Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/7–2148

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)¹

secret

[Washington,] July 21, 1948.

Participants:	Mr. James G. McDonald—Special Representative of the United States of America
	Mr. Lovett—U
	Mr. Wilkins—NE

Mr. McDonald called on me this afternoon prior to his departure from New York on July 23 for London on his way to Tel Aviv.

Mr. McDonald said that he had called on General Bradley,² Secretary Forrestal, Mr. Royall,³ Mr. Symington,⁴ Mr. Clifford and the President this morning to pay his respects and to say goodbye.

Mr. McDonald said that Secretary Forrestal had instructed the Secretaries of Navy, Army and Air Force to take immediate action on his request for service attaches for Tel Aviv. Mr. McDonald said he wanted good men to report on military matters in Israel as he himself was a novice at such affairs.

Mr. McDonald said that he had not discussed the question of de jure recognition with the President but that the President’s advisers seemed to be of the opinion that the United States could give de jure recognition to the de facto Government of Israel. Mr. McDonald explained that he had not studied this question of international law since his early days as a student and that, as a result, he was somewhat confused.

I replied that the United States had recognized the Provisional Government of Israel as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel. I pointed out that this action constituted recognition of the State completely and fully and de facto recognition of the Provisional Government. I added that de jure recognition of a government of Israel as opposed to a provisional government of Israel could normally be expected to follow the holding of elections for such government. Any other course might result in a demand for immediate recognition by any junta or group seizing power by force or by some other unconstitutional means. I also referred to the present character of the Provisional Government of Israel and pointed out Ben Gurion’s presently successful efforts to maintain control. I noted, however, that the Irgun and the Stern gang were still active in Palestine and stressed the fact that premature de jure recognition of the Provisional Government of Israel might, unless we were satisfied as to its stability, place the United States Government in the position of having relations with a government under Soviet influence.

I informed Mr. McDonald that although we were unable to obtain Marine guards for Tel Aviv we had been able to obtain a group of highly qualified consular guards from other Departments of the Government such as ex-servicemen, ex-FBI men and CIA men. Mr. McDonald said he appreciated our arranging for a guard and, in this connection, expressed concern for the safety of Mr. Stanton Griffis, the new American Ambassador to Egypt, and for the safety of the personnel at the American Embassy in Cairo. I asked Mr. Wilkins to inquire what action the Department was taking in this respect and to follow through on it.

Mr. McDonald showed me a copy of the President’s letter of July 21, 1948 to him which read as follows:

“In wishing you Godspeed in your important mission I am well aware of the difficulties in making effective our policy aimed at the peaceful settlement of differences among the nations of the Near East and cooperation among them.

“Success of your efforts will depend largely on teamwork and alertness of all persons concerned with this problem both here and abroad and upon hearty collaboration with you. In addition to your regular reports to the Department of State, I shall expect you to keep me personally informed on such matters as relate to the arms embargo, the appropriate time for full recognition, and the types of assistance as may be required by and can properly be granted to the new state.

“Let me assure you that you have my fullest confidence and support.”

Mr. McDonald referred to Count Bernadotte’s recent mediation proposals in which it had been suggested that the City of Jerusalem and its environs be placed under Arab control. Mr. McDonald asked me what the Department’s policy was in this respect. I told him that it was possible that Count Bernadotte had made this suggestion for bargaining purposes and that, in any event, the United States had consistently supported the internationalization of Jerusalem as was evidenced by our stand in the General Assembly in the fall of 1947, by our position as expressed during the Special Session in the Spring of 1947 and by the attitude which we had adopted on the French proposals in the Security Council in the Spring of 1948. I asked Mr. Wilkins to supply Mr. McDonald with the various papers in this respect.

I told Mr. McDonald that I had no specific instructions to give him at this time with regard to American policy toward Palestine but that we would inform him of developments as they took place in the future. I added, however, that I would appreciate his informing the Department of the manner in which the United States Military Observers attached to Count Bernadotte performed their functions. I told Mr. McDonald that it appeared that the activities of the American-French-Belgian Military Observers during the four-week truce under the Resolution of May 29 appeared to have been somewhat disorganized but expressed the hope that the Military Observers under the new truce would be able to function more effectively than they had on the previous occasion.⁵

1. Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.
2. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff, United States Army.
3. Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army.
4. W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force.
5. For Mr. McDonald’s account of his conversation with Secretary Marshall on July 21, see his My Mission in Israel, 1948–1951 (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1951), p. 7.