501.BB Palestine/7–348: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret   us urgent
niact

2964. Wright said July 3 Foreign Office submits for Department’s consideration and comments following as suitable advice for HMG to give Abdullah of Transjordan in response to his request (Embassy’s 2959, July 21)

2. Abdullah should realize that he must acquiesce to the existence of a sovereign Jewish state as a permanent entity in Palestine. He should realize that it is impossible to get rid of this state by fighting and that resumption of conflict as far as Arabs are concerned is likely to weaken the negotiating position which Arabs now enjoy.

3. Abdullah should realize also that if the Jews agree to continue negotiations with Mediator and Arabs do not, the Arabs will lay themselves open to sanctions under Chapter 7.

4. In view of circumstances described in paragraphs two and three above, HMG strongly recommends that Abdullah use his influence in Arab League to continue both the negotiations and the truce. The King would be given discretion to quote HMG if he so desired.

5. Foreign Office suggests that this advice should stand without specific reference to the nature of the Mediator’s proposals of which HMG has not seen full text, and upon which, consequently, cannot comment.

6. Wright said HMG is most anxious to keep USG fully informed and to receive US comments but he realizes the Monday is a holiday US. Since USG and HMG are already agreed (Department’s 2348, June 22) that it is imperative that truce should be continued Wright said he thought HMG would be safe in conveying foregoing advice to Abdullah solely as that of HMG even in advance of receiving US comments. He wishes, however, to give Department an opportunity of commenting and unless events make earlier action necessary, Foreign Office will not telegraph Amman before Monday July 5.

7. Wright said he wished to place before the Department another question of equal urgency: so far as HMG knows, Mediator is still awaiting replies from parties and has not specifically proposed extension of truce. There is no way of knowing when Mediator will report to SC, as it is possible that this might be done so late that [Page 1190] truce would end without time for SC action re extension if that should be necessary. Consequently, Wright urgently desires views USG (which will also be sought through Cadogan) re convening SC on July 6 or 7 with a view to taking any steps necessary to assure continuance of truce in the event Mediator (a) fails to secure agreement to his proposals and (b) fails himself to secure an extension of the truce by agreement. Wright visualizes several ways which this could be done: One might be SC sending instructions to Mediator for use in eventualities named above, to call formally upon both Arabs and Jews in the name of SC to extend the truce for one month irrespective status Mediator’s proposals and prospects for negotiations.

8. Please advise Department’s views urgently.2

Douglas
  1. Not printed; it reported a conversation between King Abdullah and Sir William Mack, British Ambassador in Iraq, in which the former made known his views that the Mediator’s proposals were totally unacceptable to Transjordan since they involved diminution of her sovereignty. The Ambassador urged the King not to make a hasty decision. The King agreed, expressing the hope that the British Government would furnish him with good advice (501.BB Palestine/7–348).
  2. The Department, in reply on July 4, stated that “action by HMG along lines paras 2–6 urtel 2964 July 3 would be most helpful. Regarding para 7, Dept is anxious to obtain extension of truce (Deptel 2552) and tentatively believes SC extension of May 29 resolution will be required.” (Telegram 2557, 501.BB Palestine/7–348) For No. 2552, July 3, see p. 1186.