501.BB Palestine/7–2148: Telegram
The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup) to the Secretary of State
secret
us urgent
us urgent
New York, July 21,
1948—6:50 p. m.
932. Reference unnumbered from Navy Department dated July 20 (CTF 167 to SecState1) transmitting text of message to Secretary from Bernadotte requesting temporary assignment of Marines for duty in Jerusalem. We suggest Department consider following points in preparing reply:
- 1.
- We consider public opinion reaction in US would be adverse to assignment our service personnel for guard duty in Palestine.
- 2.
- Adverse public opinion reaction would be strengthened if any of this personnel were injured or killed.
- 3.
- We consider psychological reaction of Arabs in their present attitude towards US would be adverse.
- 4.
- Proposed action would strengthen Soviet propaganda case against US participation in truce supervision.
- 5.
- We have repeatedly pointed out orally to Secretariat officers at all levels, and formally in our letter of June 29 (to Lie) (Ref. Deptel 436, June 28) (copy sent McClintock June 29) that US is not in a position to second American forces for UN guard duty nor to recruit American citizens for such duty. In same formal communication and orally before and since that date, we have urged Secretariat to do their own recruiting for UN guard force in Palestine. I took specifically same line with Bernadotte at lunch last Friday.
- 6.
- Persistence of idea that US armed forces be supplied suggests that Bernadotte or members his staff may be persisting in idea that show of force is necessary to impress Arabs and Jews and that such show of force would be more effective if carried out by armed personnel of major powers. Department will recall Bundle’s repeated urging of a naval demonstration. Show of force idea has been a recurrent one for long time past.
- 7.
- Perhaps a minor point is apparent desire of Bernadotte to develop new channel of communication direct with Secretary. This is presumably not likely to result in any real confusion within US Government, although we should be careful that Bernadotte does not get impression that he can get more favorable attention this way. On other hand, confusion may well result if we are getting some requests direct from Bernadotte and others through Secretariat. In our view there should be single channel of communication and it may well be that most effective cooperation could be brought about by direct communication [Page 1236] between Bernadotte’s headquarters and Washington if communications facility are now adequate for this purpose.
Jessup