Office of the Historian

501.BB Palestine/7–1548

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

[Washington,1] July 15, 1948.

There is less support for the Syrian resolution2 in the Security Council than we first supposed. Syria, China, Belgium and Colombia [Page 1223] will probably vote for it. Canada, France, Argentina, U.S.S.R., and the Ukraine are expected to abstain. The United Kingdom is definitely cool toward the resolution; the United Kingdom Foreign Office had given the UK Delegation preliminary permission to vote for the motion, but now is thinking it over again. USUN estimate is that if the United States not only votes for the motion but strongly supports it in debate, it might pass. United States abstention would let motion die with four or five votes.

Jessup, Ross and I have gone over various alternatives at some length. We agree that it would be unfortunate to allow this issue to become magnified beyond its real merits. Israel Representatives are bitterly opposed on grounds there is nothing to adjudicate and Israel has no guarantee that it can even be heard at present as a party before the Court under the proposed action. Further, Israel believes that if matter goes to Court, this fact would be used by the Arabs to postpone settlement and by other states to delay recognition. Another factor is general view among Security Council delegations that this motion is diversionary in intent and cannot be considered as a bonafide effort to use the Court to move closer to a final settlement.

Jessup and I are concerned about denying a party to a dispute its proper day in Court. Nevertheless, the Court statute provides ways and means for parties to adjudicate certain types of questions. In this case, the Arabs have shown no inclination to settle the Palestine question by adjudication. In any event, direct issue between the parties goes to Court on basis of consent of parties, lacking in this instance. We have no assurance Arab League would accept opinion of Court if it favored Israel.

In present situation Security Council is dealing with threat to peace and is seeking to bring an end to present hostilities. Answer to question posed by Syrian motion is not required for that purpose. That question concerns the substance of the political issues which were before the General Assembly. The General Assembly chose to try to deal with such issues through recommendation and mediation. Our position might be, therefore, that the Security Council should not interfere with approach decided by the General Assembly unless it should become necessary to maintain international peace, which is not the case at this time.

I recommend that we abstain, either with no statement at all or with very short statement based on above line. If the United Kingdom decides to support motion, we may have to reconsider in light of need to maintain common US–UK line. Neither Jessup nor I is entirely satisfied with recommended position but we are unable to propose a more satisfactory course in light of all the factors.3

  1. A marginal notation indicates that this memorandum was telephoned from New York at 8:50 a. m., July 15.↩
  2. Regarding this draft resolution, see editorial note, p. 1215.↩
  3. Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: “Talked with Clifford 10 a. m. 7/15. ‘He agrees abstain. We should not support motion under any circumstances since he feels it is a device and a tricky one at that.’ Do not use veto as this involves ‘pacific settlement’.”

    The amended Syrian draft resolution (see SC, 3rd yr., No. 98, p. 33) came to a vote of the Security Council on July 27. The United Kingdom and five others voted for the measure; the United States, the Soviet Union, and two others abstained; and the Ukraine was recorded in opposition. The resolution was not adopted, having failed to attain the required seven affirmative votes (ibid., p. 34).

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