could come into force at once;

(c). It would obviate either side jockeying to improve its position.

Disadvantage of positive resolution is that Arab leaders would find it extremely hard in face Arab public opinion to give explicit recognition now in existence of Jewish state. Leaders would probably be unwilling to risk recommending this, and the result might be renewal of fighting by Arabs or at least serious internal instability in Arab countries. A provisional resolution, on other hand, would face dangers for Arabs but Arab leaders might prefer it for internal reasons. If so, their choice re form of¹ resolution should probably be adopted (see paragraph 14 below).

10. British Government is most anxious to keep in step with US on this question and visualizes that optimum US–UK cooperation in achieving final settlement along above lines might embrace the following:

(a). Once US and UK can agree that new hand has been dealt in Palestine and that cards now available must be played to secure lasting settlement, US and UK might make clear to Mediator either in ME or during his Swedish visit the similarity of their view re settlement along line his earlier proposals (see paragraph 5). This information might be extremely useful when he begins serious work with two parties again.

(b). US and UK at same time could urge Mediator to produce map showing clearly the line-of-force which existed at the time [end of fighting?] because this line, with such minor modifications as might be agreed by parties, would be that which both sides must continue to respect. In case of positive resolution line would be frontier between Jewish state and Arab area.

(c). US and UK could attend UN with an agreed view as to the resolution which should go before UN on basis Mediator’s new report and new proposals. If US and UK could agree to work together re resolution HMG believes there would be so much support forthcoming for a Palestine settlement endorsed by both US and UK and which at same time would reinforce prestige UN that agreed resolution (either in positive or provisional form—see paragraph 5) would pass with ease.

11. Above represents [Foreign Office?] views re optimum US–UK cooperations. Foreign Office is aware of special difficulties with which USG may be faced in next few months and if US cannot for various reasons undertake to advocate openly the imposition by UN of the “lines-of-force” in Palestine as the basis for a reasonable and workable settlement, at [least?] British would hope that USR [ USG?] would not oppose a British resolution to this effect and above all that USR [ USG?] would not stimulate opposition of other states to such a resolution.

12. Essence of problem is that British believe that neither US nor UK can ignore developments in Palestine since November 29 and they would like us to join with them in efforts to get UN to finalize as a reasonable and workable solution the de facto frontier in Palestine which has emerged out of fighting. British feel US–UK cooperation is vital to the success of such an effort not only for purpose of effective UN action but also because a divergence between US and UK at this juncture before a UN forum would intensify the essence of Palestine problem itself. They believe that if USG should elect to stand firmly upon November 29 partition plan (upon acceptability of which [there?] is vast doubt) and if USG should ignore actual partition which has taken place in Palestine, this would encourage Jews to make territorial demands beyond areas which are under their control at present and which in circumstances can be enlarged only by renewed fighting. By same token, divergence between US and UK would encourage Arabs to believe that by being more intransigent they can induce UK to secure for them a more favorable territorial settlement by getting UN to eject Jews from at least part of territory now under PGI control. British desire that US and UK should attend UN not as champions of either Jews or Arabs; they would like to see us appear as great states whose joint interest is achievement of a workable and permanent settlement of Palestine problem. HMG cold-shouldered Arabs in order to secure their acquiescence to truce and HMG is prepared to this again to secure Arab acquiescence to de facto situation in Palestine (see paragraph 13) provided USG for its part is willing to base its own policy in UN on realities and if necessary, cold-shoulder the Jews.

13. Task of HMG is bringing about Arab acquiescence is delicate and difficult now because Arab bitterness against West is already deep and imposition upon Arabs of Jewish state, which they have committed themselves never to accept, will intensify this bitterness. In British view this feeling can be minimized only by giving Arabs at same time some concrete evidence of western understanding of their position by such measures as UN aid in solving Arab DP problem; special guarantee that Jews will not be allowed within a few years to enlarge their state or Arabs enlarge their state, economic aid for Arabs, etc. In absence such steps British consider that revulsion Arab feeling against West would facilitate spread Soviet influence and at very least would mean that US and UK could not count on Arab cooperation in connection with their strategic requirements.

14. Evidence of British preoccupation with ways and means to achieve Arab acquiescence to Jewish state without risk internal disorders in Arab states, loss British military facilities and loss for indefinite period of some if not all ME oil, in fact that in connection with resolution (paragraph 8 above) British Government would wish to take Arab leaders into their confidence at an early stage and privately consult them as to whether Arabs would acquiesce more readily to a positive or to a provisional resolution.

15. [garble] with proposals [omission] that only recommendation which I feel qualified to make at present is that proposals, which are logical development of my meeting with the British Defence Council reported my 2267, May 25, deserve most thoughtful consideration of our government.

16. I feel, however, that I should supply the following footnotes:

(a). Re paragraph 5 suggest[ion] that union should be dropped from [Bernadotte?] proposals [garble] made by Foreign Office with the object of making these proposals more acceptable in the immediate future. Foreign Office does not intend thereby that possibility future cooperation should be excluded. On contrary, Foreign Office shares my views that there will have to be close economic relations between all parts Palestine in interest of their economic survival.

(b). Re idea of exchanging western Galilee for Negev it seems to me that compulsion sometimes offers a firmer basis for a workable peaceful settlement than theoretical plans.

(c). If we accept British proposals we should be prepared in the immediate future to witness a number of pro-Arab British gestures designed to raise almost non-existent stock of British influence with Arabs so that when time comes [apparent omission] pressure to be applied again to Arabs [garble] resolution HMG will have some measure of Arab confidence to work upon.

17. It is only stating the problem when I say that [garble] is the maintenance of UN as an organism equipped to cope with realities; the tranquillity of ME so deeply involved in US–UK strategic requirements (including oil), and the US desire to see Israel, untainted by the corrosive poison of irredentism which has destroyed so many [garble] states flourish at peace with its neighbors as a responsible member of community of nations.

Douglas

1. The source text indicates a garbled group of letters at this point.